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ABSTRACT
When inclement weather reduces the arrival capacity of a busy metropolitan airport, it
may lead to significant airborne delays. Delaying aircraft in the air consumes additional
fuel, increases overall air traffic congestion, and may lead to costly flight diversions. As
a result, during periods of inclement weather, the FAA may implement a Ground Delay
Program (GDP) to proactively delay flights on the ground before they depart and reduce
the possibility of future airborne delays. However, in order to assign ground delays to
flights, a GDP must be implemented before they depart, at a time when the future airport
arrival capacity may be uncertain.
This dissertation discusses two analyses in regards to the design of a GDP. The first
analysis proposes a model that solves for the optimal assignment of ground delay to
aircraft for a stochastic and dynamic forecast of the airport arrival capacity, with non-
linear delay cost functions, and a capacity of the airborne arrival queue. This model is
applied to several hypothetical examples and, in comparison to prior models from the
literature, identifies solutions with a lower total expected cost, a smaller maximum
observed arrival queue, or both.
The second analysis compares the salience, or importance, of various stakeholder groups
to their roles in the design of a GDP in practice. Passengers, in particular, are shown to
be an important, but under-represented stakeholder group. A second model is proposed
that solves for an assignment of ground delay that minimizes the total passenger delay
cost. A comparison of these results to those of the first model show that the total cost of
delays to passengers could be reduced by more than 30% if the FAA were to directly
consider the cost of delays to passengers during the design of a GDP.
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Introduction
The air transportation industry in the United States has grown significantly in the
past 20 years. Deregulation of commercial air services, changes in the business
environment, and new materials and manufacturing technologies have led to a greater
number and variety of aircraft in the skies than ever before, from the proliferation of
small corporate air taxi services to the use of the much-publicized Airbus A-380. As the
industry has grown, so has the use of the nation's airspace, such that the scheduled
demand for the use of various air routes and runways may meet or exceed the planned
capacity and, therefore, result in significant delays to aircraft, crews, and passengers.
One of the responsibilities of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA') is the
management of the flow of air traffic through the National Airspace System (NAS). In
cases where excess demand is a chronic condition, such as at busy metropolitan airports
in New York and Chicago, the FAA may reduce demand by placing limits on the number
of scheduled flight operations, or increase capacity by redesigning the airspace or
working with airports to build additional runways. However, for situations in which the
excessive demand is unplanned, such as when inclement weather reduces the capacity of
a sector or airport, it may not be possible to increase the capacity of the system. In these
cases, the FAA may implement various air traffic flow management (ATFM) techniques
to reroute or delay flights in the air or on the ground.
'A list of acronyms is provided in the appendix
Chapter 1
Inclement weather is of particular concern because it can result in substantial
delay costs. Not only may weather-related reductions in NAS capacity be significant, but
the timing and severity of the decrease may also be subject to uncertainty. Busy
metropolitan airports are especially prone to weather-related delays and congestion,
where poor weather, such as changes in wind speed and direction, visibility, and
precipitation, can reduce the airport arrival capacity by one-half, or more. Furthermore,
as there may be limited buffer capacity during nominal operating conditions, a temporary
reduction in the arrival capacity of one airport may lead to delays throughout the system
that persist for hours.
To mitigate the congestion and other costs of delays due to insufficient arrival
capacity at an airport, the FAA may implement a Ground Delay Program, or GDP. The
objective of a GDP is to avoid extensive airborne delay by proactively delaying flights on
the ground before they depart. Ground delay is preferable to airborne delay because
delays on the ground may avoid the excess fuel consumption, flight diversions, and
overall air traffic congestion that are associated with airborne delays. However, in order
to assign ground delays, a GDP must be initiated before flights depart, at which time the
future capacity of the destination airport may be uncertain.
This uncertainty presents a key tradeoff for the design of a GDP. The earlier that
a GDP is initiated, the more flights that are eligible to receive ground delay, but the
greater the uncertainty in the arrival capacity of the airport (Figure 1-1). If a program is
initiated before the airport arrival capacity is known, then there is a risk that it may assign
more ground delay than is necessary to offset the actual reduction in arrival capacity.
This additional, or unrecoverable, ground delay not only has a direct cost, but may also
result in a cascade of delays throughout the day, as the aircraft to which it assigns ground
delay may have little buffer in their daily flight schedules.
On the other hand, if too little ground delay is assigned, or if the implementation
of a GDP is postponed until more information is available, extensive airborne delays may
result. Airborne delays may be very costly because, as aircraft run low on fuel, they may
divert to an alternate airports. International and long distance flights are particularly
susceptible because they may not carry sufficient fuel to endure an airborne delay of
more than a few minutes. Furthermore, airborne delays can result in air traffic
congestion, with may result in delays for flights that are flying to other, unconstrained
airports.
Figure 1-1 The tradeoff between control and information over time
Information
Quantity Precision Accuracy
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Ground Delay
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This dissertation is motivated by the question of how to assign ground delays in
order to minimize the costs due to a weather-related reduction in the arrival capacity of
an airport. The question may be characterized by three key qualities of the problem.
First, decisions must often be made as based upon uncertain forecasts of the airport
arrival capacity and demand. Second, the decision is dynamic; not only does the
uncertainty of the forecast decrease over time, but the option to assign delay to flights
also decreases as aircraft depart (Figure 1-1). Furthermore, decisions made at a given
time may influence the opportunity to make additional decisions at later times. And
third, a GDP will have wide-ranging impacts on a variety of stakeholders and the costs of
delays to these stakeholders may not be uniform. Thus, two important questions
regarding the design of a GDP are:
1. Who or what should be considered during the design of a GDP and
2. What is the optimal assignment of ground delay?
This chapter provides a brief overview of the design of GDPs in practice and in the
academic literature and then summarizes the contribution of this thesis.
Section 1.1 The Design of Ground Delay Programs In Practice
In practice, a GDP is designed by an air traffic manager at the FAA Air Traffic
Control System Command Center (ATCSCC) in Herndon, VA. The traffic manager is
responsible for three key decisions: 1) whether or not to implement a GDP, 2) which
flights are eligible to receive ground delay, and 3) the choice of planned airport arrival
rates, which reflects the opinion of traffic manager as to what the future arrival capacity
of the airport will be. In making these decisions, the traffic manager will consider one or
more forecasts of the airport arrival capacity and a list of flights that are scheduled to
arrive at the airport. In addition, the traffic manager may consult with representatives
from the commercial airlines, as well as other traffic managers from local air traffic
control facilities, such as the airport terminal radar approach control facility (TRACON)
or the air route traffic control centers (ARTCCs).
Once the decision to implement a GDP has been made, the traffic manager
assigns ground delays using the Ration-By-Schedule (RBS) algorithm. RBS assigns
ground delays to eligible flights in a manner consistent with a first-scheduled-first-served
order (FSFS). The outcome of the RBS algorithm is dependant on the choices made by
the traffic manager; only those flight that are included in the GDP may be assigned
ground delay and the amount of ground delay that is assigned depends on the chosen
arrival capacity rate.
A key quality of the assignment of delays is that from the perspective of the
traffic manager and the RBS algorithm, all flights are considered to have an equal
priority. Other factors, such as the number of passengers, and passenger, crew, and
equipment connections are not explicitly considered. To account for additional
considerations, the ground delays that are initially assigned by the traffic manager (using
RBS) may be revised by the airlines using various mechanisms, such as flight swaps and
slot-credit-substitution. A key to each of these mechanisms is that they allow the ground
delays to be revised to reflect information that is available to the airlines but will not
increase the arrival demand as controlled by the GDP for any period of time. Additional
discussion on the design of GDPs in practice may be found in Wambsganss (2001) and
Chang et al. (2001).
The assignment of ground delay in practice is based on a qualitative evaluation of
the problem. First, the decisions to assign of ground delay to aircraft are based on the
experience and expertise of the traffic manager. As a result, given the same set of inputs,
two different traffic managers might design the GDP differently. Second, the forecast
uncertainty of the airport arrival capacity is not quantified by the design of a GDP; one
arrival acceptance rate is chosen for the purposes of planning the GDP. In actuality,
however, there may be one or more different forecasts of the future arrival capacity, each
of which has some likelihood of occurring. The choice that is used for the design of the
GDP may be the most likely capacity, but that does not guarantee that it will occur.
Third, the design process does not quantify the various costs of choosing an incorrect
arrival capacity rate. As a result, the design of a GDP in practice reflects a subjective
evaluation of the available information and might be sub-optimal from the perspective of
the system.
Section 1.2 The Design of Ground Delay Programs in the Academic Literature
In the academic literature, the design of a GDP is represented as the single airport
ground holding problem (SAGHP). Various models have been proposed in the SAGHP
literature that use mathematical optimization techniques to solve for an assignment of
ground delay. One advantage of these models is that, subject to a set of input parameters
and an objective function, the assignment of ground delay that is defined by the solution
is both objective and optimal. Furthermore, the academic literature has also proposed the
use of scenario trees to model stochastic and dynamic forecasts of the airport arrival
capacity. Using these scenario trees, a series of models have been proposed to solve the
SAGHP subject to a stochastic and dynamic arrival capacity forecast.
These stochastic/dynamic SAGHP models are advantageous because they are able
to consider many of the characteristics of the problem of designing a GDP. However, as
with any model, the value or utility of the solution depends on the degree to which the
model and its input parameters represent the problem as it occurs in practice. For
example, existing SAGHP models are limited to objective functions of a particular form
and do not consider either the costs of flight diversions, which occur due to lengthy
airborne flight delays, or limits that might be placed on the size of the airborne arrival
queue by the traffic manager. As a result, the solutions to these models may permit more
airborne delays than would be desired in practice by the traffic manager and might also
result in more diversions, which are undesirable to both airlines and their passengers..
Section 1.3 Contributions of the Thesis
This thesis is presented in two parts. The first part of the thesis builds upon the
wealth of existing models in the literature and proposes a new model to solve the
stochastic/dynamic SAGHP. The second part explores the design of GDPs in practice by
comparing the salience of various stakeholders to their roles in the design process.
Section 1.3.1 A New SAGHP Model
The first contribution of this thesis is a new optimization model that solves the
SAGHP subject to a stochastic and dynamic forecast of the airport arrival capacity. This
new model, the ECM, improves upon those in the literature by also considering a wider
range of delay cost functions and a capacity of the airborne arrival queue. The objective
function of the ECM assumes that the cost of the delays may be a non-linear function of
the duration of airborne, ground, and cumulative delay to each flight, where cumulative
represents the sum of airborne and ground delays. It is assumed that non-linear functions
may more accurately represent costs such as flight diversions and missed connections
than functions that are strictly linear. The ECM allows the traffic manager to specify a
maximum limit, or capacity, of the airborne arrival queue permitted by the optimal
solution.
Two sets of experiments are conducted using the model. The first set examines
the sensitivity of the solution to the model to changes in various input parameters, with a
focus on those parameters that are unique to the ECM as compared to other stochastic
and dynamic SAGHP models. The analysis indicates that it is possible to identify certain
"critical" decision times at which the decisions regarding the implementation of a GDP
and the assignment of ground delay should be made.
The sensitivity analysis also identifies a relationship between these objectives and
the times at which ground delays are assigned. For the given example, the total expected
cost of the solution to the ECM is sensitive to the time at which ground delays are revised
subject to perfect information. However, the cost is much less sensitive to the time at
which ground delays are assigned subject to an initial, uncertain forecast. On the other
hand, the ability to identify solutions with smaller arrival queues is much more sensitive
of the time of the initial GDP than to subsequent revisions.
The second set of experiments is an arrival study case study analysis, which
solves the SAGHP for a variety of arrival capacity forecasts and with previous models
from the SAGHP literature. The analysis shows that not only can the ECM be applied to
such forecasts, but that it also results in solutions that are preferable to those of the
previous models. For each example, the solution to the ECM either results in an equal or
lower cost, a smaller maximum observed arrival queue length, or both.
Section 1.3.2 A Stakeholder Approach to the Design of a GDP
As an extension of the SAGHP, an analysis is presented which examines the
salience of different stakeholder groups in regards to the design of a GDP in practice.
Various stakeholder groups are described and classified according to their power,
legitimacy, and urgency in regards to the design of a GDP. Airlines and the FAA are
identified as being the most salient stakeholders, which is in accordance with their roles
in the GDP design process. However, passengers, are also identified as an important, but
under-represented stakeholder in the design process. Although this result may not seem
surprising (to passengers), previous SAGHP models have not considered how delays
might affect passengers.
This dissertation presents a final analysis to demonstrate how passengers might be
considered during the design of a GDP. A second SAGHP model is proposed that
assigns ground delays to minimize the total passenger delay cost. This formulation is
applied to a simple example and the results show that the delay cost to passengers might
be significantly reduced if the traffic manager were to explicitly consider the cost of
delay to passengers during the initial design of a GDP.

Chapter 2 A Review of the Literature
A Ground Delay Program (GDP) is a tool used by the FAA to manage the arrival
demand at a capacity-constrained airport, often as a response to inclement weather, which
may reduce the arrival capacity of an airport significantly. GDPs intentionally delay
aircraft on the ground prior to departure in order to avoid the possibility of future
airborne delays. Ground delay is preferable to both the FAA and the airlines that use the
NAS because it is less costly and it reduces airborne congestion. However, in order to
delay flights on the ground, a GDP must be initiated before they depart, at which time the
future arrival capacity of the airport may be uncertain.
In the academic literature, the decision to assign ground delay to aircraft is
represented as the ground hold problem (GHP). The objective of the models that solve
the GHP is to identify an assignment of ground delay to aircraft that minimizes the total
cost of ground and airborne delay across all flights. Within the GHP, the models that are
most closely related to the design of a GDP in practice are those that assign delay to
flights that are scheduled to arrive at a single airport. The development of these single-
airport GHP (SAGHP) models has focused on the assignment of delay in consideration of
stochastic and dynamic forecasts of the airport arrival capacity.
This chapter discusses the stochastic/dynamic SAGHP models in the literature
and identifies an opportunity to improve how they consider the objectives of a GDP as
designed in practice. First, §2.1 and §2.2 outline the GHP and discuss the use of
optimization techniques by models in the literature to solve for the assignment of ground
delay. Then, §2.3 and §2.4 discuss the SAGHP and opportunities to improve upon
SAGHP models in the literature.
Section 2.1 A Description of the Ground Holding Problem
In the academic literature, the decision to hold aircraft on the ground as a means
of air traffic flow management (ATFM) is represented as the ground holding problem
(GHP). Although the origins of the GHP in the research literature may be traced as far
back as thirty years2, the first systematic treatment of the problem is by Odoni (1987).
Odoni describes the use of ground delays as part of a more general air traffic flow
management problem, in which the movement of aircraft through the NAS is managed by
the FAA and subject to the capacity of various elements of the system, such as air routes
and airports.
As described by Odoni, the decision to assign ground delays embodies several
key characteristics:
1. The demand for and capacity of system elements, such as airport arrivals, are
stochastic, or subject to uncertainty
2. Information regarding the demand and capacity and the ability to assign
ground delay are dynamic and will evolve over time
3. The use of ground delays may be measured by its distributive effects on
individual aircraft
4. Ground delays will also have aggregated effects on groups of aircraft, airlines,
and other stakeholders
2 Odoni (1987)
The review of GHP literature presented in this chapter highlights the use of optimization
models to assign ground subject to these considerations, and focuses on models designed
for the case of a single airport. For a more comprehensive (and excellent) review of the
GHP literature, please refer to Hoffman et al. (2007) or Ball et al. (2006).
Section 2.2 An Overview of Optimization Models for the GHP
Following this initial description, numerous models have been proposed in the
literature that solve for an assignment of ground delay to aircraft in consideration of
various aspects of the GHP. A common approach has been to use mathematical
optimization techniques to solve for an assignment of flight departure times that
minimizes the sum of delay costs to each flight. Key differences between the models are
the assumptions that each makes in regards to the characteristics of the problem; to date,
no tractable model has been proposed that captures all of the aspects identified by Odoni.
Models in the GHP literature are often classified by the number of capacity-
constrained NAS resources that are considered. Terrab and Odoni (1993) propose an
integer programming (IP) formulation that assigns ground delays to aircraft that are
scheduled to arrive at a single airport with deterministic capacity. The formulation
minimizes the sum of the delay costs attributed to each flight, which assumes that the
function of delay cost is known a priori. Hoffman and Ball (2000) propose an IP model
for a single airport that considers additional banking constraints, representing how delays
affect the operations of a hub airline.
Other models have been proposed that consider multiple resources. For example,
Vranas et al. (2004) propose an IP formulation for a network of multiple airports with
deterministic capacity. Mukherjee (2004) proposes an IP formulation that considers the
capacities of multiple arrival fixes at a single airport. Bertsimas and Stock-Patterson
(1998) propose an IP that considers the capacity of both multiple airports and en route
sectors. The advantage of the multiple resource models is that they may capture the
downstream effects of delays at a single airport, as well as the interaction between
capacity constraints for multiple airports and en route sectors. However, the multiple
resource models require more information, resulting in more variables and constraints,
which may exceed computational resources.
Within the larger body of literature, one area of focus has been to explore how
solutions to the GHP distribute delays among aircraft and airlines. Odoni (1987) suggests
that strategies for optimizing the flow of aircraft may result in a systematic bias in favor
of long-distance flights. Hanowsky (2007) demonstrates that an optimal assignment of
ground delay to flights scheduled to arrive at a single airport assigns more delay to short-
distance flights and, as a result, to the airlines that operate these flights. Additionally,
Lulli and Odoni (2007) show that if multiple resources are considered, then a reduction in
capacity to one resource may result in ground delays for flights that are not scheduled to
use the constrained resource.
Furthermore, several models have been developed in the literature to incorporate
the distribution of ground delay among flights into the objectives of the GHP. Vossen
(2002) proposes a model for mitigating the bias in assigned delay due to flight
exemptions. Mukherjee (2004) proposes an optimization model that uses a super-linear
cost function to identify solutions that are more equitable. Mukherjee also demonstrates
that it is possible to adjust the balance of equity vs. efficiency in the solution by varying
the weight assigned to such a function.
Section 2.3 The Single Airport Ground Hold Problem
A GDP is one type of ATFM initiative in which the assignment of ground delay is
specific to flights that are scheduled to arrive at a single capacity-constrained airport. As
ground delays are assigned before these flights depart, the design of a GDP may be
subject to an uncertain forecast of the airport arrival capacity. In the academic literature,
the design of a GDP is represented by a sub-problem within the GHP that is referred to as
the single-airport ground hold problem (SAGHP). Published research on the SAGHP has
contributed to two general areas: (1) the development of quantitative models to represent
uncertain and dynamic arrival capacity forecasts and (2) the use of optimization methods
to solve the SAGHP in consideration of stochastic and/or dynamic capacity forecasts.
Section 2.3.1 A Model of a Stochastic and Dynamic Arrival Capacity Forecast
A principal input to the design of a GDP in practice is a planned arrival
acceptance rate, or PAAR, which is the maximum rate at which an airport is expected to
be able to accommodate arriving aircraft. Although the PAAR may be set to a nominal
rate to represent regular operating conditions, unscheduled reductions in the acceptance
rate - resulting from exogenous factors, such as changes in wind speed and direction,
visibility, and precipitation - will often trigger the initiation of a GDP in practice.
Because atmospheric conditions may change over the course of a day, the forecast arrival
capacity of an airport can be represented as a profile of PAARs that vary over time3.
Terrab and Odoni (1993) and Richetta and Odoni (1993) represent an arrival rate
forecast in the presence of uncertainty as a mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive
set of profiles, each of which has an associated likelihood of representing the actual
airport arrival capacity. Let an arrival capacity scenario consist of the set of possible
profiles that correspond to a given forecast. The profile that actually occurs is said to be
realized. An important assumption regarding any arrival capacity scenario is that exactly
one of the profiles in the scenario will ultimately be realized.
Figure 2-1 An example of an arrival capacity scenario forecast
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3 Terrab and Odoni (1993)
Figure 2-1 shows an example of a simple scenario with two profiles. Under
Profile #1, the airport maintains a nominal capacity, while Profile #2 represents the
passing of a hypothetical storm, for which the PAAR falls to 0 arrivals/period at 1500 Z
and then increases to 25 after 1600 Z. At the time this scenario is forecast (1300 Z), the
likelihood of Profile #1 is 90% and that for Profile #2 is 10%.
Over time, new information may become available which makes a revision of the
arrival capacity forecast possible. Richetta and Odoni (1994) and Mukherjee (2004)
model the set of forecasts that may occur over time as a scenario tree. The branches of
the tree represent individual capacity scenarios and nodes indicate an update, or revision,
to the arrival capacity forecast, which results in a new scenario. From a given point on a
branch of the tree, the information available regarding the airport arrival capacity will
change in a manner defined by one of the continuous paths leading from that point to a
leaf on the right.
For the simple example discussed above, it is assumed that the arrival capacity
forecast could be revised by direct observation at 1500 Z - one could simply check the
actual arrival rate at that time. The scenario tree for this hypothetical example is shown
in Figure 2-2 (page 28). The initial arrival capacity scenario, which contains two
profiles, is represented as the branch on the left side and the node at 1500 Z signifies the
availability of a new forecast. This revised forecast results in one of two new scenarios;
the upper branch indicates that Profile #1 will occur and the lower branch Profile #2. The
likelihoods of the revised forecast resulting in each of these new scenarios are 90% and
10%, respectively. On the right side of the tree, each leaf represents an arrival capacity
scenario that contains a single profile and corresponds to the realization of that profile.
Figure 2-2 An example of a scenario tree
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Arrival Capacity Forecasts as Decision Trees
The nodes of a scenario tree could be alternately described as the chance nodes of
a decision tree, where a forecast will follow a new branch at each node with a probability
defined by the relative likelihoods of the respective capacity profiles. The use of scenario
trees to model dynamic arrival capacity forecasts assumes that a revision to the arrival
capacity forecast will only occur at the nodes of a tree. This assumption allows for an
important simplification in the modeling of a GDP. If the arrival capacity forecast does
not change between the nodes of the tree, then decisions regarding a GDP are best made
at the nodes, when the capacity forecast has just been revised but there have not been any
additional flight departures. Thus, with this assumption, the design of a GDP can be
represented as a set of sequential decisions defined by the nodes of a scenario tree, such
as the one shown in Figure 2-3.
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Figure 2-3 The scenario tree as a decision tree
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The decision tree framework carries an important implication regarding how a
GDP is modeled. GDPs are dynamic decision processes in which a program might be
initiated and then revised one or more times as new information becomes available. Each
decision to initiate, revise, or cancel the GDP - or even to take no action at all - will
impact the alternatives available at later times. Reducing the design of a GDP to a
problem of making choices at the nodes of a scenario tree allows for the explicit and
simultaneous consideration of the initial GDP, as well as future opportunities to revise the
assigned ground delays. And, as shown by the development of various models in the
SAGHP literature, it is possible to use optimization techniques to design an optimal GDP
subject to this dynamic decision framework.
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The Development of Scenario Trees
Additional research has sought to identify methods of developing arrival capacity
scenario trees for use in practice. MIT Lincoln Laboratory (2004) discusses the
development of a stochastic forecast for the clearing time of marine stratus at San
Francisco International Airport (SFO). In the presence of low cloud ceilings, flight
arrivals at SFO are restricted to a single runway, which may halve the arrival capacity of
the airport. Liu et al. (2006) propose a more generalizable clustering algorithm that
develops an arrival capacity scenario tree based upon the historical acceptance rates of an
airport. Although the Liu et al. model is applicable to a greater number of airports, it may
not yield predictive forecasts that are sufficient for use with optimization methods
(Liu 2007). The development of additional, practical methods to construct scenario
capacity trees is an area of ongoing research.
Section 2.3.2 SAGHP Optimization Models
In the academic literature, a series of models have been proposed that use
optimization methods to solve the SAGHP subject to a stochastic and/or uncertain
forecast of the airport arrival capacity, which may be given as a scenario tree. The
various models differ in the assumptions each makes in regards to the arrival capacity
forecast. Deterministic models only consider forecasts with a single profile and
stochastic and static models are limited to forecasts with a single arrival capacity
scenario. The most advanced models in terms of arrival capacity consider both a
stochastic and dynamic forecast. However, as compared to the deterministic models, the
static and stochastic models are more limited in regards to the types of delay cost
functions they can consider and the type of optimization method they use to solve for the
assignment of ground delays.
As mentioned previously, Terrab and Odoni (1993) propose an IP formulation for
the SAGHP for a deterministic and static forecast of the airport arrival capacity. Their
model divides time into a set of discrete and continuous periods and is compatible with a
scenario that contains a single profile. Terrab and Odoni also propose a dynamic
programming (DP) model for a stochastic and static forecast in which the arrival
capacities are represented by a set of profiles, or a capacity scenario. For both models,
the total delay cost of a solution is the expected value of the sum of ground and airborne
delay costs for each flight4 . Delay cost is assumed to be a non-linear function of delay
time that may also vary by aircraft.
Richetta and Odoni (1993) propose a stochastic and static IP formulation for the
SAGHP. This formulation is more tractable than Terrab and Odoni for larger problems.
However, it assumes that the cost function for airborne delay is both linear and identical
for all aircraft. This assumption, which is repeated by later SAGHP models, and its
ramifications for the solution to the SAGHP will be discussed further in the next section.
Ball et al. (2003) also propose a stochastic and static SAGHP model with linear
costs that has the additional advantage of yielding an integer solution when solved as a
linear program (LP). Kotnyek and Richetta (2006) show that the Ball et al. formulation is
a special case of the Richetta-Odoni model and that Richetta-Odoni also solves to an
integer solution as an LP if the cost of ground delay to a flight is non-decreasing in time.
Integer solutions are important for GHP models because aircraft, for practical purposes,
must be treated as whole entities. By solving the SAGHP as an LP, the Ball et al. and
4 For the deterministic model, there is no airborne delay
Richetta-Odoni models solve as or more efficiently than other conceivable models that
might use IP, MIP (mixed-integer program), or, especially, DP formulations.
Other SAGHP models consider dynamic forecasts of arrival capacity that may
change over time, such as one represented by a scenario tree. Richetta and Odoni (1994)
propose a static and partially-dynamic IP model. This model is able to revise the ground
delay assigned to aircraft if the arrival capacity forecast is revised during the course of a
GDP. However, a limitation of the model is that it is unable to revise ground hold
strategies by releasing aircraft previously held on the ground if the forecast of arrival
capacity is revised upward. Mukherjee (2004) proposes a stochastic and fully-dynamic
MIP model that overcomes these limitations. Mukherjee also demonstrates that by
including a super-linear term in the cost of ground delay in the objective function, it is
possible to favor solutions that feature distributions of ground delay that might be more
equitable. As noted by Odoni (1987) and Vossen (2002), equitable, or fair, allocations of
ground delay may be preferable in practice.
Several models have also been proposed in the literature that extend this
formulation. Mukherjee (2004) proposes a second stochastic/dynamic MIP formulation
that also considers the capacity of the airport arrival fixes. Finally, Mukherjee and
Hansen (2007) propose a stochastic/dynamic MIP formulation that considers the capacity
of the airborne arrival queue. However, this last model was published after the analyses
for this thesis were performed and is not included in the comparisons performed in
Chapters 3, 4, and 5.
Section 2.3.3 Models of Delay Cost
Figure 2-4 (page 34) summarizes the various optimization models in the SAGHP
literature. Although the Terrab and Odoni models are the least sophisticated in regards to
the modeling of arrival capacity, they are the most general in terms of the types of cost
functions they consider. On the other hand, the formulations proposed by Mukherjee are
advantageous because they consider dynamic strategies in which ground delays are
revised as new information becomes available. In comparison to the static and partially
dynamic SAGHP models, Mukherjee identifies solutions with a lower total expected
cost 5. However, this requires that the cost of delay - and the objectives of a GDP - be
expressed in a form that is compatible with the Mukherjee model. For the design of
GDPs in practice, the Mukherjee models, as well as other dynamic SAGHP models in the
literature, have four general limitations.
First, the dynamic SAGHP models, such as Mukherjee (2004) and Richetta-Odoni
(1994), are limited to delay costs that can be expressed as a linear or a non-linear function
of the ground delay plus a linear function of the airborne delay experienced by each
aircraft. This restriction follows an initial set of assumptions made by Richetta and
Odoni (1993) that model the marginal cost of airborne delay per aircraft as a constant
value. However, in practice, delay costs may be much more variable. For example,
airborne delays of short duration may have a relatively small cost to NAS users, while
longer delays may result in costly flight diversions. Furthermore, some costs may be a
function of the total time that a flight is delayed, such as those due to missed connections
of passengers, crew, and equipment.
5 Mukherjee (2004)
Figure 2-4 A Summary of SAGHP Models
Arrival Capacity Capacity-Constrained Delay Costs
Forecast Elements
Terrab and Ground: Non-linear5
Odoni19931(1) IP Deterministic, Static Airport Arrivals Airborne: n/a
Terrab and Ground: Non-linear5
Odoni19931(2) DP Stochastic, Static Airport Arrivals Airborne: Non-linear5
Richetta and Ground: Non-Linear5  LP2  Stochastic, Static Airport Arrivals Airborne: Linear
Odoni 1993 Airborne: Linear
Ground: LinearBall et al. 2003 LP Stochastic, Static Airport Arrivals Airborne: LinearAirborne: Linear
Richetta and Ground: Non-LinearRichetta and MIP Stochastic, Dynamic3  Airport Arrivals Ground: Linear
Odoni 1994 Airborne: Linear
Mukherjee Ground: Non-Linear6
20041 (1) MIP Stochastic, Dynamic Airport Arrivals Airborne: Linear
Mukherjee Airport Arrivals and Ground: Non-Linear6
2004 (2) MIP Stochastic,Airport Arrival Fixes Airborne: Linear
Mukherjee and Airport Arrivals and the Ground: Non-Linear 6
Hansen 2007 Airport Arrival Queue Airborne: Linear
Airport Arrivals and the Ground: Non-LinearHanowsky 2007 MIP Stochastic, Dynamic rport Arrival Queue Airborne: Non-LinearAirport Arrival Queue Airborne: Non-Linear
Terrab and Odoni (1993) and Mukherjee (2004) each propose multiple SAGHP models
2 Richetta and Odoni (1993) solves as an LP for non-decreasing marginal ground delay cost
3 Richetta and Odoni (1994) is partially-dynamic
4 Delay costs refer to the cost of a delay as a function of the duration of delay experienced by each flight
5 Terrab and Odoni (1993) and Richetta and Odoni (1994) consider functions of delay cost that may vary
by flight. In the other models, each flight is identical from the perspective of how costs are accrued.
6 Mukerjee (2004) and Mukherjee and Hansen (2007) may not solve efficiently as an IP for all non-linear
ground delay cost functions
Second, the cost of delays may also vary by aircraft. The stochastic/dynamic
SAGHP models in the literature require that all aircraft be equal from a cost perspective.
However, in practice, costs may not be experienced equally, as larger aircraft require
more fuel and crew members and also carry more passengers; long distance flights may
be more susceptible to diverting as a result of airborne delays; and flights with connecting
passengers may be more sensitive to delays, in general, than other flights. It should also
be noted that the initial description of the GHP by Odoni (1987) and the model proposed
by Richetta and Odoni (1993) assume that delay costs may vary by aircraft.
Third, the solutions to models that only seek to minimize the total expected delay
cost, such as those proposed by Mukherjee, permit arrival queue lengths that might be
unacceptable to the traffic manager in practice. These models assign delay to minimize a
weighted average of the flight delay costs under each profile. For a profile that represents
a significant reduction in arrival capacity but for which the likelihood of being realized is
relatively low, the weighted cost may not be significant enough to induce the assignment
of ground delay. However, in practice, it may be preferable to the traffic manager to
avoid the possibility of extensive airborne arrival queues, even if this would increase the
total expected delay cost.
Fourth, the Mukherjee model, specifically, may not solve efficiently as a MIP if
ground delay or costs are non-linear. Although Mukherjee demonstrates that his
formulation may consider some non-linear cost functions, adaptation of the model to
consider arbitrary non-linear ground delay cost functions is not trivial. By
experimentation, it was found that certain non-linear functions of ground delay cost may
cause the model to fail to resolve to an integer solution in a timely manner. Thus, while
the Mukherjee formulation is the most advanced SAGHP model in its consideration of
stochastic and dynamic arrival capacity forecasts, it is also the most restrictive in terms of
the types of delays costs that may be considered. The model proposed in this thesis
solves more efficiently the stochastic/dynamic SAGHP for a wider range of cost
functions than Mukherjee and other prior models.
Section 2.4 Conclusion
The design of GDPs in practice is subject to stochastic and dynamic forecasts of
the airport arrival capacity. A series of models have been proposed in the academic
literature that solve for the optimal assignment of ground delay given such a forecast.
However, these models have certain gaps or deficiencies that may act as major barriers to
their use in practice. In this thesis, a new SAGHP model will be proposed that considers
both a stochastic and dynamic arrival capacity forecast and a more generalized model of
delay cost.
Chapter 3 A Mixed-Integer Programming Model for the
Stochastic and Dynamic Single-Airport Ground
Holding Problem with Non-Linear Cost Functions
During periods of inclement weather, the FAA may implement a Ground Delay
Program, or GDP, to manage the rate of flight arrivals at a capacity-constrained airport.
The objective of a GDP is to avoid extensive airborne delay by proactively delaying
flights on the ground before they depart. Ground delay is preferable to airborne delay
because delays on the ground are less costly, along several dimensions, than those in the
air. In order to assign ground delays, however, a GDP must be initiated before flights
depart, at which time the future capacity of the destination airport may be uncertain.
A series of models have been proposed in the academic literature to design a GDP
subject to uncertain capacity. Two important criticisms of these models are that they
permit very large airborne queues, which may be unacceptable to air traffic managers in
practice, and that they are unable to consider non-linear airborne delay costs, which are
more representative of how costs are accrued by users of the NAS. This chapter proposes
a new model to dynamically assign ground delay to flights that are scheduled to arrive at
an airport with uncertain arrival capacity, subject to constraints on size of the airborne
queue and with non-linear flight delay costs. The model is applied to a hypothetical
example and is shown to be more general and more applicable than those in the existing
literature.
This chapter is presented in four sections: §3.1 identifies the advantages offered
by the proposed model over those in the literature; §3.2 proposes and discusses the model
formulation; §3.3 describes how the model might be applied in practice and, for two
simple examples, compares its solution with those of other models; and §3.4 summarizes
the contribution of the proposed model to both the literature and the design of GDPs in
practice.
Section 3.1 Contributions of the Extended Cost Model
The model presented in this chapter extends a body of literature on the single-
airport ground holding problem (SAGHP)6 . Existing models in the literature, most
notably Richetta and Odoni (1994) and Mukherjee (2005), identify an optimal assignment
of ground delay subject to a stochastic and dynamic forecast of the airport arrival
capacity, which is provided in the form of a scenario tree. However, a limitation of the
existing models is that the types of objective functions they permit are unable to capture
several important considerations of the design of a GDP in practice, such as costs that
occur due to extended airborne delays or the size of the airborne arrival queue. The
model presented here improves upon previous stochastic and dynamic SAGHP models
and offers four features that make it attractive for use in the design of GDPs in practice.
The first is that the model considers a wider range of objective functions than
previous models in the literature. Whereas existing models are limited to an objective of
the sum of a linear or non-linear function of ground delay time and a linear function of
airborne delay time, this new model minimizes the sum of linear or non-linear functions
of the airborne, ground, and cumulative delay time of each flight. As this model extends
6 §2.3
the range of delay cost function that may be considered in the design of a GDP it is,
therefore, referred to as the "extended cost model," or ECM.
A second feature of the ECM is that it is capable of distributing all delay - not
just ground delay - more evenly among aircraft. Given two solutions with equal total
delay cost, the solution that distributes delay more evenly may be preferable in practice.
Prior models have shown that it is possible to identify solutions that distribute ground
delay more evenly. However, these models are unable to consider the distribution of
airborne delay, which is relevant because flights that are delayed during a GDP may
experience both ground and airborne delay. The ECM is able to identify solutions that
distribute ground, airborne, or the total amount of delay assigned to each flight more
evenly.
A third feature of the ECM is that it can be solved in a reasonable amount of time
for use in practice. In nearly all examples tested, including those for a variety of different
non-linear delay cost functions, the LP relaxation of the ECM yields an integer solution.
In those cases for which an integer solution is not found for the LP relaxation, an exact,
optimal solution is quickly identified using a branch-and-bound algorithm. For the
examples discussed in this thesis, model run time is often on the order of a few seconds
and the largest problem solved requires less than ten minutes to find an optimal solution.
A fourth feature of the ECM is that it is able to avoid solutions that could result in
excessive airborne delays and long arrival queues. There may exist solutions that
minimize the total expected cost but allow for the possibility of lengthy arrival queues
that might not be acceptable to traffic managers in practice. The ECM allows the traffic
manager to place limits on the size of the arrival queue that is permitted in the optimal
solution.
Section 3.1.1 A Model of Delay Cost
The model of delay cost that is used by the ECM takes the perspective a flight that
experiences delay during a GDP. The cost of the delay to the flight may be a
consequence of one or more of many different possibilities (Figure 3-1), such as the fuel
consumed during airborne delay. Another example is labor, which incurs cost as a
function of the cumulative delay time. Cumulative delay refers to the total amount of
time a flight is delayed and is defined as the sum of air and ground delay times
(Figure 3-2).
Figure 3-1 A classification of various delay costs experienced by NAS users
Cost Description Delay Type Cost Function
Cancellations Cost of flight cancellation due to Ground Non-Linear
excessive ground delay
Diversions Cost of diverting to an auxiliary Airborne Non-Linear
airport due to excessive airborne
delay
Fuel Fuel costs due to extra flight time Airborne Linear
Labor Labor costs due to delayed arrival Cumulative Linear or
Non-Linear
Missed Connections Costs to reroute passengers, crew, Cumulative Non-Linear
and equipment that missed scheduled
connections
Three types of cost (in addition to fuel and labor) shown in Figure 3-1 are of
interest because each is non-linear with respect to a different type of delay time: the
likelihood of a cancellation may increase with the duration of ground delay, of diversions
with airborne delay, and of missed connections (of passengers, crew, and equipment)
with cumulative delay. For example, consider two possible allocations of airborne delay,
one that delays one flight for 45 minutes and the second that delays three flights for 15
minutes each. Although the total delay time in each allocation is the same, the lengthy
airborne delay in the first might result in a costly diversion that would not occur in the
second.
A key assumption made by this model of delay cost is that the three categories of
cost, ground, airborne, and cumulative, are mutually exclusive and collectively
exhaustive. Each of the various costs incurred by a delayed aircraft must be assigned to
exactly one category. For example, labor cost is assigned to cumulative delay and not to
either the airborne or ground delay cost categories. In order to prevent a double-counting
of such costs by the ECM, it is important that costs be allocated into categories properly
before the model is applied.
Figure 3-2 The relationship between ground, airborne, and cumulative delay
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Section 3.1.2 The Distribution of Delays
A second, more subtle benefit of the use of non-linear cost functions is to identify
solutions that distribute delay more evenly across aircraft participating in a GDP. For a
given objective function, there may exist multiple optimal solutions with the same total
delay cost. Consider the previous example with two possible solutions: the first that
delays one aircraft for three periods of 15 minutes and the second that delays three
aircraft for one period each; except, in this case, let the delays be taken on the ground.
Assuming that ground delay has a cost of one unit per period, these two solutions would
have an identical cost. However, from the perspective of the traffic manager, the latter
solution may be preferred because it assigns some delay to each aircraft rather than all
delay to a single aircraft.
Mukherjee (2005) demonstrates that if there exist multiple optimal solutions, then
it is possible to favor those solutions that assign ground delay more evenly across flights
by including a super-linear term in the objective function. However, it may be preferable
to consider the distribution of cumulative delay, rather than ground delay, because it is
possible for a flight to receive both air and ground delay. The ECM is able to consider
cost functions that incorporate a super-linear term into the cost of cumulative delay, thus
distributing both ground and airborne delay more evenly.
Section 3.1.3 An Airborne Arrival Queue Capacity
In practice, traffic managers may assess alternatives for strategic ATFM decisions
by placing limits on airspace usage, such as a cap on the number of aircraft
simultaneously permitted in a sector or volume of airspace. These limits may differ
across sectors and may vary over time for the same sector, as inclement weather can
reduce the amount of traffic a volume of airspace may accommodate. For the design of
GDPs subject to an uncertain airport arrival rate capacity, planning for a specific capacity
rate might lead to situations in which there is a low, but appreciable risk of exceeding the
maximum number of aircraft allowed to be in an airborne queue at the same time. The
SAGHP models in the literature, which seek only to minimize the expected delay cost,
permit solutions in which the size of the airborne arrival queue might exceed acceptable
limits. To avoid these solutions, the ECM allows the traffic manager to specify a
capacity, or maximum limit, for the arrival queue under each profile.
Section 3.2 The Extended Cost Model MIP Formulation
Five key concepts for the design of a GDP are described in §3.1:
* Dynamic decision-making
* Uncertain arrival capacity
* Prevention of unacceptable airborne queue sizes
* Minimization of the expected cost of delays to NAS users
* The distribution of delay among aircraft
This section presents the formulation of a mixed-integer mathematical program
for the design of a GDP for a dynamic and stochastic arrival capacity forecast, with non-
linear cost functions, and subject to constraints on the length of the airborne arrival
queue. For convenience, the ECM is repeated without the explanatory text in the
appendix.
Section 3.2.1 Notation
Consider an airport for which there is a list of scheduled flight arrivals and a
dynamic and stochastic forecast of the arrival capacity. The list of scheduled arrivals
contains a set of flights F that are scheduled to arrive at the airport. Each flight f E F
has a scheduled departure time and a scheduled arrival time. The arrival capacity
forecast is provided as a scenario tree with a set of capacity profiles Q and a set of
capacity scenarios B. Each capacity profile q E Q represents a profile of PAARs over
time and has a likelihood of being realized given by probability p,, with 3Pq =1.
Let time be divided into a series of consecutive time periods r = {0,..., T}, where
each period t E r represents a distinct period of time. The initial period t = 0 is the time
at which the current decision regarding a possible GDP is being made and the final period
of time t = T is assumed to be far enough in the future as to accommodate a GDP of any
length. In practice, GDPs are limited to a single day of demand, so a reasonable time
horizon would be between 8 and 12 hours. By convention, time periods have equal
duration (for example, 15 minutes), although the ECM can be applied to any set of
distinct and sequential time periods.
Arrival demand and capacity is defined by the set of time periods. Let the
scheduled departure and arrival times of flight f be SDTs E r and SATf E T. For
convenience, the scheduled flight time en route STEJ is defined as the difference between
these times:
STE =SATf 
-
SD Tf V fE F
The planned airport arrival capacity under profile q during time period t is Mq,,, which is
assumed to be both non-negative and integer. It is assumed that the capacity of the final
time period t = T is sufficient to handle all arrivals.
MqT=IFI V qEQ
As part of the arrival capacity scenario tree, the forecast will be updated at
specific times, as represented by the nodes of the scenario tree. Each scenario b E B is
associated with a start time period b, E r and an end time period be E r, which
correspond to the start and end nodes of the scenario. For the example shown in
Figure 3-3, the start time period of b, corresponds to 1300 Z and the end time period to
1500 Z.
Figure 3-3 Arrival capacity scenario tree notation
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Each scenario b also contains the set of profiles that could be realized following
b, such that b = {q,...q. } C Q. Thus, each profile q is an element of the set of all
profiles Q and of one or more scenarios as defined by the scenario tree. For example, in
Figure 3-3, profile q, is an element of scenarios b, and b2.
The Cost of Delay
Consider a flight f, which may experience ground or airborne delay or both
before it arrives at an airport. The total cost of delay to f is defined as the sum of the
costs that are incurred as a result of the ground delay, airborne delay, and cumulative
delay experienced by f. For each of these three types of delay, cost will vary by the
duration of delay and may be expressed as the sum of incremental amounts. For
example, the cost of n periods of airborne delay for flight f is al, where ai is the
i-1
incremental cost of the ith period of airborne delay and i E r. Similarly, y, is the
incremental cost for the i t period of ground delay and X, is the incremental cost for the
i th period of cumulative delay. Thus, the total delay cost to a flight that receives m
m n mi+n
periods of ground delay and n periods of airborne delay is Y, + a, + Yx,.
1 1 1
It is assumed that the cost when no delay is incurred is 0 units and that the
incremental costs are non-decreasing:
ao = Yo = Xo = 0
Xt 0 ,t-1 V tl1
a t a at-1 V tal
Yrt 2 Ytl V tal
This assumption is a reasonable approximation to the accrual of delay costs to NAS
users, where short delays can often be easily absorbed by "buffer times" in schedules, but
long delays have a more significant impact.
Section 3.2.2 Decision Variables
The decision variables for the ECM indicate the departure time period, arrival
demand time period, and landing time period of each flight, where the arrival demand
period is the time at which a flight would land if not otherwise delayed in the air. The
variables are dfq, 6ftq, and Aftq, which represent the fraction of flight f that departs,
demands arrival, or lands, respectively, by time t and under profile q; only dft, is
required to be binary.
dftq E{0,1} V f E F; t E -r; qE Q
bftq E [0, 1] V fE F; tE ; q EQ
rfq E[0,1] V f EF; tE-r; qEQ
Although included as a decision variable in the ECM, the flight arrival demand
variable btq is fully determined by the departure variable dftq and the scheduled time en
route STEJ, which the ECM assumes to be deterministic. Although the ECM could be
reformulated without fq,, it was noted during initial experimentation that retaining the
arrival demand variables does not significantly increase the run time of the model.
Furthermore, including these variables facilitates the future adaptation of the ECM to
consider stochastic en route times.
Figure 3-4 Sample decision variables for one flight
Ground delay time Time en route Air delay time
Figure 3-4 shows a possible solution to the ECM corresponding to a flight f with
SDTf = 1 and SATf = 6 and a capacity profile q. The first row of values indicates the
departure status of f over time assigned by the solution. The value of the departure
variable for the initial time period t = 0 is zero, which indicates that f has not departed
prior to the initiation of the program. The change in the value of the indicator from zero
to one at t = 2 indicates that flight f departs during the second time period in this
solution. The difference between the scheduled departure time and the departure time
assigned by the model, which is one period, is ground delay.
The second and third rows in the figure correspond to the arrival demand and
landing variables. As shown, flight f would have been able to land at time t = 7, but
does not actually land until time t = 9. The difference between the arrival demand and
landing times assigned by the model, which is two periods, is airborne delay. Lastly, the
difference between the assigned landing time and the scheduled departure time, which is
three periods, is cumulative delay.
The departure, arrival demand, and landing indicator variables have three
properties:
1. Their values are non-decreasing
2. There is a hierarchy across variables: a flight must depart before it demands
arrival, and it must demand arrival before it lands
3. Values must be binary for practical reasons
The third property is of special importance. Fractional values for the departure
indicator variables are impractical for use in the design of a GDP. For example, if
dftq = ½ in the optimal solution, it would indicates that one-half of flight f should depart
by time t. As discussed in §2.3.3, the branch-and-bound algorithm may not resolve these
fractional values efficiently. Thus, requiring that variables take binary values is
necessary for practical reasons, but also requires that the ECM be solved as an MIP and
not an LP.
The arrival demand and landing variables are not required to be binary in the
ECM. This assumption is consistent with the use of GDPs in practice, where only flight
departure times are assigned. However, this also means that the arrival demand and
landing variables could take fractional values in the optimal solution. Should this occur,
the departure times assigned by the model would still be optimal if and only if there
exists an alternate solution with the same assignment of departure times and an identical
objective function value, but with binary values for the arrival demand and landing
variables.
Claim: If there exists an optimal solution to the ECM with binary values for dftq, then
there exists an optimal solution with binary values for 6fq and Lftq.
Corollary. If there exists an optimal solution to the ECM and if the incremental flight
delay cost parameters adhere to the following relationship.
aG + X, < aj + ZX V n; i<j
then there exists an optimal solution in which flight arrivals are first-come-first
serve (FCFS).
The claim and corollary indicate that the solution identified by the ECM is
optimal if the flight arrival process is FCFS, even though the model does not require it.
Proofs of both are available in the appendix.
Auxiliary Decision Variables
An additional set of decision variables is used in the ECM to calculate the
airborne delay cost of each flight. Let
Zfs,q E V f EF; sOE ...T- SATf -1; tE s...T-SATf -1; qEQ
These variables will be discussed further in the next section.
Section 3.2.3 Objective Function
The objective function of the ECM minimizes the total expected delay cost:
Minimize [pq (CDCfq + ADCfq + GDCfq)]F (3.01)
Where CDCfq, ADCfq, and GDC/q represent the cumulative, air, and ground delay costs,
respectively, for flight f under profile q and are defined in equations (3.02) - (3.06)
below.
T-I
CDCf = 1((- AnX Xt-SAT,+1) V fEF; qEQ (3.02)
t-SATf
T+SDT -SAT 1-1
GDCfq = 1((1-dfq)x Yt-SDTo,+) V fEF; qEQ (3.03)
t-SDTf
T-1 T-SATf - T-SATf-1
ADCfq= Y((1- Af, tq)xa,_AT,+)- Zstq V f E F; q EQ (3.04)
t=SATf s-O t-s
Z,ftq = (a-t_,- - a,) x minL - ,f(t+SAT)q, - df(ssorD)q]  (3.05)
V fE F; sEO...T- SATf -1; tE s...T- SATf -1; q EQ
For the purposes of the formulation, equations (3.05) are replaced with constraints
(3.06a) and (3.06b):
Zftq s (at,,l -a,_,) x - ,(t+SAT)q (3.06a)
Zstq : (at-,,, -at_,) x (1- df(s+sorD)q (3.06b)
Cumulative delay cost CDCfq and ground delay cost GDCfq are the sum of the
costs associated with each incremental period of delay assigned to each flight. For
example, consider equations (3.02), which express the cumulative delay cost as the
function with two terms. The first term (1- Afq) is equal to 1 if and only if flight f does
not land by time t for profile q. The second term is the cumulative delay cost increment
Xt-SAT,+1, which is indexed to the scheduled arrival time off. Equations (3.03) similarly
express flight ground delay cost.
Figure 3-5 Delay cost calculation example
Cumulative Delay
Airborne Delay
Ground delay
/II
1 - dtq 0 0 0 00 0 / O 0 0
A sample calculation of cumulative and ground delay costs is shown above in
Figure 3-5. Recall the previous example of flight decision variables (Figure 3-4, page 48)
in which a flight f receives one period of ground delay and two periods of airborne delay.
The time periods during whichf experiences delay, which are indicated by shading in the
figure, correspond to the times for which the (1- dftq) and (1- A•q) terms equal 1. As the
vectors of incremental ground delay and cumulative delay costs are offset by the
scheduled departure and arrival times, respectively, the equations (3.02) and (3.03)
calculate the costs of cumulative and ground delay as CDCf, = X + X2 + X3 and
GDCfq = y1.
In contrast to cumulative and ground delay costs, there does not exist a convenient
time at which to index the airborne delay cost coefficient. Instead, airborne delay cost is
expressed in equations (3.04) as the difference of two terms. The first term is similar to
(3.02) and (3.03) and represents the cost of air delay cost to flight f that would be
incurred if all of the observed delay in arrival time is taken as airborne delay (i.e. if none
of the observed delay occurs on the ground). For the flight in the previous example that
X1
a1I
2:::::::2:: 
a2
S:i
a3
X4
a4 a5
SATf ) Cumulative Delay
1 - k• q 1....I I I. .I Ii . ....... .. .. i . 1 0 1 0
received two periods of airborne delay and one period of ground delay, the value of the
first term is a, + a 2 + a3. However, the cost for of two periods of airborne delay is
actually a, + a2; by itself, the first term overstates the cost of airborne delay.
The purpose of the second term in equations (3.04) is to subtract the delay cost
that is overstated by the first term. The sum of the Ztq, decision variables in the second
term represents the reduction in delay cost that is due to some of the observed delay in
arrival time being taken on the ground and not in the air. Thus, for the given example,
the value of the second term is equal to a3.
Figure 3-6 A sample calculation of the Zf,, values
1-ýI I I 1 I0 0io
Figure 3-6 shows how the second term calculates the cost reduction. The axes of
the table are expressed in periods of time, where s represents the time periods starting
with the scheduled departure time (such that SDTf = 1) and t the time periods starting
with the scheduled arrival time. The vectors that correspond to the (1- dft,) and (1- Afq)
terms are also indexed by s and t, respectively. The elements of the body of the table
represent the difference between consecutive values of a, and are defined as
a,_,+1 - a,_,7. If s represents the incremental ground delay time and t the incremental
airborne delay time, then the value of cell (s, t) is the reduction in the tth period of
airborne delay cost due to the sth period of ground delay.
As the second term in equations (3.04) has a negative coefficient, minimizing the
objective function (3.01) forces the Zlstq variables to take the maximum possible values
permitted by constraints (3.06a) and (3.06b). For non-decreasing airborne delay cost
increments, Zttq > 0 only if flight f is assigned at least s periods of ground delay and t
periods of airborne delay under profile q. For this example, Zftq = 0 for t > 3 (3.06a) or
s > 1 (3.06b). Thus:
Zfllq 1al
Zfl2q = a2 1
fl3q = a 3 - a 2
Zf,,tq = 0 otherwise
Thus, ZfStq = -aand ADCfq = al + a 2.
Contributions of the Cost Functions
The form of the delay cost functions contributes two key benefits to the study of
the GHP. First, the expressions of ground delay cost (3.02) can consider any function
that is represented in a piecewise linear form. As discussed in §2.3, existing stochastic
and fully-dynamic models in the literature8 may not consider an arbitrary non-linear
7 Cells for which S > t are excluded from both the table and the summation in the second term because the
amount of ground delay assigned to a flight cannot exceed the amount of cumulative delay.
8 Mukherjee (2004)
ground delay cost function. The ECM is the first model to solve the stochastic and
dynamic SAGHP subject to a piece-wise linear ground delay cost function.
A second contribution is the consideration of non-linear cumulative and airborne
delay costs. Previous models in the SAGHP literature consider only linear costs.
Although equations (3.04) - (3.06) also require a significant number of additional
decision variables, experimental results indicate that that the ECM often yields binary
solutions when solved as an LP relaxation, which avoids the use of the branch-and-bound
algorithm. Non-integer solutions will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter Four and
model size is discussed in §3.2.5.
Section 3.2.4 Constraints
The constraints for the ECM
ftq > df(t-l)q
df(t-STEf)q = -ftq
3ftq 0s
Afq = 1
A qMA(ftq - ,ftq) WM
F
I(Xftq - Af(t-1)q) Mtq
F
d ftq= 
.." dftq
are
V
V
V
expressed in equations (3.07)- (3.15) below:
fE F; tE 1...T; q E Q (3.07)
fE F; tE 1...T; q EQ (3.08)
fE F; tE STEf...T; q EQ (3.09)
V fE F; tE r; qEQ
V fE F; tE ... SATj -1; qEQ
V fE F; qEQ
V tE r; qEQ
(3.10)
(3.11)
(3.12)
(3.13)
(3.14)V tE ; q EQ
V fE F; bE B; qi,...,qj E b; tE {bs...be} (3.15)
Recall that the decision variables must be non-decreasing in time and that the
departure, arrival demand, and landing of each flight must occur in a specific order.
These requirements are reflected by constraints (3.07) - (3.10). Constraints (3.07) and
(3.08) ensure that departure and landing indicator variables are non-decreasing in time.
Constraints (3.09) set the arrival demand indicator of flight f at time t (in profile q) to
be equal to the departure indicator at time t - STEf, effectively requiring that f demands
arrival STEJ periods after it departs. Furthermore, as the departure variables dfq are non-
decreasing, the arrival demand variables bftq are non-decreasing, as well. Lastly,
constraints (3.10) require that each flight lands at or after the time at which it demands
arrival.
Constraints (3.11) and (3.12) establish bounds on the assignment of flight
departure and landing times. Constraints (3.11) prevent flights from being assigned
arrival demand times earlier than scheduled (and, by (3.09), an earlier departure time).
Constraints (3.12) require that all flights land by the final time period for all profiles q.
As the capacity of the final arrival period for all profiles Mq, is equal to the total number
of flights, by definition, there exists a solution to the formulation that does not violate
(3.12).
Constraints (3.13) and (3.14) require the number of flights demanding arrival and
landing to be less than specified limits. Constraints (3.13) specify that the number of
aircraft in an airborne arrival queue during time period t in profile q cannot exceed any
limits that may be placed on the size of the airborne queue by traffic managers. The
values of these limits W' AX may be specified for each time period t E r and under each
profile q E Q. Constraints (3.14) similarly require that the number of flights that are
assigned to land at time t not exceed the planned arrival capacity of the airport specified
by the capacity forecast.
Finally, constraints (3.15) are coupling', or non-anticipativity, constraints. The
formulation contains a set of decision variables for each capacity profile. However, the
various profiles also belong to one or more of the branches of the decision tree, such that
each branch contains a set of arrival capacity profiles {q,,..., q 10o. For the time periods
associated with a branch b, coupling constraints require that the assignment of ground
delay for all flights must be the same under all of the profiles contained in b.
Section 3.2.5 Model Size
As the ECM may be solved as a MIP, the size of the model, as measured by the
numbers of variables and constraints, is of practical consideration; if too large, the model
may not solve in a reasonable amount of time, if at all. The ECM requires four types of
decision variables, dftq, 6f, Aftq, and Zf,,q. The first three are each defined per flight,
time period, and profile, and may be described using mathematical notation as O(FTQ),
where F, T, and Q refer to the number of flights, time periods, and profiles. However,
the Z,,q variables, which are used for the calculation of the cost of airborne delay, are
O(FT2Q). Similarly, most constraints are also O(FTQ) or less, while those for the
calculation of airborne delay cost are O(FT2Q).
Due to the calculation of airborne delay cost, the numbers of variables and
constraints of the ECM increase on the order of the number of time periods squared. As a
9 Richetta and Odoni (1994)
10 §3.2.1
result, the size of the model is sensitive to both the total amount of time that is considered
and the duration of each time period. It is believed that the size of the examples that are
discussed in this dissertation, which require as many as 1 million variables and 2 million
constraints, may be representative of the size of some problems that occur in practice".
However, further research to revise or reformulate the ECM in order to reduce the size of
the model is strongly suggested.
One possibility would be to change how the ECM calculates the cost of airborne
delay. As noted previously, the variables and constraints that refer to airborne delay cost
(3.06a and 3.06b) increase the size of the model significantly. Although a beneficial
feature of the form of these constraints is that the ECM often yields a binary solution
when solved as an LP, there may exist an alternate formulation that both solves as an LP
relaxation and is of smaller size.
Section 3.3 Demonstration of the Model
To demonstrate the capabilities of the ECM, the following section illustrates its
application to two simple, hypothetical examples. In each, the model produces a GDP
that minimizes the total expected cost of delays subject to an airborne arrival queue
capacity. Furthermore, the ECM is shown to compare favorably to prior models in the
literature. It avoids solutions that might be unacceptable in practice and/or results a
lower total expected cost.
11 Details on the implementation are discussed in §3.3.1
Section 3.3.1 Experimental Setup: The Base Case
Experiments using the ECM were run using a base case, which includes a given
flight demand list, flight exemptions, arrival queue capacity, delay cost functions,
computer platform, and set of models to which the ECM is compared.
Arrival Demand
The airport arrival demand is provided by a list of scheduled flight arrivals. This
list contains 348 aircraft that are expected to arrive at Chicago O'Hare International
Airport (ORD) between 1500 Z and 1900 Z on June 22, 2005, as forecast by the
Enhanced Traffic Management System, or ETMS. ETMS data, which are based on a
combination of airline schedules (from the Official Airline Guide, or OAG), filed flight
plans, flight-tracking data, and atmospheric information, represent the best objective and
comprehensive information available to traffic managers during the design of a GDP.
As the inputs to ETMS are changing over time, the ETMS forecasts of flight
arrival times are also subject to change. In this case, the snapshot of forecasted ORD
arrivals was taken at 1300 Z on June 22, 2005 and would be representative of the arrival
demand forecast available at 1300 Z for a possible GDP starting at 1500 Z. Figure 3-7
(page 60) shows a sample of these data, which includes the departure airport and
scheduled departure time of each flight. Flights that are airborne at 1300 Z are indicated
by a letter "A" that precedes the departure time.
Figure 3-8 (page 60) illustrates the cumulative arrival demand forecast by time
period for the duration of the GDP. Note that the nominal arrival capacity rate of ORD is
around 100 aircraft/hour, or 25 aircraft/period. The scheduled arrival demand at 1545 Z
and 1715 Z exceeds the nominal capacity; this implies that even without any adverse
weather, some delays may occur. Furthermore, as the average demand is 22
aircraft/hour12, the buffer to accommodate aircraft if the arrival capacity is reduced is
very limited.
Figure 3-7 A sample of ten flights from the demand list
# ACID TYPE ORIG ETD DEST ETA
1 53A1186 B735 MSY A1237 ORD E1500
2 53A111 B752 BDL A1236 ORD E1502
3 10A305 CR32 ORF P1304 ORD E1502
4 47A126 DC93 MSP P1403 ORD E1502
5 53A529 A319 BOS A1216 ORD E1504
6 01A829 MD82 BDL A1230 ORD E1504
7 01A311 MD83 LGA A1252 ORD E1504
8 10A321 CR32 RDU P1319 ORD E1504
9 01A548 MD82 TUL P1335 ORD E1505
10 27A310 B733 AEX P1303 ORD E1507
ACID: Aircraft Identification
(airline prefix is masked)
TYPE: Aircraft Type
ORIG/DEST: Airport of flight
origination/destination
ETD/ETA: Time of
departure, (E)stimated,
(P)lanned, or (A)ctual
Figure 3-8 Cumulative arrival demand forecast by time period
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12 The FAA has restricted the number of scheduled flights to 88 arrivals/hour since 2004
Flight Exemptions
The list of scheduled flight arrivals includes exempt flights, which are those that
originate from an international airport, are already airborne, or are otherwise designated
as exempt by the traffic manager. For example, of the 348 flights in the sample demand
list, 43 (12.4%) either originate at an international airport or are already airborne at
1300 Z. If ground delays are not assigned until 1500 Z, then the number of international
and airborne flights increases to 141 (40.5%). Exempt flights are not eligible to receive
ground delay but, like non-exempt flights, they may receive airborne delay; thus, total
delay cost of a GDP should include the costs incurred by exempt aircraft. For examples
discussed in this thesis, it is assumed that the set of exempt aircraft (at 1300 Z) is known
a priori and that the exemption status of a flightf is indicated by a parameter
XMTf E {0,1}, where XMTf = 1 for all exempt flights and 0 for non-exempt flights.
As formulated, the ECM assumes that all flights are eligible to receive both
ground and airborne delay. Therefore, two important modifications are made in order to
consider the airborne delay cost to exempt aircraft without assigning them ground delay.
First, each exempt flight in the set of flights F is replaced with a proxy for use by the
ECM. Each proxy flight has the same scheduled arrival time as the flight it replaces but a
scheduled departure time equal to time period t = 0. For consistency, the value of
XMT1 = 1 for all proxy flights.
Second, a set of additional constraints (3.16) are added to the formulation that
require the departure status variable of each flight in time period t = 0 to be equal to the
value of its exemption status parameter. As XMTf = 1 for the exempt/proxy flights, these
constraints ensure that all proxy flights depart as scheduled, in time period t = 0. All
non-exempt flights, for which XMTf = 0, remain eligible to receive ground delay.
dfoq = XMTf V fE F; qEQ (3.16)
The solution to the ECM with these proxy flights is consistent with the use of
flight exemptions. First, neither the proxy nor originally exempt flights receive ground
delay. Second, as the proxy flights have the same scheduled arrival times as the flights
that they replace, the cumulative arrival demand at the airport is unchanged. Third, the
proxy flights may receive airborne delay and the cost of this delay is considered by the
ECM when assigning ground delay to non-exempt flights. And, as an additional benefit,
replacing the airborne flights with proxies that depart at t = 0 means that the ECM does
not need to consider any time periods prior to 1500 Z, thus reducing the required number
of periods and the size of the model 3 .
Maximum Allowable Arrival Queue
The maximum allowable arrival queue W,qM is the largest number of aircraft that
the ECM permits in the arrival queue at the end of every time period (3.13). This limit
may vary over time and for each profile and is assumed to be an input provided by the
traffic manager. For the simple examples discussed here, WMAX is set equal to a
hypothetical value of 30 aircraft for all time periods and profiles.
13 §3.2.5
Functions of Delay Cost
Each experiment is based upon a set of common delay cost functions for ground,
airborne, and cumulative delay. This common set serves two purposes. First, it is used
as the basis for the objective function of the ECM, as well as those of other models from
the literature to which the ECM is compared. Second, as the various models have
different objective functions, this common set will also be used to evaluate the
performance of each solution.
Figure 3-9 shows functions for the incremental delay cost of airborne, ground, and
cumulative delay for each flight. The incremental cost of airborne delay increases with
the duration of delay. For
and the fourth period is 11
Figure 3-9 Functions
for flight delay cost
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example, the cost of the first period of airborne delay is 1 unit
units. Incremental ground delay cost is 0 units/period for the
first eight periods of delay and 1 unit/period thereafter.
T astl'o inrement l c itii d la t h l f 1
y, a u u ve e y cos as a vaue o
unit for all periods of delay time.
Recall that the delay cost model presented in §3.1
requires that the functions of ground, airborne, and
cumulative delay cost be mutually exclusive in terms of the
types of costs they represent. The set of functions in
Figure 3-9 is consistent with this model. For example, the
total delay cost for a flight that receives one period of
ground delay and no airborne delay is 1 unit (Figure 3-10,
page 64), which might represent the cost due to labor. The
cost for a flight that receives one period of airborne delay
and no ground delay is 2 units, representing labor and fuel. Lastly, the total delay cost for
the flight in Figure 3-4 (page 48), which receives one period of ground delay and two
periods of airborne delay, is 7 units: three periods of labor, two of fuel, and an additional
penalty to account for the possibility of a diversion.
Figure 3-10 A Sample Calculation of the Total Delay Cost for a Flight
Flight Ground Delay Airborne Delay Expression of Total Cost Total Cost
fi 1 0 Y1 + X] = 1
f2 0 1 a, + x, = 2
f3 1 2 y, + a, + a2 + X1 + x 2 + X3 = 7
Although the cost functions in Figure 3-9 are hypothetical, the increasing
incremental costs are suggestive of how delay costs may be incurred in practice. For
example, the cost of a flight diversion, which becomes more likely as the duration of
airborne delay increases, is represented by an increase in the incremental cost of airborne
delay. Furthermore, the increase in the incremental ground delay cost might represent the
cost of a flight cancellation that may occur due to ground delays of extended duration.
The Distribution of Delay Among Aircraft
It is possible to affect how the ECM distributes delay among flights by modifying
the cost functions used by the model. Specifically, if the marginal cost of delay increases
with the duration of delay, then the ECM will favor solutions that distribute delay more
evenly over those that concentrate the assignment of delay to a few flights. However,
this is not true in the functions shown in Figure 3-9 for all t. Therefore, the cumulative
delay cost function is adjusted for use in the ECM to include a super-linear function. The
cost functions shown in Figure 3-11 are identical to
those in Figure 3-9, except the parameters for
incremental cumulative delay cost are replaced
with:
Xt = tl* -(t -1)"", where e = 1.0 E-5
The slight increase in X, with t in
Figure 3-11 causes the formulation to favor
solutions that distribute delay more evenly.
Consider a simple example with two flights f, and
f2 and two solutions. In solution #1, f, receives one
period of cumulative delay and f 2 three periods,
Figure 3-11 Delay Cost
Parameters Used in the ECM
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and in solution #2, both flights receive two periods
of delay. Although both solutions have an equal number of cumulative delay periods,
solution #2, which assigns delay more evenly, will have a lower value as given by the
super-linear function (Figure 3-12).
Figure 3-12 Cumulative delay cost example' 4
Possible f, delay f 2 delay Cost (Fig 3-09) Super-linear
Solution (periods) (periods) Cost (Fig 3-11)
#1 1 3 4 4 + 32 E-6
#2 2 2 4 4 + 26 E-6
14 (XI) + (XI + X2 + X3) = 1.0 + 3.000032959
Comparison to Prior Models in the Literature
Within the SAGHP literature, the two closest models to the ECM are the Richetta-
Odoni partially-dynamic LP model (RO-PDM) and the Mukherjee fully-dynamic MIP
model (M-DM). As discussed in §2.3.3, Mukherjee improves upon Richetta-Odoni by
allowing for the early release of aircraft when the arrival capacity forecast is revised
upward. Neither of these models are able to consider flight-specific, non-linear airborne
delay cost functions, such as those in Figure 3-9, which are assumed to represent the
actual cost of delays in practice. Instead, both require a parameter that represents the
ratio of the cost of one period of airborne delay to that of one period of ground delay. For
the examples that are discussed in this thesis, both M-DM and RO-PDM are solved
subject to a linear delay cost function, where ground delay has a cost of 1 unit/period and
airborne delay of 2 units/period.
Mukherjee also proposes alternative objective functions for M-DM that yield
solutions that distribute delay more evenly across aircraft. One alternative (M-DMDD)
amends the objective function to include a cost penalty that increases with the square of
ground delay time. Therefore, for the examples discussed in this thesis, the solution
provided by the ECM is compared to those from three other models:
1. Mukherjee Dynamic Model (M-DM)
2. Mukherjee Dynamic Model with Distributed Delays (M-DMDD)
3. Richetta-Odoni Partially-Dynamic Model (RO-PDM)
Figure 3-13 briefly summarizes the models and their qualities.
Figure 3-13 A comparison of various SAGHP models
Model Dynamic Non-Linear Costs Distributes Applies Cost
Assignment Delays Function
ECM Fully Cumulative, Ground, Air Yes (Cumulative) Super-linear X,
M-DM Fully None No Air/Ground (A/G) = 2.0
M-DMDD Fully Ground Yes (Ground) A/G = 2.0; plus (Delay) 2
RO-PDM Partially None No A/G = 2.0
As the various models minimize different functions of delay cost, a direct
comparison of the respective objective function values is meaningless. Therefore, as a
basis for comparing the models, the cost functions proposed in Figure 3-9 are applied to
each solution. Throughout the discussion in this thesis, the "cost" of a solution refers to
the value of the under the common cost functions, while "objective function value" refers
to the value of the objective function as specified in Figure 3-13.
Implementation
All models were implemented in OPL Studio and solved using CPLEX (v. 09) on
a Pentium 4 desktop computer. The ECM and both Mukherjee models were solved as
MIPs, and the Richetta-Odoni formulation as an LP.
Section 3.3.2 A Deterministic Example
The first example considers a deterministic arrival capacity forecast, which is
represented as a scenario with a single, nominal capacity profile. This deterministic
example demonstrates that the ECM yields a reasonable result for a nominal airport
capacity rate and also offers a convenient starting point for comparisons between the
ECM and other models from the literature. Furthermore, this deterministic example
serves as a control for additional experiments with exhibit stochastic and dynamic arrival
capacity.
Arrival Capacity Scenario
The arrival capacity scenario in the deterministic example consists of a single
profile with a capacity of 25 arrivals in each 15-minute period, a rate equivalent to 100
arrivals/hour. This arrival capacity rate is on a par with the nominal operating capacity of
a few large, metropolitan airports, such as Chicago's O'Hare International Airport
(ORD). The average demand over the four-hour time horizon is well within the capacity
of the airport. However, spikes in demand exceed capacity at 1545 and 1715 Z
(Figure 3-14), which suggests that there will be some airborne arrival delays if no GDP is
implemented.
Figure 3-14 Arrival capacity scenario for a deterministic example
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It is assumed that the time at which a GDP might start is 1500 Z and that the
current time, at which the GDP might be initiated, is 1300 Z. The initiation time is
relevant because all flights that are scheduled to depart before 1300 Z (and thus already
airborne when the decision is made) are exempt from ground delay, regardless of their
scheduled arrival time.
Results
The SAGHP is solved for the deterministic example using five models: the four
noted previously plus a fifth model that gives the delay cost if no GDP is implemented.
The fifth model (No-GDP) is identical to the ECM, except that no ground delays are
permitted. The results of the models are presented in Figure 3-15 (page 70), which lists,
for each solution, the:
1. Total cost (in units)
2. Total ground and airborne delay (in periods)
3. Length of the maximum observed airborne queue (in aircraft)
4. Maximum ground, airborne, and cumulative delay (in periods) observed to
occur for any one flight
5. Time required to run each model (in seconds), as well as the number of
variables and constraints in the CPLEX implementation
The ECM required 1.5 seconds to find an optimal solution for the deterministic
example. This solution assigns one period of ground delay to each of ten aircraft, for a
total often periods of ground delay; no airborne delay is observed. As compared to the
ECM, No-GDP results in the same amount of total delay time, except that all delay
occurs in the air instead of on the ground. Thus, for this example, implementing the GDP
suggested by the solution of the ECM reduces the total delay cost by 50%, as the air
delay that would occur without a GDP is replaced by an equal amount of ground delay.
The other models, M-DM, M-DMDD, and RO-PDM, result in optimal solutions
with the same cost, ground delay, airborne delay, and observed maximum flight delays
and arrival queues as the ECM. These solutions are said to be equivalent, which is
defined as meeting the following four criteria:
1. Assigning the same total amount of air and ground delay
2. Having the same maximum observed arrival queue length
3. Resulting in the same maximum observed flight delay
4. Have the same total expected cost
Figure 3-15 Results of the first, deterministic example
ECM M-DM M-DMDD RO-PDM No-GDP
Total
Cost 10 10 10 10 20
Ground Delay 10 10 10 10 0
Air Delay 0 0 0 0 10
Max. Queue
Flight Max
Ground Delay
Air Delay
Cum. Delay
Model Stats
Runtime (sec)
Variables
Constraints
Units
n n A A
1 1 1 1 0
0 0 0 0 1
1 1 1 1 1
1.5 0.79 0.88 0.09 1.24
46,007 28,229 28,577 5,829
76,084 37,809 38,157 3,072
Cost: units of cost
Max. Queue: aircraft
Delay: periods
Note that equivalent solutions may differ in the specific assignment of ground delay to
flights, which means that there may exist multiple optimal and equivalent solutions for a
given problem. For the purposes of evaluating the various models, these flight-specific
differences are not considered.
That the solution to the ECM is equivalent to those of prior models in the
literature is expected. The key improvements associated with the ECM become evident
when there is a possibility of lengthy or numerous airborne delays, neither of which are
present in this example.
Section 3.3.3 Low Likelihood of a Severe Capacity Reduction
The second example is motivated by the design of GDPs in practice, where the
objectives may include avoiding outcomes with excessive airborne delay. This example
features a hypothetical capacity scenario with a low but appreciable likelihood of a severe
reduction in capacity. If the severe reduction is realized, it might lead to substantial
delays, flight diversions, and an unacceptable number of aircraft in the airborne arrival
queue if a GDP is not implemented proactively. However, the probability of the severe
event is low, so that models that seek only to minimize the total expected delay cost may
not assign sufficient ground delay to avoid an unacceptable outcome.
Arrival Capacity Scenario
The arrival capacity scenario in this example has two profiles. The first profile
represents the nominal airport arrival capacity (25 aircraft/period), which is identical to
that of the previous example in §3.3.2. For the second profile, which has a likelihood of
10%, the airport arrival capacity rate is temporarily reduced to 0 aircraft/period at 1500 Z,
maintains this rate for four periods (one hour), and then returns to the nominal rate. This
hypothetical example might represent the passing of a weather front, where there is a
small likelihood that airport operations will cease due to severe weather15. For each
profile, the capacity of the arrival queue is 30 aircraft.
For this second example, the GDP is modeled dynamically; it is assumed that an
initial decision of whether or not to initiate a GDP is made at 1300 Z and that the
assignment of delay may be revised once, at 1500 Z. Figure 3-16 shows the arrival
capacity scenario superimposed on the cumulative scheduled arrival demand. The
columns indicating cumulative arrival demand are separated into three parts (denoted by
the dark, medium, and light shading), which represent the flights that are exempt at
1300 Z, the flights that would be exempt at 1500 Z if no proactive action is taken, and
flights that are scheduled to depart after 1500 Z.
Results
In this second example, the solution to the ECM initially (at 1300 Z) assigns a
total of 144 periods of ground delay to 94 aircraft. The flights delayed as part of this
initial GDP represent 96% of the 98 non-exempt departures scheduled between 1300 Z
and 1500 Z. Most of these aircraft are held for a short period of time and then released;
by the time of the forecast revision at 1500 Z, only 16 of the 94 delayed aircraft remain
on the ground. The average assigned delay per delayed aircraft is 1.53 periods, or about
23 minutes.
15 The scenario tree for this example is the same as that shown previously in Figure 3-3, page 45
Figure 3-16 Arrival capacity and demand for the second example
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At 1500 Z, the assignment of ground delay is revised. If Profile #1 is realized,
which indicates nominal capacity, all of the aircraft that are being delayed on the ground
are immediately released. In this case, through the remainder of the program, an
additional 29 aircraft would each receive one period of ground delay. Alternatively, if
Profile #2 is realized, the 16 aircraft already being delayed on the ground are assigned
additional delays of up to one hour. Furthermore, under Profile #2, a total of 745 periods
of ground delay are also assigned to the 207 flights that are scheduled to depart after
1500 Z, for an average of 3.6 periods, or 54 minutes, of ground delay per flight
(Figure 3-17).
Figure 3-17 Ground delay assigned under Profile #2 for departures after 1500 Z
Departure Count of Avg. Ground Delay/Flight
Time Flights Periods Time (h:mm)
1500-1515 Z i 42 4.85 1:13
1515-1530 Z 21 4.38 1:06
1530-1545 Z 17 3.94 0:59
1545-1600 Z 22 3.77 0:57
1600-1615 Z 16 3.44 0:52
1615-1630 Z 18 3.22 0:48
1630-1645 Z 18 3.06 0:46
1645-1700 Z 22 2.72 0:41
1700-1845 Z 31 2.29 0:34
Total 207 3.60 0:54
Despite the significant ground delays assigned by the ECM, the solution still does
not avoid substantial airborne delays. If Profile #2 is realized, 51 aircraft receive a total
of 116 periods of airborne delay (2.27 periods/delayed aircraft), with a total airborne
delay cost of 358 units (7.02 units/delayed aircraft). The maximum observed size of the
airborne queue under Profile #2 is 30 aircraft (Figure 3-18), which indicates that the
constraints (3.14) are binding in the optimal solution.
For this example, the cost of the solution to the ECM is greater than that of the
other models (Figure 3-20, page 77). The M-DMDD solution has the lowest cost (202.4
units), while the M-DM, and RO-PDM solutions cost slightly more. The cost of the
ECM solution is 296.5 units, a 46.5% increase over M-DMDD. However, in comparison
to the other models, the ECM is the only one to avoid an unacceptably large airborne
queue under Profile #2. The other solutions could result in as many as 56 aircraft in the
airborne queue, nearly twice the number as the ECM.
Figure 3-18 The airborne queue over time for the solution to the ECM
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The total expected cost of the ECM is greater because the maximum queue
constraints (3.15) require that additional flights be proactively delayed on the ground.
For example, in contrast to the 94 flights that are assigned ground delay prior to 1500 Z
by the ECM, only 10 are delayed proactively by M-DMDD. Furthermore, in order to
accommodate the arrival of the flights delayed at 1300 Z, additional ground delay (and
cost) is incurred after 1500 Z. If Profile #1 is realized, the solution to the ECM results in
an additional 29 periods of ground delay after 1500 Z while the Mukherjee solution
requires none! Thus, while the ECM reduces both the cost and observed airborne queue
of the worst-case outcome, it increases the cost of the best, most likely case.
The ECM is used to solve the problem under three alternative hypotheses. The
first (No-MQC) solves for an assignment of ground delay for which there are no
constraints on the size of the arrival queue. The expected cost of the No-MQC solution is
............
32.4% lower than that for the ECM and 1% lower than M-DMDD (Figure 3-21, page 78).
The No-MQC result shows that in the absence of the airborne queue size constraint the
ECM identifies a lower cost solution than Mukherjee - the key difference between
No-MQC and M-DMDD being the direct consideration of non-linear cost functions.
The second and third provide an upper and lower bound on delay costs. The
upper bound is a solution in which no ground delays are assigned (No-GDP) and that
results in a total expected cost of 489.6 units. The lower bound is found by assuming that
the initial assignment of ground delay is based upon "perfect information" (PI), meaning
that there is no uncertainty in the 1300 Z arrival capacity forecast 6 . For this example,
perfect information results in a total expected cost of 133 units. Figure 3-19 summarizes
the solutions of the different models.
Figure 3-19 A comparison of the costs for the solution to each model
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16 The PI model is identical to the ECM except the coupling constraints (3.15) are removed.
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As a final note, in regards to runtime, the ECM also takes longer than other
models. However, at 7.05 seconds, the run time of the ECM would be acceptable for use
in practice. Run time of the ECM will be discussed in greater detail in §4.3.2.
Section 3.3.4 Conclusions from the Two Examples
The two examples in §3.3.2 and §3.3.3 illustrate some of the differences between
the various models. In the first example, the ECM finds a solution equivalent to that of
the Mukherjee and Richetta-Odoni models; in the second, the ECM solution is more
costly, but also more practical. Note that the two examples are similar: both use the same
flight demand list and assume the same decision times. The only difference between the
two examples is that, in the first, the nominal capacity profile is guaranteed, while in the
second, there is a small likelihood of a severe storm. The ECM is capable of addressing
both examples, while the solutions to the Mukherjee and Richetta-Odoni models, which
lack constraints on the length of the arrival queue, might result in an unacceptable
outcome in the second example.
The ECM avoids extensive airborne delays because it assigns ground delay
proactively. The size of the departure queue, or the number of aircraft in a ground hold,
is never more than two aircraft in the first example. However, under Profile #1 for the
second example, the departure queue is as large as 30 aircraft (Figure 3-22, page 80). On
the other hand, M-DMDD assigns nearly the same amount of ground delay under Profile
#1 in the second example as it does in the first example (Figure 3-23, page 81) - in the
second example, the M-DMDD effectively takes no proactive action! The Mukherjee
model minimizes the expected cost and, as a result, does not assign the additional,
preemptive delays that are needed to reduce the observed airborne queue for Profile #2 to
an acceptable level.
In contrast to prior models in the SAGHP literature, the ECM is better able to
identify the risk posed by the possibility of a severe storm and takes proactive action to
assign delays. Furthermore, a feature of the ECM is that the degree to which the model is
averse to risk can be adjusted. As the results of the No-MQC test indicate, the queue size
constraints (3.13) can be relaxed so as to not be binding in the optimal solution. In this
case, the ECM finds a solution (No-MQC) with a cost that is lower than the other
SAGHP models.
Figure 3-22 Departure queue over time (ECM)
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As a final observation, note that the linear cost functions used in the Mukherjee
formulations could also be easily applied to the ECM. With identical cost functions and
no restriction on the airborne queue, the ECM would yield a solution equivalent to that of
Mukherjee in the second example, as it did in the first example. Thus, the ECM is not
only more applicable, but it is also a more general formulation than Mukherjee, as well.
Section 3.4 Conclusions
A GDP is a tool used by traffic managers at the FAA to manage the arrival
demand at capacity-constrained airports. GDPs reduce the amount of airborne congestion
by proactively delaying flights before they depart. However, a program must often be
17 For comparison, the departure queue for the solution to the ECM is included, as well, and marked in thin
gray lines.
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implemented before the future arrival capacity of the capacity-constrained airport is
known with certainty. The decision of which flights to delay, and by how much, is
described in the academic literature as the single-airport ground hold problem, or
SAGHP.
Chapter Three proposes a new model to address the SAGHP: the ECM, or
"extended cost model." As compared to previous models, the ECM generalizes the
calculation of delay costs, permitting the incremental cost of a delay to vary with its
duration. The model also considers an additional GDP objective, which is to prevent the
formation of lengthy airborne arrival queues that might be undesirable or unacceptable to
traffic managers. In comparison to other models, the ECM is able to incorporate more of
the factors that are considered in practice.
The ECM compares favorably, in many respects, to other models when applied to
two hypothetical examples. In the second example, for which the arrival capacity is both
uncertain and dynamic, and for which there is a low, but appreciable likelihood of a
severe reduction in arrival capacity, the ECM is solved with and without restrictions on
the allowable size of the arrival queue. With the restriction, the solution assigns delays
more aggressively than other models and reduces the possible size of the arrival queue
significantly. Without the restriction, the solution has a lower cost than any of the other
models tested.
In addition to demonstrating some of the advantages of the ECM over other
models in the literature, Chapter Three also suggests how the model might be applied in
practice. Assuming the availability of an arrival capacity scenario, the ECM is adapted to
use ETMS arrival demand data, as well as account for flights exempt from ground delays.
Practical considerations impose additional requirements on model performance: the
solutions should be robust in regards to uncertainty in the input parameters (such as cost,
capacity, etc.) and the formulation should solve sufficiently quickly so as to be of use
during the design of a GDP in practice. Chapters Four and Five explore the performance
of the ECM under a wide variety of examples in order to better demonstrate its
capabilities.

Chapter 4 An Analysis of the Sensitivity of the Solution to the
ECM to Changes in the Values of Input Parameters
The ECM, or "Extended Cost Model," solves the single airport ground hold
problem (SAGHP) subject to uncertain and dynamic arrival capacity. As with other
SAGHP models, the ECM is motivated by the FAA's use of Ground Delay Programs to
manage the arrival demand at capacity-constrained airports. However, unlike previous
models, the ECM also considers non-linear airborne delay cost functions and the capacity
of the airborne arrival queue, thus avoiding solutions that might be unacceptable in
practice. For two examples discussed in Chapter Three, solutions to the ECM compare
favorably to those from previous models in the literature.
An example in the previous chapter applies the ECM to a problem in which there
is a low, but appreciable likelihood of a severe reduction in arrival capacity. Such an
example raises many interesting questions about how the assignment of delay would
change under various alternative assumptions. For example, what if the reduction in
arrival capacity is less severe? What if the reduction is more likely to occur? Or, what if
the capacity of the airborne arrival queue is greater? Examining how the optimal solution
changes under alternative assumptions also provides insight into how the ECM compares
to alternative models in the literature, as well as how it might be applied in practice.
Chapter Four presents the results of a sensitivity analysis of the solution to the
ECM to changes in the input parameters. First, §4.1 provides an overview of the
objectives of the analysis and describes the experimental setup. Then, §4.2 discusses the
results of nine separate experiments that test the sensitivity of the solution to changes in
various input parameters. Finally, §4.3 draws conclusions about the performance of the
ECM for solving the SAGHP and for use in practice.
Section 4.1 Objectives of the Sensitivity Analysis
The advantages of the ECM in comparison to models in the SAGHP literature
may be viewed from two different perspectives. First, from the perspective of the
literature, the ECM generalizes prior models to consider a wider range of delay cost
functions and the capacity of the airborne arrival queue. Second, from the perspective of
an air traffic manager, the ECM minimizes the cost of delays subject to constraints that
prevent solutions that might permit an unacceptably large airborne queue.
Correspondingly, the sensitivity analysis presented in this chapter seeks to
provide insight for both of these perspectives. The analysis has three primary objectives,
which are to: 1) demonstrate that the ECM can consider various input parameters with a
wide range of values; 2) show that the ECM solves non-trivial problems quickly enough
to make it useful in practice; and 3) identify the relationship between various input
parameters and the optimal assignment of ground delay.
Section 4.1.1 Conducting the Analysis
The sensitivity analysis is conducted as nine separate experiments. Each
experiment measures the change in value of various dependent variables (such as the total
expected cost) in response to a change in one or more independent variables. The
independent variables are various input parameters to the ECM and are listed for each
experiment in Figure 4-1.
Figure 4-1 A summary of experiments in the sensitivity analysis
Independent Range of Count of
Exp. Variable(s) Values Trials
1 Airport Arrival Capacity 0 - 30 aircraft 14
2 Profile Likelihood 0.00 - 1.00 21
3 Airborne Queue Capacity 15 - 60 aircraft 18
4 Time of Initial Decision 1300 - 1500 Z 9
5 Airborne Queue Capacity 15 - 60 aircraft 69
Time of Initial Decision 1300 - 1500 Z
6 Time of Revision 1300 - 1600 Z 18
7 Airborne Delay Cost (A) 1 - 55 units 15
8 Airborne Delay Cost (B) 0 - 10 20
9 Airborne Delay Cost (C) 0 - 25 units 16
The sensitivity analysis highlights the conceptualization of stochastic and
dynamic arrival capacity forecasts and the input parameters that are unique to the ECM
among models in the SAGHP literature. The experiments focus on three areas:
1. The arrival capacity scenario tree (experiments #1, 2, 4, 5, and 6)
2. The capacity of the airborne arrival queue (3 and 5)
3. The cost of airborne delay (7, 8, and 9)
Section 4.1.2 Experimental Setup: The Base Case
The nine experiments share a common experimental setup that is previously
presented as an example in §3.3.3. For each experiment, arrival demand is given by a list
of 348 flights that are scheduled to land at Chicago O'Hare International Airport over a
four-hour period of time. The arrival capacity scenario tree contains two profiles, one
that represents the nominal arrival rate (25 arrivals/period) and the other a severe
reduction (0 arrivals/period). A comparison of the arrival demand and capacity under
each profile for the base experimental setup is shown in Figure 3-16 (page 73). The
scenario tree contains two nodes, or decision times. At 1300 Z, a GDP is initiated for a
forecast specifying that the likelihood of Profile #1 is 0.90 and that of Profile #2 is 0.10.
At 1500 Z, the actual arrival capacity of the airport is revealed and the GDP is revised
accordingly.
For these experiments, it is assumed that the cost of delay to each flight is
represented by the functions in Figure 3-9. However, as discussed in §3.3.1, these
functions are modified slightly for use by the ECM in order to identify solutions that
distribute delay more evenly among aircraft. Please note that the term "cost" as used in
this chapter refers to the value obtained by applying the modified functions in
Figure 3-11 to the solution of the ECM.
This example, which is summarized in Figure 4-2, is used as the basis for the
sensitivity analysis for two reasons. First, with two contrasting profiles, the example is
simple enough to allow meaningful conclusions to be drawn about the sensitivity of the
solution to the individual input parameters, yet complex enough to represent the core
tradeoff in the design of a GDP between the control of flights and the availability of
information. Second, this example is one for which the solution to the ECM holds some
advantages over those of other models in the literature18 .
18 §3.3.3
Figure 4-2 A summary of the base experimental setup
Profile #1
Profile #2
Incremental
Delay Cost
Decision Initiation Revision Arrival Queue 30 aircraft
Time 1300 Z 1500 Z Capacity
Section 4.1.3 Terminology
To facilitate a discussion of the results of each experiment, several terms are
defined below. Each term is defined with reference to the optimal solution of the ECM
for a single trial.
* Cost under a profile: the sum of the delay costs across all flights assuming the
realization of a particular arrival capacity profile
* Total expected cost: the expected value of sum of delay costs across all flights
* Marginal cost or marginal delay: the observed incremental change in cost or
delay per unit of change in the independent variable with respect to the
previous trial
* Maximum observed arrival queue: the maximum number of flights that would
simultaneously experience airborne delay
* Maximum observed flight delay: the greatest amount of airborne, ground, or
cumulative delay assigned to any one flight
Section 4.2 Results of the Sensitivity Analysis
In this section, the sensitivity analysis is presented as nine separate experiments.
The general results of the sensitivity analysis as a whole will be discussed in §4.3.1.
Detailed results are also provided in the appendix.
Section 4.2.1 Severity of the Capacity Reduction: M2t
The first experiment varies the planned airport arrival capacity rate (PAAR) of
Profile #2 between 1500 and 1600 Z, which is referred to as M 2t. The values of M 2, vary
between 0, which is the value in the base setup, and 30 aircraft, which exceeds the
nominal arrival capacity. A superposition of the profiles used in this experiment is
shown in Figure 4-3. The arrival capacity under Profile #2 after 1600 Z and under Profile
#1 for all time periods is held constant at 25 aircraft/period.
Figure 4-3 Arrival capacity profiles used in experiment #1
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A summary of the setup for experiment #1 is shown in Figure 4-4. Note that the
profile likelihoods are {p, = 0.10, p, = 0.90}. This change increases the sensitivity of the
overall solution to the capacity of Profile #2.
Figure 4-4 A summary of experimental setup #1
Initial Capacity Likelihood
IncrementalProfile #1 25 0.10
Delay Cost
Profile #2 Varies 0.90
Decision Initiation Revision Arrival Queue
Time 1300 Z 1500 Z Capacity
Results
30 aircraft
In this experiment, as the arrival capacity under Profile #2 increases, the total
expected cost decreases (Figure 4-5, page 92). However, the marginal benefit of an
increase in capacity (measured as the reduction in total delay cost per unit change in
capacity) is less for larger values of M 2,. For example, if M 2, is 0 aircraft, then increasing
the capacity by 5 aircraft reduces the total expected cost by 459.5 units. However, ifM 2t
is 20 aircraft, then the same net increase in capacity reduces the cost by only 19.8 units.
This suggests that an incremental increase in the arrival capacity or decrease in the arrival
demand is most beneficial when the capacity is low or when the difference between
demand and capacity is greatest.
Similarly, the cost under each profile also decreases as the capacity of Profile #2
increases. For example, the expected cost under Profile #1 decreases from 349.0 to 10.0
units as M 2, increases from 0 to 30 aircraft/period. The decrease in cost under Profile #1
is especially notable because the capacity of this profile is the same for all trials in the
experiment; the reduction is due to the coupling constraints (3.15) that apply to all ground
delay assigned prior to 1500 Z revision. Additional detailed results are available in the
appendix.
Conclusions
This experiment examines the solutions of the ECM for 14 different values of the
airport arrival capacity rate under Profile #2 between 1500 and 1600 Z. The results
indicate that increasing the capacity under one profile reduces the total expected cost, as
well as the cost under each profile. Furthermore, the marginal benefit of an increase if
greatest when the arrival capacity is most constraining.
Figure 4-5 Delay cost as a function of M 2 t
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Section 4.2.2 Likelihood of a Reduction in Capacity: P2
The second experiment varies the likelihood of the arrival capacity profiles
(Figure 4-6). Recall that the cumulative likelihood IPq = 1; so for a scenario with two
Q
profiles, the likelihood of one profile can be expressed as a function of the other. For
convenience, in this experiment, p, is treated as a dependent variable, with p, = 1 -p2.
Possible values of P2 are specified on the interval (0,1) in increments of 0.05.
Figure 4-6 A summary of experimental setup #2
Initial Capacity Likelihood
IncrementalProfile #1 25 Varies Delay Cost
Profile #2 0 Varies
Decision Initiation Revision Arrival Queue
Time 1300 Z 1500 Z Capacity 30 aircraft
Of note in this experiment is that the scenarios in which p 2 = {0,1} are equivalent
to a scenario that contains only a single profile. For example, if p = 1, then Profile #1 is
assured of being realized; this represents the same forecast as the deterministic scenario
used in the example in §3.3.2. As additional profiles with a likelihood of 0 do not change
the forecast represented by a scenario, they are considered to be irrelevant.
Irrelevant profiles may affect the optimal solution to the ECM in two ways. First,
the maximum queue constraints (3.13) apply to all profiles, without regard to the profile
likelihood. Thus, an irrelevant profile may force the solution to consider the queue size
of a profile that will not occur! This represents a limitation of the ECM. Second, if the
likelihood of a profile is 0, then the cost of delays under that profile will not be factored
in to the value of the objective function. As a result, the ECM may assign delays under
irrelevant profiles that would be impractical or inconsistent with those for a profile with a
positive likelihood. To avoid such solutions, the trials in this experiment solve the
SAGHP at the limit as p2 approaches 0 and 1. This will not affect the cost of the
solution, but may change the delays assigned under an irrelevant profile.
Results
Figure 4-7 summarizes the results of the second experiment. As the likelihood of
Profile #2 increases, the optimal solution assigns more ground delay, which increases the
cost under Profile #1 and decreases the cost under Profile #2. Furthermore, as P2
increases, the total expected cost curve is downward sloping (Figure 4-8)19 20. This
indicates that additional proactive ground delays reduce the cost under Profile #2
(weighted by P2) by more than they increase the cost of Profile #1 (weighted by p ).
The change in slope of the total expected cost curve is measured in terms of the
change in the marginal cost, or second derivative. This is exhibited in Figure 4-7 as the
column labeled "o2." Note that the trials for which the change in the marginal cost is
equal to 0, such as those for p2 = [0.30, 0.50], correspond to solutions for which the
assigned ground and airborne delays are identical to those of the next trial.
19 The slope is highlighted by an additional straight line that is added to the chart.20 Please note that, for the charts exhibited in this chapter, a marker indicates the result of each trial and,
where applicable, a straight line has been drawn between markers for successive trials to highlight the rate
of change in value.
Figure 4-7 A summary of the results of experiment #2
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Figure 4-8 Delay cost as a function of the likelihood of Profile #2
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Conclusions
This experiment examines changes in the cost and assignment of ground delay for
varying likelihoods of the arrival capacity profiles. Although an increase in p 2 generally
decreases the cost under Profile #2 and increases the cost under Profile #1, there exist
values of P2 for which a net change of up to 0.2 does not change the assignment of
ground delay in the optimal solution. For the design of GDPs in practice, this suggests
that it may be useful to evaluate the sensitivity of the solution if the profile likelihoods,
themselves, are uncertain. A more detailed examination of the sensitivity of the solution
to changes in likelihood is an area of possible future research.
Furthermore, this experiment also demonstrates that solutions to the ECM may be
sensitive to the addition of irrelevant profiles to the arrival capacity scenario. As noted
previously, the scenario in which p, = 0 represents the same arrival capacity forecast as
the scenario used in the example in §3.3.2. However, as the maximum queue (3.13) and
coupling (3.15) constraints apply to the irrelevant profile, the solution to the ECM assigns
more delay - and results in a higher total expected cost - for the scenario in this example
than it does when there is only a single profile. Therefore, care should be exercised
before using the ECM to ensure that the scenario tree and the values of Wq L  are
appropriate. Additional research might also explore alternative formulations in which the
capacity constraints consider likelihood.
Section 4.2.3 The Capacity of the Airborne Arrival Queue: WMAX
The experiments discussed in the previous sections assume that the capacity of the
airborne arrival queue WmAx is 30 aircraft. This experiment varies the arrival queue
capacity between 16 and 60 aircraft. For values of less than 16 aircraft, the ECM does
not have a feasible solution for this example. The experimental setup is summarized in
Figure 4-9; note that the profile likelihoods are {p, = 0.95, p2 = 0.05}.
Figure 4-9 A summary of experimental setup #3
Profile #1
Profile #2
Incremental
Delay Cost
Decision Initiation Revision Arrival Queue
Time 1300 Z 1500 Z Capacity
Results
Varies
The maximum queue constraints are not binding for values of W AX > 56. For
these trials, the optimal solution assigns 10 periods of ground delay under Profile #1 and
804 periods of ground delay (plus an additional 247 periods of airborne delay) under
Profile #2 (Figure 4-10, page 98). As the value of Wqa x decreases, the constraints
become binding and the optimal solution assigns more ground delay. Therefore, in this
experiment, assigning additional ground delay decreases the cost under Profile #2 and
increases the cost under Profile #1, as well as the total expected cost.
The additional ground delay increases the cost under Profile #1 and decreases the
cost under Profile #2. Overall, reducing the capacity of the arrival queue increases the
total expected cost by as much as 371%, from 106.2 units for WmAX = 56 to 393.9 units
for Wq"AX = 16.
Figure 4-10 Ground and airborne delay as a function of WmAx
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Conclusions
This experiment varies the capacity of the airborne arrival queue. If the constraint
on the capacity of the arrival queue is binding in an optimal solution, decreasing the value
of WMAX
* Reduces the cost of Profile #2, which would otherwise have an arrival queue
in excess of WMa
* Increases the cost of Profile #1, which does not exhibit any airborne delays
* Increases the total expected cost of the optimal solution substantially
The infeasibility of the ECM for Wq x < 16 indicates that it is not possible to design a
program that restricts the size of the arrival queue to an acceptable length because of the
number of aircraft that are either airborne at 1300 Z or otherwise exempt. The
relationship between W •" and the time at which the decision to implement a GDP is
made will be discussed further in §4.2.5.
Section 4.2.4 The Initiation Time of a GDP
The fourth experiment varies the time at which a GDP is initiated between 1300
and 1500 Z. In practice, traffic managers may postpone the decision to implement a GDP
until more information is available, which is also referred to as a "wait and see" strategy.
However, flights depart over time (Figure 4-11), which reduces the ability of a program
to preempt airborne delays. The ECM can model the effects of the "wait and see"
strategy by selectively exempting21 all aircraft that are scheduled to depart before a
Figure 4-11 Exempt Aircraft by Decision Time
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desired decision time. For this experiment, the time of the revision (1500 Z) is
unchanged and the capacity of the arrival queue is sufficient so as to not constrain the
optimal solution (Figure 4-12).
Figure 4-12 A summary of experimental setup #4
Initial Capacity Likelihood
IncrementalProfile #1 25 0.90 Delay Cost
Profile #2 0 0.10
Decision Initiation Revision Arrival Queue
Time Varies 1500 Z Capacity
Results
348 aircraft
The optimal assignment of ground delay for a GDP initiated at 1300 Z results in a
total expected cost of 200.4 units22. As the GDP is postponed, the total expected cost
increases, with the greatest cost (205.1 units) incurred for an initiation at 1500 Z.
However, the relative magnitude of the cost increase over this time is small: postponing
the initial GDP by two hours increases the total expected cost by a mere 2.3%!
Changes under the individual profiles are more significant than those for the total
expected cost. For example, as the initiation of a GDP is postponed from 1300 Z to
1500 Z, the cost under Profile #1 increases from 1,779 to 1,961 units, an increase of
10.2%. The largest observed change occurs between 1400 Z and 1415 Z. This coincides
with the departure of 19 aircraft, which is the most of any period prior to 1500 Z. This
suggests that the increase in costs correspond to a decrease in the number of flights that
are eligible to receive ground delay.
22 Note that this solution is equivalent to the No-MQC model in Figure 3-21, which also ignores the
capacity of the arrival queue.
100
Conclusions
In general, the earlier that a GDP is initiated, the lower the total expected cost will
be. However, for the given example, the total expected cost associated with an optimal
assignment of ground delay is relatively insensitive to changes in the initiation time.
Although this result may be specific to the example in this experiment, it may also signify
that the total expected cost of a dynamic GDP is less sensitive to the time at which the
GDP is initiated than it is to other input parameters. Postponing the initiation time
reduces the number of flights that are eligible to receive ground delay to those with the
latest departure times. However, a quality of an optimal solution is to delay the flights
that depart last. Therefore, as long as the number of flights that remain on the ground is
sufficient to avoid significant airborne delays, the "wait and see" strategy may not have
significant effects on the total expected cost of the optimal GDP. The question of how
many flights are sufficient may depend on other parameters, such as the capacity of the
arrival queue, which was not considered in this experiment. The experiment discussed in
the next section simultaneously varies both the initiation time and the capacity of the
airborne arrival queue.
Section 4.2.5 The Airborne Queue Capacity and GDP Initiation Time
The fifth experiment varies the capacity of the airborne arrival queue and the
timing of the initial assignment of delay simultaneously (Figure 4-13, page 102). As
shown in the previous experiment, if the capacity of the arrival queue is ignored,
postponing the initial assignment until 1500 Z results in a relatively small change to the
total expected cost. However, a GDP initiated at 1500 Z would also result in a maximum
observed arrival queue of 60 aircraft, which might exceed acceptable limits.
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Figure 4-13 A summary of experimental setup #5
Initial Capacity Likelihood
IncrementalProfile #1 25 0.90
Delay Cost
Profile #2 0 0.10
Decision Initiation Revision Arrival Queue
Time Varies 1500 Z Capacity
Results
Varies
This experiment consists of 69 trials, for decision times between 1300 and 1500 Z
and arrival queue capacities between 16 and 60 aircraft. For eight of the trials, the ECM
is infeasible (marked as "INF" in Figure 4-14), indicating that the aircraft that are already
exempt at the time the GDP is initiated will exceed the capacity of the arrival queue. As
a result, if the ECM is infeasible for a given trial, then a reduction in the capacity of the
queue for the same decision time will also result in an infeasible solution. The minimum
feasible value of W ,"" for each initiation time is identified by direct experimentation
and the infeasible regions of the table are shaded in light gray.
There are two manners of interpreting Figure 4-14. First, by reading across each
row, the cost of the "wait and see" strategy for a desired airborne queue capacity can be
identified. For example, for an arrival queue capacity of 60 aircraft, the total expected
cost of the optimal solution does not change significantly if the time a GDP is initiated is
postponed from 1300 to 1500 Z23. However, for a capacity of 30 aircraft, the formulation
is infeasible unless the GDP is initiated by 1315 Z. In general, postponing the time at
which a GDP is initiated does not significantly increase the total expected cost of the
23 Note that these values are identical to those in the previous experiment for which the capacity constraint
is relaxed.
102
optimal solution, but may preclude the possibility of reducing the size of the arrival
queue to an acceptable length.
Second, reading down the columns of Figure 4-14 indicates the cost of meeting
each arrival queue capacity for a given initiation time. For example, a GDP initiated at
1300 Z with an arrival queue capacity of 60 aircraft will have a total expected cost of
200.4 units. If the capacity is only 16 aircraft, then the cost is 438.6 units. In this
example, the total expected cost is more sensitive to changes in the arrival queue capacity
than to the time the GDP is initiated.
Figure 4-14 Total expected cost by initiation time and arrival queue capacity
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Conclusions
This experiment indicates that the "wait and see" strategy may result in the
maximum observed arrival queue length exceeding an acceptable limit. Furthermore, the
latest time at which a program could be initiated without exceeding a given queue
capacity may not be immediately clear from the optimal solution for a single trial.
Alternatively, by solving the ECM at various initiation times, the time at which a decision
must be made can be identified.
Section 4.2.6 Time of GDP Revision: tp,
Recall that for the base arrival capacity scenario tree, ground delays are initially
assigned at 1300 Z and revised once the actual arrival capacity of the airport is known
with certainty. Previous experiments have assumed that the GDP revision will occur at
1500 Z. However, the time at which the revision will occur may also vary. For example,
an improved forecast might be made available at an earlier time or the GDP might not be
instantaneously revised once the update does become available. As the actual arrival
capacity rate of the airport is known with certainty when the revision is made, this time is
also referred to as the time ofperfect information, or tp,.
For the sixth experiment, tai varies between 1300 and 1600 Z (Figure 4-15). Note
that the arrival capacity profiles used for each trial are the same; only the time at which
the information becomes available to the traffic manager is changed. Thus, the trial for
1600 Z implies that the revision would occur one hour after the capacity reduction is first
observed at the airport.
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Figure 4-15 A summary of experimental setup #6
Profile #1
Profile #2
Incremental
Delay Cost
Decision Initiation Revision Arrival Queue
Time 1300 Z Varies Capacity
Results
30 aircraft
The total expected cost increases with each postponement of the revision time.
For example, a revision at 1300 Z results in a total expected cost of 133.0 units, while a
revision at 1500 Z in 196.5 units24. The increase in cost (123%) is much greater than that
observed for a similar change in the initiation time. Furthermore, a revision after 1500 Z
results in additional cost increases of 38% each at 1500 and 1515 Z.
The costs under each profile also increase with tp, for most trials (Figure 4-16,
page 106). Under Profile #1, cost increases most significantly (by 173%) between
1500 Z and 1530 Z, which coincides with the increase in total expected cost noted
previously. Under Profile #2, the greatest observed increase in cost occurs at 1315 Z,
which is also a critical time to assign initial ground delay25.
However, between 1500 Z and 1530 Z, the cost of Profile #2 decreases slightly,
from 1,408 to 1,401 units. The cause of this curious result is not immediately clear from
the solution to the ECM. However, it suggests that, for each trial, there exist multiple
optimal solutions with identical total expected cost, but for which the costs under the
individual profiles are different.
24 These results are consistent with the PI and ECM results for the example shown in §3.3.3.
25 §4.2.4
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Figure 4-16 Delay cost as a function of the GDP revision time
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Conclusions
This experiment varies the time at which a GDP is revised to reflect the actual
airport arrival capacity. Not only does the total expected cost of the optimal solution
increase with tpI, but the results suggest that it is much more sensitive to changes in the
revision time than to the initiation time. In general, the later the revision time, the greater
the total expected cost of delays.
For this example, the analysis identifies three critical decision times (1415 Z,
1500 Z, and 1515 Z), after which the delay cost increases significantly if the GDP is not
revised. As the time of the revision also reflects the time at which the actual arrival
capacity becomes known to the traffic manager, additional research in the sensitivity of
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the solution to a change in revision time would be useful for evaluating the value of
technology that would increase the lead-time of capacity forecasts.
Section 4.2.7 The Maximum Airborne Delay Cost Increment: a;
The seventh experiment varies the incremental cost of airborne delay. The ECM
considers incremental airborne delay costs that vary with the duration of delay, such as
those that might be due to a flight diversion. The experiments that have been discussed
previously use a hypothetical airborne delay cost function at26 . In this function, the first
period of airborne delay has a cost of one unit, while the fourth period of delay has an
incremental cost of 11 units.
This experiment assumes that the incremental airborne delay cost function will
follow a similar form as a,, but that the maximum possible increment is equal to a
constant A. Let the experimental incremental airborne delay cost a; be defined as a
function of A and a,:
a, { max(A, at) V tE 1,2, 3 (4.01)At V t>4
Figure 4-17 (page 108) shows a superposition of the set of cost functions that will be
applied in this experiment, for which A varies between 1 and 55 units. As shown, for
delays of less than three periods (45 minutes), a; is capped by a,.
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26 §3.3.1
Figure 4-17 The set of airborne delay costs used for experiment #7
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n
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Figure 4-18 A summary of experimental setup #7 - 9
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Initiation Revision
1300 Z 1500 Z
Incremental
Delay Cost
Arrival Queue
Capacity
In order to increase the sensitivity of the formulation to changes in A, two
additional modifications are made to the experimental setup for this analysis
(Figure 4-18):
* The airborne arrival queue capacity is made sufficiently large so as to not
constrain the optimal solution
* The profile likelihoods are set to {p, = 0.75, p2 = 0.25}
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Profile #1
Profile #2
Decision
Time 348 aircraft
Results and Conclusions
Figure 4-19 shows the results for this experiment. As A increases, so does the
total expected cost; this result is expected because A is the incremental cost of airborne
delay.
In contrast to cost, the amount of ground and airborne delay assigned in the
optimal solution does not always change with A. The amount of ground delay assigned
under both profiles increases for A < 5. However, increasing A beyond 5 units does not
change the assignment of delay. Furthermore, even for large values of A, the size of the
maximum observed queue is never less than 44 aircraft. Previous experiments (#3 and
#5) show that there exist solutions in which the observed queue length is as small as 16
aircraft. However, these solutions are not be found by increasing the value of A, alone.
Figure 4-19 A summary
A Exp.
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r of the results for experiment #7
Profile #1 (0.75) Profi
Air Ground Max. AirCost CostDelay Delay Queue Dela
12 0 12 0 1,290 24
17 0 17 0 1,423 23
60 0 60 0 1,426 17
65 0 65 0 1,451 17
71 0 71 0 1,471 16
71 0 71 0 1,478 16
71 0 71 0 1,485 16
71 0 71 0 1,492 16
71 0 71 0 1,499 16
71 0 71 0 1,506 16
71 0 71 0 1,541 16
71 0 71 0 1,611 16
71 0 71 0 1,681 16
71 0 71 0 1,751 16
71 0 71 0 1,821 16
aircraft Run Time:
units of cost Air, Ground Delay:
lie #2 (0.25)
Ground Max.
y Delay Queue
.0 810 56
'0 820 55
'8 872 46
'2 878 45
5 885 44
5 885 44
5 885 44
5 885 44
5 885 44
5 885 44
5 885 44
5 885 44
5 885 44
5 885 44
5 885 44
seconds
aircraft-periods
Run
Time
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Section 4.2.8 Airborne Delay Cost Multiplier a1'
As in the previous experiment, the eighth experiment also varies the cost of
airborne delay. However, in this case, a constant B multiplies the incremental cost of
airborne delay. Let the experimental incremental airborne delay cost be defined as:
a'= B x a, V t E (4.02)
Figure 4-20 shows a superposition of the incremental delay cost curves that correspond to
values of B between 0 and 10. A key difference between B and A in the previous
experiment is that the cost of a single period of airborne delay may exceed one unit. In
all other regards, the experimental setup is the same as in the previous experiment
(Figure 4-18, page 108).
Figure 4-20 The set of airborne delay costs used for experiment #8
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Results
The results show that increasing the multiplier B increases the total expected cost
(Figure 4-21, page 112). In general, the costs under each profile also increase with B,
although for several trials the cost under Profile #2 decrease. As with the experiment
related to the revision time in §4.2.6, this may indicate the presence of multiple optimal
solutions for these trials.
Increasing B also results in less airborne delay and more ground delay for higher
values of B. The marginal benefit of increasing B, in terms of reduced airborne delay,
decreases at higher values; this can be seen as a flattening of the slope of the delay curves
in Figure 4-22 (page 112). Additionally, increasing B also reduces the maximum
observed airborne queue size. For values of B _: 3.5, the maximum observed queue is
less than 30 aircraft.
As a final observation, the run time for the trial corresponding to B = 1.50 is
82.56 seconds, greater than any other trial in the preceding experiments. For this trial,
the increased run time is due to the application of the branch-and-bound algorithm; the
linear relaxation of the ECM did not give an integer solution27 28. Integer solutions in the
context of the ECM will be discussed further in §4.3.2.
27 Repeated trials for B = 1.50 consistently resulted in similar model run times.28 The branch and bound algorithm terminated with an exact optimal solution.
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Figure 4-21 Costs as a function of the multiplier B
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Figure 4-22 Delays as a function of the multiplier B
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Conclusions
In this experiment, a multiplier of the airborne delay cost function is varied over a
range of 0 to 10. Three general conclusions can be drawn from this experiment:
1. Total expected cost increases as airborne delay cost increases
2. The maximum observed arrival queue can be reduced by varying the cost of
short-duration airborne delays
3. For one trial, the linear relaxation of the ECM resulted in a non-integer
solution
The following section will discuss a third experiment of the sensitivity of the solution to
changes in the airborne delays cost.
Section 4.2.9 Base Airborne Delay Cost a"'
As in the previous two experiments, the ninth experiment also varies the
incremental airborne delay cost. In this case, a parameter C adds to the each increment
such that:
a"= a, + C V tEr (4.03)
Figure 4-23 (page 114) shows a superposition of the experimental incremental airborne
delay cost functions corresponding to values of C between 0 and 25 units. Other than the
cost of airborne delay, this experiment uses the same setup as the two previous
experiments (Figure 4-18, page 108).
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4-23 A superposition of the incremental cost curves in experiment #9
100
C = 0,00
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Duration of Delay (Periods)
Results
For this experiment, a total of 16 trials were conducted, for values of C between 0
and 25 units. Notable values of C include:
* 0.0, for which the results are identical to that of the trial for B = 1
* 5.0, which is the smallest value of C (among those tested) for which the
maximum observed arrival capacity is less than or equal to 30 aircraft
* 19.0, which is the smallest value of C (among those tested) for which the
maximum observed arrival queue is 16 aircraft2 9
29 The smallest value of the maximum arrival queue length for which the ECM is feasible is 16 aircraft
(§4.2.3)
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Figure
As with previous experiments, increasing the cost of airborne delay (in this case,
by increasing C) assigns more preemptive ground delay and increases the total expected
delay cost. Furthermore, for those trials with values of C greater than 16 units, the
maximum observed arrival queue is reduced to the minimum feasible length. For this
experiment, the linear relaxation of the ECM again failed to find an integer optimal
solution in one trial (C = 1.50 units). Coincidentally, the solution in this case is the same
as that discussed previously (B = 1.50).
Conclusions
The sensitivity of the solution to changes in incremental airborne delay cost was
examined in three separate experiments. In the first, the maximum incremental cost
varies by a parameter A (4.01); in the second, the incremental costs are multiplied by a
parameter B (4.02); and in the third, a parameter C is added to each incremental cost
(4.03). In each experiment, increasing the value of the parameter results in the
assignment of more ground delay and an increase in the total expected delay cost.
(Strictly speaking, assigned ground delay and total expected cost are non-decreasing with
increases in the parameters A, B, and C.) Furthermore, the greater the value of the
parameter in each experiment, the less the observed effect of an increase on the solution.
A key difference in the three experiments is in regards to the relative cost of short
(1 or 2 periods) vs. long (> 2 periods) delays. For example, for values of A t 5 in the
first experiment, further increases in A do not change the optimal solution because the
incremental cost of a short delay is bounded by a,. However, increasing the value of B
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or C increases the cost of a short delay above that in the base setup - and does reduce the
maximum observed arrival queue.
Section 4.3 Conclusions of the Analysis
The sensitivity analysis conducted in this chapter consisted of nine separate
experiments, with a total of 195 trials. Each of the nine experiments examined the
change in the optimal assignment of delay due to a change in one or more input
parameters, including the arrival capacity scenario, the capacity of the airborne arrival
queue, and the relative cost of airborne delay. This section summarizes the results of the
experiments and identifies areas for future research.
Section 4.3.1 General Results
In practice, a GDP is an assignment of ground delay to aircraft. Each of the
experiments in this analysis assigns ground delay to flights assuming a common scenario
tree that contains two profiles, one representing the nominal arrival capacity and the
second a reduction in capacity. An example in §3.3.2 shows that the optimal solution
assigns a total of 10 periods of ground delay when the nominal capacity profile is
considered alone. However, when there is also the possibility of a severe reduction, the
optimal solution may assign additional ground delay under the nominal profile in order to
reduce airborne delays if the reduction is realized.
As shown by the experiments in this chapter, the volume of ground delay that is
assigned depends on the input parameters to the ECM. Therefore, the impact of a change
in an input parameter can be measured by observing the corresponding change in ground
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delay assigned under the nominal profile. In each of the nine experiments, an equal or
greater volume of ground delay is assigned under Profile #1 when:
* The severity of the capacity reduction increases (Experiment #1)
* The likelihood of the capacity reduction increases (#2)
* The capacity of the airborne arrival queue decreases (#3, 5)
* The GDP is initiated at an earlier time (#4, 5)
* The GDP is revised at a later time (#6)
* The cost of airborne delay increases relative to ground delay (#7, 8, 9)
In six of the nine experiments, when an increase in ground delay under Profile #1
is observed, the ground delay under Profile #2 and the total expected cost are also
observed to increase. However, in three experiments - #4, 5, and 6, which correspond to
the initiation and revision times - this observed relationship between total expected cost
and the optimal assignment of ground delay does not hold.
First, the results of experiments #4 and #5 show that the earlier a GDP is initiated,
the greater the ground delay under Profile #1 and the less the total expected cost. When
the decision to assign delay is made at a later time, flights will depart and become exempt
from ground delay, risking more costly airborne delays. These results suggest that the
intentional postponement of the enactment of a GDP - the wait-and-see strategy - will
never decrease the total expected cost of delay because it relinquishes the ability to assign
delays without gaining any benefit, such as additional information.
Second, the result of experiment #6 indicates that postponing the revision time
increases the ground delay assigned under Profile #1 but decreases the ground delay
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assigned under Profile #2. By postponing the revision time, the ECM applies coupling
constraints to a greater number of decisions. A revision at 1300 Z will effectively allow
ground delay to be assigned independently under each profile. However, a revision at
1600 Z requires that the same ground delay be assigned during the first three hours under
both profiles. Therefore, as the revision time is postponed, the solutions under each
profile converge, reducing the ground delay under Profile #2 and increasing the ground
delay under Profile #1.
Section 4.3.2 Run Time of the ECM
For the 195 trials conducted as part of the sensitivity analysis, there were 187
feasible solutions. The cumulative distribution of run times for these 187 trials is shown
in Figure 4-24.
For the 187 unique trials, the average run time was 7.58 seconds and the
maximum 89.61 seconds. For three of the trials (1.5%), the linear relaxation of the ECM
did not result in an integer solution and the branch-and-bound algorithm was applied3°.
Excluding these three trials, the run times of the model range from 3.38 to 12.42 seconds,
with an average of 6.69 seconds. As shown, the distribution of run times is also observed
to vary across the different experiments (Figure 4-25). A more detailed exploration of
the relationship between the variation of different input parameters and model run time is
left as an area for future research.
3o For each of these, the branch-and-bound algorithm terminated with an optimal integer solution.
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Figure 4-24 Cumulative distribute of run times
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As a final note regarding the run time of the ECM, recall that the comparison of
the ECM to prior models in the literature (§3.3.4) indicated that the ECM requires
significantly longer to solve than the other models. However, the sensitivity analysis also
demonstrates that the ECM solves a hypothetical problem quickly enough to be of
practical use - even when the linear relaxation does not yield an integer solution. The
analysis also shows that model run times tend to be relatively consistent for different
values of the input parameters; in only three of the nearly 200 trials did the solution
require longer than 12 seconds.
Section 4.3.3 Sensitivity in Practice
The sensitivity analysis presented in this chapter assumes a hypothetical airport
arrival capacity scenario. However, the results of the analysis offer three meaningful
conclusions for how a similar analysis could be used for the design of ground delay
programs in practice.
First, a sensitivity analysis identifies the effects of uncertainty in the value of
input parameters upon the optimal assignment of ground delay. For example, there may
exist several different methods to forecast the arrival capacity of an airport, each of which
may provide a different estimate of the likelihood of a decrease in capacity. Instead of
choosing a single value, a sensitivity analysis could explore the impact on the assignment
of ground delay for a range of possible probabilities.
Second, a sensitivity analysis demonstrates the effect of a wait-and-see strategy.
For the hypothetical example used in this discussion, postponing the initial decision until
1500 Z resulted in only a small relative increase (2.3%) in the total expected cost.
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However, if the decision is made after 1315 Z, it is not possible to prevent the airborne
arrival queue from exceeding 30 aircraft. By simultaneously varying both the capacity of
the arrival queue and the time of the initial decision, it is possible to identify critical times
by which a decision should be made in order to achieve a desired arrival queue capacity.
Third, a sensitivity analysis demonstrates the value of improving the accuracy and
precision of various input parameters. As shown in experiment #6, revising the GDP at
an earlier time may significantly reduce the total expected cost. However, the time of the
revision also depends on the time at which a new arrival capacity forecast is made. For a
single GDP, a sensitivity analysis could be used to determine the reduction in total
expected delay cost corresponding to an earlier revision. Further research could extend
this analysis in order to demonstrate the practical value of developing new technology
that delivers improved forecasts with greater lead-time.
Section 4.3.4 Summary
The nine experiments discussed in this chapter examine the sensitivity of the
optimal solution to changes in the input parameters and demonstrate three key results.
First, the ECM is capable of solving for the optimal assignment of ground delay under a
wide range of input parameters and could be used to perform a sensitivity analysis of the
decision to implement a GDP. Second, the time required for the ECM to find a solution
for various combinations of inputs is short enough that the model could be used during
the design of a GDP in practice. Third, the analysis demonstrates how the optimal
assignment of delay varies with respect to changes in different input parameters. For
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example, "critical" decision times are identified by varying the time of the initial and
revising decisions.
Furthermore, this analysis also illustrates the opportunity for future study on the
effects of variations in the value of the input parameters on the assignment of ground
delay. Specifically, studies could be conducted to explore the sensitivity of the solution
to simultaneous variation in multiple variables, or to determine the value of improving
forecasting technology. A third area for exploration is to examine how the ECM assigns
delay under various arrival capacity scenarios - an analysis that will be presented in the
next chapter.
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Chapter 5 An Application of the ECM to Hypothetical Arrival
Capacity Scenarios
The ECM is a mixed-integer program that solves the single airport ground hold
problem (SAGHP) subject to a stochastic and dynamic forecast of the airport arrival
capacity. This model improves upon previous stochastic/dynamic SAGHP models in the
literature because it considers both non-linear airborne delay costs and the capacity of the
airborne arrival queue.
Chapter Five presents an analysis comparing the solution to the ECM to those of
other models in the SAGHP literature for ten different hypothetical airport arrival
capacity forecasts. The various forecasts, which are referred to as "case studies," include
uncertainty about the severity and timing of a reduction in the arrival capacity rate, as
well as the times at which revised forecasts are made available. The analysis shows that
not only can the ECM be applied to a wide variety of arrival capacity forecasts, but it also
results in solutions that are preferable to those of previous models in the literature.
The analysis in Chapter Five is presented in three parts. Section 5.1 discusses the
objectives of the analysis and describes the common experimental setup. Section 5.2
presents the results of 10 arrival capacity cases. Section 5.3 summarizes the results and
discusses the merits of the ECM.
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Section 5.1 An Overview of the Analysis
The analysis is presented as a set of ten experiments, each of which compares the
solution to the ECM to those of other models for a given arrival capacity forecast. Each
forecast is represented as a scenario tree that contains a set of hypothetical arrival
capacity profiles and one or more forecast revision times. The set of scenario trees is
chosen to include uncertainty in various elements of an arrival capacity forecast, such as
the number of profiles and the start time, severity, and duration of a decrease in arrival
capacity. Each scenario tree, together with the other inputs that are considered by the
ECM, is referred to as a "case study."
The case study analysis makes three general contributions to this thesis. First, it
demonstrates how arrival capacity scenario trees might represent various hypothetical
forecasts, including those for which the likelihoods of individual profiles change over
time, and demonstrates that the ECM can solve for the optimal assignment of ground
delay given these forecasts. Second, it shows that the solutions of the ECM are
preferable to those of previous models in the SAGHP literature for various forecasts of
the arrival capacity. Third, it shows that the ECM could also be used as an off-line tool
to identify strategies for the design of a GDP subject to stochastic and dynamic arrival
capacity forecasts.
Section 5.1.1 Experimental Setup
Each of the ten cases is based upon a common experimental setup, previously
introduced in §3.3.1, which includes a set of expected flight arrivals, a capacity of the
airborne arrival queue, and delay cost functions. Arrival demand is given by a list of 348
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aircraft that are scheduled to arrive at ORD over a four-hour period of time31. The
capacity of the arrival queue is assumed to be 30 aircraft for all time periods. And the
functions used to evaluate the cost of a solution are given by the incremental costs in
Figure 3-9.
The arrival capacity scenario tree is different for each of the ten cases in this
analysis. However, the differences reflect various elements of an arrival capacity forecast
and are also chosen so as to facilitate the comparison of results between each experiment.
For example, Case #2 represents a forecast with an uncertain time of an increase in
capacity, while Case #5 represents uncertainty in the time of the decrease. Furthermore,
four cases demonstrate how the timing of a forecast revision changes the optimal
assignment of ground delay (Figure 5-1).
Figure 5-1 A description of the ten arrival capacity case studies
Case # Type(s) of Uncertainty Represented Forecast Revisions
1 Severity of a decrease in capacity (2 alternatives) (2) 1400, 1500 Z
2 Duration of a decrease in arrival capacity (1) 1530 Z
3 Duration of a decrease in arrival capacity (4) 1530, 1600, 1630, 1700 Z
4 Severity of a decrease in capacity (5 alternatives) (1) 1500 Z
5 Start time for a decrease in capacity (1) 1500 Z
6 Start time for a decrease in capacity (4) 1500, 1530, 1600, 1630 Z
7 Start time and severity of a decrease in capacity (1) 1500 Z
8 Start time and severity of a decrease in capacity (3) 1500, 1600, 1700 Z
9 Start time and duration of a decrease in capacity (1) 1500 Z
10 Start time and duration of a decrease in capacity (3) 1500, 1600, 1700 Z
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31 As shown in Figure 3-07
Models Compared
Each experiment compares the solution to the ECM to those of various other
SAGHP models for a given case study. Three of these models are from the SAGHP
literature32:
1. The Mukherjee fully dynamic model (M-DM)
2. The Mukherjee fully dynamic model with distributed delays (M-DMDD)
3. The Richetta-Odoni partially dynamic model (RO-PDM)
An additional three models are adapted from the ECM in order to test various
assumptions.
4. The capacity of the arrival queue is sufficiently large so as to accommodate all
arrival demand (No-MQC)
5. The arrival capacity profile, as it will be realized, is revealed at 1300 Z (PI)
6. All flights are exempt from ground delay (No-GDP)
Basis for Comparison
The various models are compared on the basis of the total ground and airborne
delay times, the maximum size of the observed airborne arrival queue, and the total
expected delay cost that would be incurred by each solution. As the models may have
different objective functions, the term "cost" always refers to the value obtained by
applying a set of common cost functions (Figure 3-9) to a given solution. These
functions express the delay costs accrued by each flight due to ground, airborne, and
cumulative delay.
32 For more information on these models, please refer to the discussion in §3.3.1.
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Section 5.1.2 Terminology
To facilitate a discussion of the results, several terms are defined here; each refers
to the solution to a given model. A complete set of definitions is provided in the
appendix.
* Cost under a profile: the cost of the solution to a model as evaluated by the set
of common cost functions in Figure 3-9 and assuming the realization of a
particular arrival capacity profile
* Total expected cost: the sum of the costs under each profile weighted by the
profile likelihoods
* Maximum observed arrival queue: the maximum number of flights that would
simultaneously experience airborne delay under any profile
* Maximum observed flight delay: the greatest amount of delay assigned to any
one flight under any profile
* Departure queue: At a given point in time, the number of aircraft being.
delayed by a GDP past their scheduled departure time
Section 5.2 Case Studies on the Arrival Capacity Scenario
This section presents the results of the ten experiments based upon the arrival
capacity case studies outlined in Figure 5-1 (page 125). Each experiment solves for the
assignment of ground delay for a given case study using the various SAGHP models and
the solutions are discussed and compared.
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Section 5.2.1 Case #1: Revising the Profile Likelihoods
The first case study is an adaptation of the example previously presented in
§3.3.3. The scenario tree in this case assumes that there are three possible arrival
capacity profiles with likelihoods {p, = 0.8, p2 = 0.1, p3 = 0.1}. Under each of the first
two profiles, the airport arrival capacity is the nominal rate of 25 aircraft/period. Under
the third profile, the arrival capacity is reduced to 0 aircraft/period between 1500 and
1600 Z and then increases to the nominal rate thereafter. In a practical sense, this
scenario is identical to that of the example shown previously in §3.3.3. Although the
initial scenario at 1300 Z contains three profiles instead of two, the likelihood of a
nominal arrival capacity rate being realized is still 0.9.
As in the original example, the scenario tree in Case #1 assumes that a GDP may
be initiated at 1300 Z and then revised at 1500 Z to reflect the actual arrival rate capacity
of the airport. However, a key difference in this case is that the arrival capacity forecast
will also be revised at 1400 Z to indicate whether or not Profile #1 will be realized
(Figure 5-2). The additional forecast has the practical effect of revising the likelihood of
each profile. If the revised forecast indicates that Profile #1 will be realized, then the
forecast follows the upper branch of the scenario tree, for which the relative probability
of a reduction in capacity is 0. On the other hand, if Profile #1 is ruled out as a
possibility at 1400 Z, then the relative likelihood of Profile #2 becomes 0.5.
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Figure 5-2 Scenario tree for Case #1
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Figure 5-3 Results for Case #1
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Results
For Case #1, the total expected cost of the optimal solution to the ECM is 187.7
units and the maximum observed airborne arrival queue is 30 aircraft (Figure 5-3). In
comparison to the other models from the literature, the solution to the ECM has the
129
i
B
lowest cost and the smallest maximum observed arrival queue length. The solution to
M-DM is second-most preferable, with a cost that is identical to the ECM (M-DMDD is
0.6% higher) but a significantly longer maximum observed arrival queue length.
As a result of the additional forecast revision at 1400 Z, the total expected delay
cost of the solution to the ECM is reduced by 37% as compared to that of the original
example in §3.3.3. Furthermore, the realization of Profile #1 (in Case #1) results in a
delay cost of 38 units, which is a 78% reduction as compared to the nominal profile if
there is no revision (173 units). However, under Profiles #2 and #3 the cost is
approximately equivalent to what it would be without the revised forecast.
The effect of the 1400 Z revision is also shown in the graph of the departure
queue over time (Figure 5-4). The optimal solution assigns significantly less ground
delay under Profile #1 than it would if there were no revision but similar amounts of
ground delay under Profiles #2 and #3. Thus, adding a forecast revision at 1400 Z
reduces the total delay cost if Profile #1 occurs and has a minimal effect if Profile #1 is
not realized.
This case study makes two important points. First, it demonstrates how a scenario
tree could represent an arrival capacity forecast in which the likelihood of an event
changes over time. Second, it shows that the improvement of the ECM over other
models depends on the timing and availability of information. For the example in §3.3.3,
which has the same initial forecast and also reveals the true capacity at 1500 Z, the total
expected cost of the solution to the ECM is much greater than that of other models.
However, for Case #1, which adds an additional revision at 1400 Z, the solution to the
ECM is equal to or lower in cost than those of other models from the literature.
130
Ground queue size by time for the solution to the ECM to Case #1
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Section 5.2.2 Case #2: An Increase in the Arrival Capacity
The scenario tree in Case #2 represents a hypothetical forecast in which the time
of an increase in the arrival capacity rate is uncertain. For this scenario, the initial arrival
capacity of the airport is assumed to be 10 arrivals/period, which might represent a
reduction from the nominal capacity due to local weather conditions, such as a high cross
wind or poor visibility. It is assumed that, at some time in the future, the conditions
causing the reduction will abate and the arrival capacity rate will increase to the nominal
level of 25 arrivals/period. The time at which the increase will occur is uncertain.
An initial forecast of the arrival capacity at 1300 Z predicts that the airport arrival
capacity will increase at one of five possible times, each with a given likelihood. Which
profile will be realized will be indicated by a revised forecast at 1530 Z.
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Figure 5-4
120
100
- Profile #1
- - - - Profle #2
- -- - -Profle #3
1900 Z 2000 Z
I ··
"
-u-
1. Capacity increases at 1530 Z (P1 = 0.10)
2. Capacity increases at 1600 Z (P2 = 0.20)
3. Capacity increases at 1630 Z (p3 = 0.30)
4. Capacity increases at 1700 Z (P4 = 0.20)
5. Capacity increases at 1730 Z (P5 = 0.20)
Figure 5-5 and Figure 5-6 show the arrival capacity profiles and scenario tree.
Results
The total expected cost of the optimal solution to the ECM for Case #2 is 882.0
units (Figure 5-7, page 134). Of the other models, the cost of M-DMDD is equal to that
of the ECM and those of M-DM and RO-PDM are 4.5% and 27.8% higher, respectively.
All solutions, except that for RO-PDM, avoid the possibility of airborne delay.
The results of Case #2 suggest a strategy for reducing the cost of delays in
practice. The optimal solution to the ECM proactively assigns ground delay immediately
prior to the forecast revision. In the half hour preceding the revision, between 1500 and
1530 Z, the departure queue increases from 19 to 72 aircraft (Figure 5-8, page 134).
Then, at 1530 Z, ground delays are revised according to the profile that will be realized.
For example, if Profile #1 (the earliest possible increase) is realized, all aircraft in the
departure queue are immediately released. However, if the increase does not occur until
1730 Z, then additional ground delays are assigned and the departure queue builds to 141
aircraft. These results show that, in practice, it may be preferable to enact a GDP before
a forecast revision, rather than after, in order to create the option to assign additional
ground delay if the capacity does not increase.
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Figure 5-5 Superposition of the arrival capacity profiles for Case #2
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Figure 5-6 Arrival capacity scenario tree for Case #2
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Figure 5-7 Results for Case #2
ECM M-DMDD M-DM RO-PDM PI No-MQC NoGDP
Exp. Total Cost
% of ECM Cost
Max Obs. Queue
Exp. Delay
Ground
Airborne
Max Flight Delay
Airborne
Ground
882.0 882.0
100.0%
0 0
882.0
0.0
8
0
882.0
0.0
8
0
921.7
104.5%
0
882.0
0.0
12
0
1,127.0
127.8%
33
886.2
49.4
15
3
859.5
97.4%
0
859.5
0.0
7
0
882.0
100.0%
0
882.0
0.0
8
0
4,265
483.6%
130
0.0
859.5
0
6
Units Exp. Total Cost:
Max Obs. Queue:
units of cost,
aircraft
Exp. Delay:
Max Flight Delay:
aircraft-periods
periods
Figure 5-8 Ground, or Departure, Queue for Case #2, ECM
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Case #2 also highlights important shortcomings in both M-DM and RO-PDM.
First, the solution to M-DM for this example has a higher cost than those of other models
because it assigns more lengthy ground delays to individual aircraft. For example,
M-DM, M-DMDD, and the ECM each assign a total of 1,446 periods of ground delay
under Profile #5. However, of these models, only the solution to M-DM assigns more
than eight periods of ground delay to any one flight. In fact, M-DM assigns delay in
excess of eight periods to 83 flights, with a maximum observed flight delay of 12 periods.
Recall that the cost of ground delay to a flight is assumed to increase after the eighth
period because of the likelihood of a cancellation3 3. However, as shown by the other
solutions, these costs may be avoided in this example by either considering non-linear
ground delay costs directly (as by the ECM) or by distributing ground delay more evenly
(M-DMDD).
Second, RO-PDM results in solutions with a greater total expected delay cost
because this model is not fully-dynamic. While the optimal strategy for the solution to
the ECM requires assigning delay in anticipation of a revision at 1530 Z, RO-PDM is not
able to consider solutions that would release these flights at 1530 Z if Profile #1 is
realized. Instead, for the RO-PDM solution, aircraft remain in the departure queue at
1530 Z even if the arrival capacity increases (Figure 5-9, page 136). As a result, the cost
due to ground delay under Profiles #1 and #2 increases substantially and the solution to
RO-PDM is 27.8% higher in cost than the ECM.
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33 §3.3.1
Figure 5-9 Departure queue for Case #2, RO-PDM
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Section 5.2.3 Case #3: The Capacity Increase for an Alternative Scenario Tree
The solution to the ECM for Case #2 highlights the relevance of the 1530 Z
revision to the optimal solution. Ground delays are initially assigned to the flights that
are scheduled to depart during the half hour prior to the revision in order to create an
option to assign additional delay, if necessary, at 1530 Z. To show that this strategy is
also used when there are multiple revisions, Case #3 presents a scenario tree in which the
actual arrival capacity rate is revealed gradually, over a series of additional forecasts. In
this case, the revision at 1530 Z only indicates whether or not Profile #1 will be realized.
If Profile #1 is not realized, then there may be up to three additional forecast revisions
that will gradually reveal which arrival capacity profile will occur (Figure 5-10).
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Figure 5-10 Scenario tree for Case #3
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Results
For Case #3, the optimal solution to the ECM results in a total expected delay cost
of 952.0 units, which is an increase of 70.0 units over the solution to Case #2. The cost
increases because Case #3 is, in effect, a postponement of the time of the complete
forecast revision and postponing the forecast increases the total delay cost of the optimal
solution34. The solution to each of the different models 35 also demonstrates an increase in
cost. However, the magnitude of the cost increase is not uniform across the different
models. For example, while the cost of the M-DMDD solution is equal to that of the
ECM for Case #2, it is greater for Case #3 by 18.1 units (Figure 5-11, page 138). The
relative performance of the different models subject to changes in the revision time will
be discussed further in §5.2.6.
34 The sensitivity analysis in §4.2.6 explores the relationship between cost and the revision time in greater
detail.
35 except PI, for which the time of the revision is irrelevant
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Figure 5-11 Results for Case #3
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Section 5.2.4 Case #4: A Reduction of Uncertain Severity
Case study #4 shows an example in which there is a possibility of an extreme
outcome, the closure of an airport to flight arrivals, for an extended period of time. In
this case, it is known that the arrival capacity of the airport will be reduced between 1500
and 1800 Z, with an initial forecast at 1300 Z and one revision at 1500 Z. However, the
severity of the decrease is uncertain; the initial scenario contains five arrival capacity
profiles, each with an equal likelihood:
1. 20 arrivals/period (P1 = 0.20)
2. 15 arrivals/period (p1 = 0.20)
3. 10 arrivals/period (Pi = 0.20)
4. 5 arrivals/period (P1 = 0.20)
5. 0 arrivals/period (p1 = 0.20)
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Results
For Case #4, the optimal solution to the ECM has a total expected cost of 2,768.6
units and exhibits a maximum observed arrival queue of 30 aircraft. Each of the other
models results in a solution with both a higher cost and a longer maximum observed
arrival queue (Figure 5-12). In particular, M-DMDD is 10.3% higher in cost (and could
also result in a maximum observed arrival queue of 50 aircraft).
The solution to M-DMDD is also notable because it has a higher cost despite
assigning less airborne delay and less ground delay. The cost of the M-DMDD solution
is higher because the airborne delays that would occur are longer in duration. As
compared to the ECM, M-DMDD assigns less proactive ground delay, which results in
an airborne arrival queue that forms earlier than in the solution to the ECM. As a result,
under Profile #5, 47 aircraft receive more than three periods of airborne delay in the
M-DMDD solution, as compared to only 25 aircraft for the ECM.
Figure 5-12 Results for Case #4
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Section 5.2.5 Additional Case Studies
Six additional cases are presented for which the arrival capacity scenario trees
represent forecasts with uncertainty in the start time, severity, and duration of a decrease
in the arrival capacity. For comparison, the six cases show three separate sets of arrival
capacity profiles with different assumptions as to the number of forecast revisions
(Figure 5-13). Figures showing the scenario trees of the individual experiments are
included in the appendix.
Figure 5-13 Additional case studies performed
Scenario Description Count of Forecast RevisionsScenario Description Profiles One (at 1500 Z) Many
Uncertain start time for a decrease in
capacity Case #5 Case #6
Uncertain start time and severity of a
decrease in capacity
Uncertain start time and duration of a
decrease in capacity
In each case, the solution to the ECM results in a lower total expected cost than
those of M-DMDD, M-DM, or RO-PDM. For brevity, the results of these six cases are
discussed as part of the conclusions in the next section.
Section 5.2.6 A Summary of the Experimental Results
For each of the ten arrival capacity case studies presented in this chapter, the
ECM compares favorably to prior models in the literature. First, the solution to the ECM
has an equal or lower total expected delay cost than the other models. Second, the
solution to the ECM does not result in a maximum observed arrival queue of more than
30 aircraft under any profile. Although the limit of 30 aircraft was chosen arbitrarily for
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these examples, the ECM may be solved with any upper limit specified by the user.
Based on these experimental results, two general conclusions are drawn regarding the
performance of the various SAGHP models used in this experiment.
First, the experimental results show that the relative performance of the individual
models is consistent across the different cases. Figure 5-14 (page 143) compares the total
expected cost of each model for each case, where cost is expressed relative to the cost of
the ECM. The costs of the various solutions exhibit a similar order in each case. For
example, in each experiment, PI has an equal or lower total expected cost than each of the
other models, while RO-PDM has a higher cost than other models.
As a general observation, the various models can be placed in an approximate
hierarchy according to the total expected cost of their solutions to each case:
PI - No-MQC • ECM s M-DMDD _ M-DM : RO-PDM < No-GDP
In Figure 5-14, the models are arranged in columns corresponding to this order; models
with lower costs, such as PI, are on the left and those with higher costs, such as No-GDP,
are on the right. In general, the ECM has a lower cost than every other model, except PI
and No-MQC. There exist two notable exceptions to this hierarchy, which are
highlighted in the figure.
The first exception is the total expected cost of the ECM for Case #0, which refers
to the simple example that is discussed in §3.3.3. For this case, the ECM has a higher
cost than the other models from the literature. The reason for the higher cost is that the
ECM assigns proactive ground delay to limit the size of the arrival queue to 30 aircraft, a
limit that is exceeded by M-DM, M-DMDD, and RO-PDM (Figure 5-15, page 143). If
the arrival queue is not constrained, as shown by No-MQC, then the cost of the solution
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is lower than that of the other models. Thus, one exception to the hierarchy is cases in
which the ECM results in a higher cost because it avoids arrival queues with a length that
might be unacceptable in practice.
The second exception is the cost of the M-DM and M-DMDD solutions for
Case #1. Although M-DMDD results in a lower cost than M-DM in most examples, in
Case #1, M-DMDD has a higher cost. The only difference between these two models is
the objective function of the formulation; M-DMDD adds a penalty that increases with
the duration of ground delay (§3.3.1). As shown by Case #2, this cost penalty causes
M-DMDD to distribute ground delay more evenly, resulting in fewer ground delays in
excess of eight periods and a lower total expected cost for some cases. However, this
penalty also increases the cost of ground delay relative to that of air delay, which may
increase the amount of airborne delay in the solution. In Case #1, the additional airborne
delay increases the total expected cost and also results in a larger maximum observed
arrival queue. Thus, while M-DMDD distributes ground delay more evenly than M-DM,
it may also increase the size of the arrival queue beyond acceptable limits.
The additional airborne delay that may be incurred for solutions to M-DMDD
represents a significant drawback to the manner used by this model to distribute ground
delay among different flights. The ECM is also able to distribute ground delay by
incorporating a super-linear cumulative delay cost function, which, by itself, would also
increase the cost of ground delay relative to airborne delay. However, unlike M-DMDD,
the ECM avoids the potential pitfalls associated with distributing ground delay more
evenly by explicitly considering both non-linear airborne delay costs and the capacity of
the airborne arrival queue.
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Figure 5-14 Comparison of the total expected costs for various models by case
Total Expected Cost (as a % of the ECM cost) by Case
Case PI No-MQC ECM M-DMDD M-DM RO-PDM No-GDP
#0 44.9% 67.6% 100.0% 68.3% 68.5% 70.9% 165.1%
#1 70.9% 96.6% 100.0% 100.6% 100.0% 104.6% 260.8%
#2 97.4% 100.0% 100.0% 104.5% 127.8% 483.6%
#3 90.3% 100.0% 101.9% 106.6% 448.0%
#4 92.7% 100.0% 100.0% 110.3% 114.2% 127.9% 576.0%
#5 95.7% 100.0% 100.2% 115.9% 119.1% 720.3%
#6 85.0% 100.0% 104.8% 120.0% 639.6%
#7 69.8% 88.5% 100.0% 100.7% 104.1% 112.5% 409.2%
#8 54.5% 83.8% 100.0% 100.3% 102.4% 319.5%
#9 94.4% 100.0% 100.2% 108.4% 114.9% 562.9%
#10 78.8% 100.0% 104.9% 109.1% 470.1%
Figure 5-15 Comparison of the maximum observed arrival queues by model, case
Maximum Observed Arrival Queue (in aircraft) by Case
Case PI No-MQC ECM M-DMDD M-DM RO-PDM No-GDP
#0 16 54 30 56 56 56 92
#1 16 40 30 52 46 44 92
#2 0 0 0 0 33 130
#3 0 25 21 21 130
#4 30 30 30 50 48 63 260
#5 0 16 17 17 21 150
#6 0 27 38 38 150
#7 30 65 30 98 98 108 260
#8 30 74 30 105 105 260
#9 0 16 16 16 21 140
#10 0 25 30 30 140
Note 1: The models are arranged in order of total expected cost from lowest to highest.
Exceptions to this order are highlighted in gray.
Note 2: Blank cells indicate that a model was not used to solve that particular case.
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A second conclusion drawn from the experimental results is that the magnitude of
the benefit offered by the ECM over other models in regards to the total expected costs
depends on the times at which the arrival capacity forecast is revised. For example, the
arrival capacity scenario in Case #6 contains the same profiles as that in Case #5, but
postpones certain revisions to the arrival capacity forecast. As a result of the
postponement, the relative difference between the costs of the solutions to M-DMDD and
the ECM increases from 0.2% to 4.8%. However, postponing information does not
always increase the benefit of the ECM. For example, in Case #1, the ECM is equal in
cost to M-DM, but for Case #0, the ECM has a higher cost. Further exploration of the
relationship between the arrival capacity scenario and the relative cost of the ECM over
other models is recommended as an area for future research.
Section 5.3 Conclusions
The arrival capacity case studies discussed in this chapter demonstrate that the
ECM can be applied to various hypothetical arrival capacity forecasts. One example
shows how a scenario tree could be used to capture a forecast in which the likelihoods
change over time and others exhibit uncertainty in various elements of the arrival
capacity forecast. In each of these examples, the ECM compares favorably to previous
models in the literature, especially for cases in which there is a possibility of a severe
reduction in arrival capacity for an extended period of time. This section summarizes the
contributions of the ECM and discusses the implications of this model in regards to the
SAGHP literature and the design of GDPs in practice.
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Section 5.3.1 Comparison to SAGHP Models
The Extended Cost Model builds upon prior models in the SAGHP literature,
such as those of Mukherjee (2004), to also consider an airborne arrival queue capacity
and non-linear functions for the cost of delays. However, the formulation of the ECM
requires a significant number of variables to capture non-linear delay costs36, which
results in a model run time that is greater than those of other models in the literature,
including those of Mukherjee. For the largest cases discussed in this thesis, the ECM had
approximately 1 million variables and 2 million constraints, and required 10 minutes to
solve 37. Thus, the run time of the ECM could be a barrier for practical implementation.
In conclusion, the ECM offers several key improvements over prior models in the
SAGHP literature, including:
1. The ability to avoid solutions that result in airborne queues of unacceptable
length
2. Direct consideration of non-linear cost functions
3. A more even distribution of delay without an increase in the total expected
delay cost due to additional airborne delay
However, these benefits come at the expense of model size and run time.
Section 5.3.2 Thoughts on the Use of SAGHP Models in Practice
Ultimately, the value of models in the SAGHP literature will be determined by
how well they meet the needs of practitioners. In contrast to the current GDP design
process, which depends on one or more individuals to make subjective decisions in
36 §3.3.3
37 For platform information, please refer to §3.3.1
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regards to the scope and planned arrival rates of a program, the ECM offers two main
advantages. First, the ECM objectively considers both the uncertainty of arrival capacity
forecasts and the dynamic nature of information. Second, the ground delays assigned by
the ECM minimize the total expected delay cost, while avoiding the possibility of arrival
queues of unacceptable length.
However, before the ECM may be applied to the design of GDPs in practice, there
remain three significant hurdles. First and foremost, the stochastic and dynamic forecasts
of airport arrival capacity that are assumed by the ECM would need to be developed in
the form of scenario trees. Currently, these types of forecasts are not widely available
and research that has sought to develop them has met with limited success38. Second, the
manner in which the ECM might be used in concert with other mechanisms such as slot-
credit-substitutions, compression, and swaps39 needs to be clarified. Mukherjee (2004)
offers an initial discussion of how to include participant actions and Chapter Seven of this
thesis will also discuss this topic. Third, further research should try to improve the run
time of the ECM. Although the ECM solves for the optimal assignment of ground delay
in a reasonable amount of time for the examples discussed in this thesis (348 flights, 2-10
profiles, -40 time periods), it is not known if these examples are as large as those that
might be encountered in practice.
Despite these hurdles, the ECM still offers significant benefit in its current form
for use as an analytical tool. For example, examination of the solutions to the many case
studies in this thesis indicates that the optimal solution often holds flights on the ground
in anticipation of a revision to the forecast. It is possible that another, faster algorithm
38 Liu (2007), MIT Lincoln Laboratory (2004)
39 Chang et al. (2001)
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could be designed for implementing such a strategy in practice. Further research could
explore how the ECM and other SAGHP models might be used to identify other
strategies that might be of use in practice.
Section 5.3.3 Moving Forward
Although the ECM compares favorably to other SAGHP models, there are many
important questions that remain to be addressed, such as how equity might be defined in
regards to a GDP. As the ECM, as well as other SAGHP models, is motivated by the
design of GDPs in practice, the further improvement of SAGHP models should also be
directed by practical objectives. However, these practical objectives vary across the
different groups that are affected by the outcome of GDPs. For example, traffic
managers seek to ensure the efficient use of airspace, commercial air carriers desire to
retain flexibility and control of their schedules, and passengers seek efficient and
inexpensive service.
The next chapter in this thesis seeks to formalize the process of understanding and
evaluating the objectives of a GDP. Starting with an institutional perspective, the needs
of stakeholders and their relationships will be considered in conjunction with the use of
GDPs. Then, in Chapter Seven, the ECM will be adapted to illustrate how GDPs might
be modified to reflect the needs of some of these stakeholders.
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Chapter 6 Ground Delay Programs and the Stakeholder
Perspective
The FAA uses Ground Delay Programs (GDPs) to manage the arrival demand at
capacity-constrained airports. By delaying flights on the ground before they depart, a
GDP may reduce the volume of costly airborne delays, as well as air traffic congestion,
that occurs when the number of aircraft that seek to land at an airport exceeds its arrival
capacity. However, in order to delay flights on the ground, a GDP must be initiated
before they depart, at a time when the future weather conditions - and the arrival capacity
of the destination airport - may be uncertain.
In practice, the design of a GDP is a collaborative process between a national air
traffic manager at the FAA and representatives from various commercial airlines. The
traffic manager decides how much delay should be assigned and how to allocate it among
flights. This decision is based upon the traffic manager's evaluation of an uncertain and
dynamic forecast of the airport arrival capacity and the possible effects of a GDP on air
traffic flow management throughout the National Airspace System (NAS). To form this
evaluation, the traffic manager draws on a combination of personal experience and
judgment and opinions solicited from the airlines and local air traffic control centers.
Once delays are assigned, airlines may adjust them (subject to certain limitations) to
reflect their own internal objectives. A criticism of the design in practice is that it relies
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heavily on personal judgment - two traffic managers might interpret the same forecast
differently.
In the academic literature, the design of GDPs is represented as the single airport
ground hold problem (SAGHP). SAGHP models are advantageous for use in the design
of GDPs because they assign ground delays that are both consistent and optimal for a
given objective function. The development of these models, such as the "Extended Cost
Model" (ECM) presented in §3.2, has largely focused on capturing the objectives of the
design of GDPs as considered by the traffic manager in practice. In Chapters Six and
Seven, the design of a GDP is approached from a new direction. Chapter Six draws upon
stakeholder theory and suggests that the design of GDPs in practice should give more
consideration to the passenger. Chapter Seven adapts the ECM to consider passengers
and demonstrates that the cost of delays to passengers could be significantly reduced if
the traffic manager were to consider them directly during the design of a GDP.
Figure 6-1 Conceptual model of the research approach
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The analysis presented in Chapter Six tests the hypothesis that the design of GDPs
in practice excludes consideration of groups that should receive greater representation.
The analysis determines the salience of various stakeholders groups, where salience is
defined as the importance of a group in regards to the design of a GDP. Section 6.1
introduces the stakeholder methodology and identifies key stakeholder groups. Section
6.2 describes the relationships between the various stakeholders. Section 6.3 examines
the impacts of a GDP. And Section 6.4 determines the salience of various stakeholder
groups and compares this to the stakeholder roles and impact on the design of GDPs in
practice.
Section 6.1 A Stakeholder Approach to GDPs
The objective of the analysis presented in this chapter is to test the hypothesis that
the design of GDPs in practice excludes consideration of groups that should receive
greater representation. Existing literature related to the design of GDPs has focused on
improving the design to reflect those groups that are already part of the design process.
In order to identify additional groups, this analysis draws upon the body of literature that
deals with stakeholder theory. The theory of stakeholders is adapted for use in thinking
about the design of GDPs and an analysis is conducted to determine the salience of
various stakeholders in the GDP design process. By comparing these results to the
design in practice, those groups that should receive more consideration are identified.
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Section 6.1.1 Stakeholder Identification
The first step of the analysis is to identify the various stakeholders and to
determine the relationship between each in the context of a GDP. A GDP stakeholder is
defined as any group that "affects the outcome of or is affected by the outcome of a
Ground Delay Program." This definition is adapted from a more general definition of
stakeholders as proposed by R. Edward Freeman40. The concept of a stakeholder that is
proposed in this thesis is much broader than that suggested in existing SAGHP literature.
Whereas the literature has limited the discussion of GDPs to include groups that
influence the outcome of a GDP, this broader definition would also apply to groups that
are affected by programs but which do not have an active part in the decision process,
such as passengers.
Under this broader definition, various entities are identified, including
commercial airlines, general aviation, industry trade groups, airports, and businesses that
provide goods and services to passengers and airlines. Each is either an active participant
in the design or implementation of a GDP, mentioned in the academic or technical
literature in conjunction with GDPs, or an intermediary or third party between the FAA
and one of the other groups. These entities may be organized into a taxonomy, an
example of which is shown in Figure 6-2.
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40 Freeman (1984)
Figure 6-2 A taxonomy of various GDP stakeholders41
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As based on the taxonomy, the various entities can be grouped into eight
stakeholder groups (Figure 6-3, page 154). Each group is broadly defined so as to
encompass many sub-groups. For example, Air Transportation Service Providers, or
ASPs, includes large commercial carriers, air taxis, and general aviation. Furthermore,
groups are also defined by the role they play in regards to a GDP. For example,
passengers could be considered as part of society as a whole, but they are unique among
other groups in society because passengers, themselves, are delayed by a GDP. All
stakeholders identified previously are included in one of these eight groups (except those
that are related to but not affected by a specific GDP, such FAA research organizations).
41 Note: not all stakeholders are shown.
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Figure 6-3 Eight GDP stakeholder groups
Stakeholder Group Definition
Air Transportation The collection of commercial, competitive, for-profit enterprises
Service Providers that operate and provide scheduled passenger and cargo air
(ASPs) transportation service to airports in the U.S.
Airports The operators of airports used for commercial flight service and
that may provide other essential and non-essential services for
airlines and their passengers.
Business The at-large business community that benefits directly or
indirectly from air transportation.
FAA The Federal Aviation Administration: an administration of the
Department of Transportation, under the Executive branch of
the U.S. Federal Government; responsible for the oversight of
the aviation industry in the U.S.
Includes the traffic manager, who is responsible for designing a
GDP and the Terminal Radar Approach Control (TRACON)
facility that manages the arrivals at an airport.
Federal Government The Executive branch of the Federal Government of the U.S.,
other than the FAA; appoints and oversees the work of the
FAA.
Local/Regional/State Local, regional, and State governments that may be responsible
Governments for the oversight of airports or benefit from the commercial
impact of aviation
Passengers Connecting and terminating passengers on scheduled flights that
may use capacity-constrained resources of the National
Airspace System (NAS)
Society Society-at-large
These eight groups will be used as the basis for the stakeholder analysis presented
in this chapter. The analysis is conducted at a high level of organization for two reasons.
First, it is more likely that an analysis performed at a high level will represent all groups
that are relevant to the design of a GDP. For example, GDPs will invariably impact a
myriad of smaller air transportation companies, such as air taxis and fractional jets, but an
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explicit enumeration of these small carriers would require a larger analysis. Second,
many of the stakeholders, especially smaller ones, may have a relatively low salience.
By performing the analysis at a higher level, it is possible to determine which groups of
stakeholders will have higher salience. The results of this analysis could be used to target
research efforts to explore groups of stakeholders that are more relevant to a GDP.
Section 6.1.2 Stakeholder Salience
The salience of each stakeholder (or, in this case, stakeholder group) is
determined using a framework described by Mitchell et al. (1997). This framework
classifies stakeholders based upon three attributes. The first is power, which refers in this
case to the ability of a stakeholder to cause changes to the design of a GDP. The second,
legitimacy, is the degree to which a GDP affects a stakeholder. The third attribute is
urgency, which measures the need perceived by a stakeholder to change the GDP. The
difference between urgency and legitimacy is perception: a stakeholder that is urgent but
not legitimate perceives a need to change a GDP regardless of whether there is an actual
need; and a stakeholder that is legitimate but not urgent is affected by a GDP but may not
be aware of it. The more attributes exhibited, the more salient the stakeholder; the most
salient stakeholder is one with the need (legitimacy), willingness (urgency), and ability
(power) to influence the design of a GDP.
The Mitchell classification is both appropriate and useful for this analysis because
1) it is assumes that stakeholders are defined broadly and 2) may be applied to qualitative
data. Consistent with Mitchell's description of the analysis, each of the three attributes is
assumed to be binary and each stakeholder is assumed to possess each attribute to either a
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"high" or "low" degree. Many of the stakeholders identified in the previous section will
only possess one or two of these attributes to a high degree. A feature of the Mitchell
framework is that it will classify a stakeholder as one of eight possible types, as based
upon the combination of attributes that it possesses to a high degree (Figure 6-4). For
brevity, a discussion of the various types will be postponed to the results of the analysis
in §6.4.
Figure 6-4 Stakeholder classifications (Mitchell (1997))
Po
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In the context of a GDP, power, legitimacy, and urgency are defined as follows:
* Power: The ability to influence the FAA and/or the outcome of a GDP
* Urgency: The degree to which a stakeholder perceives the need to change the
GDP
* Legitimacy: The degree to which a GDP may affect a stakeholder
The power, legitimacy, and urgency of each stakeholder are determined by two analyses:
the first examines the transactions between the various stakeholders and the second
determines the potential impact of a GDP upon each stakeholder. Stakeholder power,
which is defined by the first analysis, is discussed in §6.2.2; urgency and legitimacy are
discussed after the second analysis in §6.3.4 and §6.3.5, respectively.
Section 6.1.3 Influencing the Outcome of a GDP
The previous discussion introduces the idea that a stakeholder may be able, in
some way, to affect a GDP. Before continuing, it is helpful to consider both the types of
changes that are possible in a GDP and the mechanism by which change is produced.
GDPs are introduced in § 1.1 as tools used by traffic managers to manage the arrival
demand at an airport by assigning ground delay to aircraft. However, in practice, the
specific decisions made by the traffic manager are only part of a larger process.
The GDP Design Process is defined as the set of three steps. In the first step, a
traffic manager gathers information and opinions in regards to forecasts of the arrival
demand and capacity of an airport from meteorologists, local air traffic control centers,
and commercial airlines. This solicitation is formalized through a series of conference
calls held every morning between these groups. In the second step, the traffic manager
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enacts a GDP, assigning an initial set of ground delays to aircraft. In the third step, these
initial delays may be revised to reflect flight cancellations and popup flights (additional
arrival demand). During the third step, commercial airlines are also permitted to adjust
the delays assigned to their flights through two formalized mechanisms: slot-credit-
substitutions (SCS) and flight swaps42.
Figure 6-5 Three steps of the GDP design process
(1) Whether or not
to enact a GDP
(2) Which flights
are delayed, and
by how much
There are two means by which a group may influence a GDP. The first is by
acting through the GDP design process, either by providing information before the initial
assignment of ground delay in step 1 or by adjusting the assigned delays after step 3.
This type of change to the process is limited to the airlines (ASPs) and the traffic
manager (FAA), which are the two stakeholders that have formalized control of the
decision process. The second means of influencing the outcome of a GDP is to change
the process, itself.
The adaptation of the GDP design process highlights the value of broadly defining
the notion of a stakeholder. The current body of research in GDPs has largely focused on
how to design a GDP subject to changes within the process. Instead, by working at a
broader level, it is also possible to consider changes to the process, involving more
stakeholders and opening a new area in which to explore the design and use of GDPs.
42 For more detail, please refer to Volpe (2004).
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Section 6.2 Stakeholder Transactions
The transactions between the various stakeholders are important for two reasons.
First, the power of each stakeholder is a measure of the ability of a stakeholder to
influence the FAA or the outcome of a GDP. This influence is a result of something the
group provides to the FAA, such as money or information. Second, transactions are also
the means by which the costs of delays - and the impacts of a GDP - are transmitted to
each of the stakeholder groups. Thus, the network of transactions also determines, in
part, stakeholder legitimacy.
Transactions between the stakeholder groups may exist at several levels. For
example, the FAA is allocated money from the Federal Government for its operational
budget. Although part of this allocation may be used to fund, in various manners, the
design of a GDP, it applies to all functions of the FAA. In contrast, airlines interact
directly with the traffic manager to provide flight schedule information for a new GDP or
to revise the delays assigned by an existing program. Thus, while the analysis presented
in this chapter focuses on the relationships that exist at the organizational level, it also
includes interactions at a more detailed level that are specific to the design of a GDP.
Section 6.2.1 A General Description of Stakeholder Relationships
A detailed accounting of the transactions between the various stakeholders is
presented in the appendix. Across these relationships, there are three general processes
that drive the transactions.
The first process is the flow of information to and from the FAA during the GDP
design process. Although airlines provide specific data to the FAA, such as flight
schedules, airline representatives may also provide advice and suggestions regarding the
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possible design or modification of a program directly to the traffic manager. Airlines
also communicate with passengers regarding the flights that are delayed by a GDP. For
their part, passengers provide the airline with information both during a GDP, such as
willingness to take an alternate itinerary, and after, through feedback given to customer
service representatives. Figure 6-06 shows a map of the key information flows between
stakeholders, with those specific to the design of a GDP highlighted in bold.
The second key process is the flow of goods and services related to the air
transportation industry. In particular, airlines and their passengers engage in economic
activities with other stakeholders. For example, airlines purchase various goods and
services from other businesses and employ pilots, cabin crew, and ground personnel.
Considered together, the U.S. commercial air carriers directly employ more than half
million full time workers domestically43. Passengers also participate in additional
economic activities, either directly though the purchase of rental cars, hotel rooms, etc.,
or indirectly through business transactions that are facilitated by travel.
Airports play a unique role in the flow of goods and services because of their co-
dependence on other groups related to the provision of air transportation. Airports
provide essential infrastructure in the form of runways and terminals for the air
transportation industry. Other goods and services that are required by the industry, such
as fuel, food service, cleaning, etc., may also be provided by an airport operator or by a
third party through a concession. At a fundamental level, airports facilitate the
transactions between airlines, their passengers, and other businesses that serve the needs
of both.
43 2006 employment for certified carriers, U.S. Bureau of Transportation Statistics
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Figure 6-6 Flow of information between stakeholders
Federal
Govenment
I
I Local/Reg
SGovenmxent
I I
% I
Airport(s)
" OMON"aW_ Passengers
In exchange, airport operators receive payment for the use of their facilities by
both airlines (e.g. rent) and passengers (e.g. PFCs), and may also profit from other
economic activity by selling fuel to airlines and concessions for passenger and employee
amenities (food courts, stores, parking, etc.). Airports also provide access to air
transportation for local residents and businesses; these positive externalities may be a
reason why many municipalities and regional governments invest in the construction of
airports.
The role of the FAA in this system is to provide a management service to ASPs
and airports, ensuring the safe and efficient use of the NAS. From the perspective of the
FAA, the economic benefits of air transportation are realized in the form of operational
funding. The FAA uses two principal funding sources: the first is the Federal
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Government, which collects corporate and personal income taxes and distributes some to
the FAA, and the second the Aviation Trust Fund (ATF), which is funded by a tax on
each commercial aviation ticket. Although airlines and passengers provide funding to the
FAA through the ATF, their contributions are required by law, as mandated by the
Federal Government.
Figure 6-7 and Figure 6-8 show the general flow of financial capital and goods
and services between the various stakeholders in regards to air transportation. Of
particular note, passengers are both an indirect source of the financial capital that reaches
the FAA and an indirect end recipient of the services provided by the FAA. However all
interactions between passengers and the FAA are through intermediary stakeholders,
such as the ASPs.
The third process is the legal control that one stakeholder may have over another.
This control may be in the form of political power or represented as an enforceable legal
contract. For example, both the Federal Government and the State, Local, and Regional
Governments are elected by their constituents, which form the general society. In turn,
the Federal Government appoints the Administrator of the FAA, who is ultimately
responsible for the FAA's policies. Although society does not control the day-to-day
operations or decisions made by the Federal Government or the FAA, society may act to
replace the government if there is disapproval of the decisions that are made (or lack
thereof). As an example, in November 2007, President Bush spoke of the need to reduce
air transportation delays44, an action which represents both a directive to the FAA, as well
as a message to society that the Federal Government is working to reduce delays.
44 "President Bush discusses aviation congestion," White House press release, November 15, 2007
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Figure 6-7 Flow of financial capital between stakeholders
Figure 6-8 Flow of goods and services between stakeholders
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The FAA exerts a form of control over both airports and ASPs by providing for
regulation, certification, and oversight of the industry, participating businesses, and its
infrastructure. A very recent example of the power of the FAA is the cancellation of
more that 3,000 American Airlines flights and delays to 250,000 passengers between
April 8 and 12, 2008, due to FAA inspections of wiring harnesses on MD-80 aircraft45 .
More specific to the design of a GDP, the FAA assigns controlled departure times to
aircraft as part of a GDP.
Figure 6-9 Flow of mandates between stakeholders
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45 "Bush keeping 'a close eye' on airline passenger misery, holds cabinet meeting Monday" International
Herald Tribune, April 11, 2008
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Passengers also hold a form of legal control over the airlines as represented by the
contract formed by the purchase of a ticket. Airlines are obligated to provide
transportation once this contract is formed (subject to various stipulations). Even
passengers who are bumped, or denied boarding, from their scheduled flight are entitled
to compensation by law46. Figure 6-9 shows a flow of legal obligations, or mandates,
through the various stakeholders.
Section 6.2.2 Stakeholder Power
The power of a stakeholder is represented by the various relationships that the
stakeholder has with the other groups. It is through these relationships that the
stakeholder gains information, acts upon another stakeholder in order to enforce its will,
or is acted upon. For the design of a GDP, stakeholder groups that interact directly with
the FAA will, generally, have higher power than those that are only tangentially related.
Specifically, recall that power is defined as "the ability to influence the FAA and/or the
outcome of a GDP." The FAA meets this definition because the FAA can control the
outcome of a GDP. Other stakeholders with high power are those that provide a
necessary input to the FAA, such as money or information, or that exert some measure of
legal control over the FAA.
The two other stakeholders with high power are the Federal Government and the
ASPs (Figure 6-10). First, the Federal Government has high power because it has a
measure of political control over the FAA and because it is directly responsible for
funding the operations of the FAA. Second, ASPs have high power because of the
46 New Federal rules announced April 16, 2008 raise the maximum compensation to $800 for domestic
passengers.
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information they provide to the traffic manager and their direct involvement in the GDP
design process. Other stakeholders, such as passengers and airports have low power
because they do not exert influence directly over the FAA or the design of a GDP.
Figure 6-10 Stakeholder power
High Power Low
To facilitate the discussion of stakeholder legitimacy and urgency, it is necessary
to first discuss the impacts of a GDP, both actual and perceived; legitimacy is discussed
in §6.3.4 and urgency in §6.3.5.
Section 6.3 Impacts of a GDP
At a basic level, a GDP assigns ground delay to aircraft in order to avoid or
reduce the possibility of future airborne delays. However, the impact that a GDP will
have depends not only on the stakeholder, but also on the perspective from which the
delays are observed. This section discusses the impacts of a GDP from three perspectives
and the impacts that each has on the various stakeholders
Section 6.3.1 A GDP from the Flight Perspective
A GDP assigns ground delay to particular aircraft in order to reduce the airborne
delays of other aircraft. On the whole, the affect is assumed to be positive, because
ground delay is preferable to airborne delay for reasons of cost and efficiency. However,
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from the perspective of individual flights, the distribution of assigned delay is important -
some flights will benefit from a GDP while others will be negatively impacted. The
decisions made during the GDP design process will affect the nature of this distribution.
For a discussion of how this distribution may be affected, please refer to §3.1.2 and
Vossen (2002).
The distribution of delay is especially important from the perspectives of ASPs
and of passengers. Commercial airlines (and other ASPs) are competitive entities that
provide transportation and a level of service for customers. Each ASP operates a group
of flights; if there is a correlation between the flights operated by an ASP47 and the
relative benefit offered to a flight by a GDP, it might give a carrier a competitive
advantage. Similarly, for passengers, the distribution of delay will affect which
passengers gain or lose as a result of a GDP.
For other stakeholders, the distribution of delay has a much smaller impact. For
example, from the perspective of the airport to which the GDP is applied, flights will be
delayed before arrival regardless of whether delay is taken on the ground or in the air.
However, the effect is not negligible because a GDP can only increase the overall amount
of delay to the flights at the airport. Furthermore, as airborne delay results in more fuel,
which many airports sell to the airlines, a GDP may even have a negative effect.
However, airports, as well as the other stakeholders, are related economically to the
ASPs; thus, the impact of a GDP on these stakeholders is most likely to be tied into how
the GDP treats the airlines.
47 Such as that identified by Hanowsky (2007)
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Section 6.3.2 A GDP from the ASP Perspective
The assignment of delay, itself, that is caused by a GDP has a second, more subtle
effect on the operations of larger commercial airlines. Under nominal operating
conditions, without a GDP, an airline is free to adjust its operational schedule at any time
for any reason. For example, the departure of a flight may be delayed to accommodate
the loading of additional baggage and passengers or to allow for repairs to non-essential
parts, such as the entertainment system or a lavatory. However, flights that are delayed
on the ground by a GDP must depart within a given window of time or risk being
assigned additional delay. Thus, a second impact of a GDP is a reduction in the
flexibility that airlines have over their own schedules.
It is assumed that this loss of control and flexibility reduces the efficiency of the
operations of an airline. However, the extent to which it impacts an airline, and whether
it impacts other ASPs, has not been studied in the GDP literature. Therefore, for the
purposes of this analysis, it is assumed that ASPs and their passengers feel the primary
impact, with other stakeholders possibly receiving a small economic effect.
Section 6.3.3 A GDP from the Air Transportation Network Perspective
A third effect of a GDP is the reduction of airborne congestion throughout the air
transportation network. Air transportation networks are complex, large-scale, and highly-
connected. A key emergent property of these networks is that the congestion caused by
airborne delays in one part of the network may quickly spread to other areas. For
example, severe weather over Tennessee might result in delays for flights from Boston to
Chicago, even though these flights would not pass through or near the weather. Although
a GDP will not reduce the arrival delay time for the airport to which it is applied, it can
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serve a critical role in reducing airborne congestion and the spread of delays through the
network. Furthermore, when viewed strategically, congestion poses a significant threat to
the air transportation industry. Severe chronic delays, or network gridlock could change
the competitive landscape or render reliable service untenable.
Reducing airborne congestion has a significant and positive impact on various
stakeholders. For ASPs, passengers, and airports there is a reduction in airborne delay.
For the FAA, reducing airborne congestion reduces the workload of air traffic controllers.
Other stakeholders benefit through their relationships with passengers, airports, and
ASPs. And, strategically, all stakeholders benefit from a functioning air transportation
system.
Section 6.3.4 Legitimacy
Recall that the legitimacy of a stakeholder is a measure of how the decisions made
by the GDP design process impacts that stakeholder. As highlighted by the previous
discussion, it is clear that all stakeholders, to some degree, are impacted by GDPs. Taken
to an extreme, without the use of any GDPs, the resulting severe delays and congestion
might decrease the supply of air transportation in the U.S. However, the level of impact
that GDPs have varies by stakeholder group.
The groups that are most directly impacted are ASPs and their passengers. Not
only are aircraft and passenger delays a direct result of a GDP, but these stakeholders also
benefit greatly from widespread reductions in airspace congestion. The cost of a delay
may vary by aircraft, such that ASPs and passengers may also be very sensitive to how
delays are distributed by a GDP. Furthermore, airlines may also be sensitive to how a
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GDP may impact the manner by which they manage their operations. The reduction in
schedule flexibility that results from the initiation of a GDP may result in operational
inefficiency for airlines and wider economic impacts for other stakeholders.
The FAA is also directly impacted by a GDP. As a method of demand
management, GDPs may reduce air traffic congestion and the peak workload for an air
traffic controller (as measured in number of managed aircraft). Peak workload is
important because there may be safety concerns if the number of aircraft managed by a
controller exceeds operational thresholds. Other stakeholders are also affected by the
design of a GDP, but to a lesser extent. For each of these, the primary concern is that air
traffic congestion reduces the overall efficiency of the NAS. Severe congestion may lead
to wider economic inefficiencies, which first affect business and society, and
consequently, all levels of government.
In order to apply the Mitchell framework, it is necessary to divide the
stakeholders into two groups, those with high legitimacy (such as ASPs, passengers, and
the FAA) and those with low legitimacy (Federal Government and Local, Regional, and
State Governments). Three stakeholder groups (airports, society and business) are
affected by a GDP, but only to a limited extent, and require a more detailed discussion.
For airports, which generate revenue based upon the business activities of airlines
and passengers, the economic impacts are mixed. To a certain extent, the choice of
which flights are delays may impact the passenger throughput (and revenues) of the
airport. However, a GDP will not reduce the overall arrival delay across all flights, thus
the direct impact on an airport may be small. The overall effects of GDPs on the air
transportation industry are likely to have greater impact on the revenues of airports. As a
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result, the legitimacy of airports depends on the overall efficiency of the NAS; if the
efficiency would be greatly reduced without GDPs, then the air transportation industry
would suffer, and the impact on airports would be significant.
A similar argument may be made for society and business; that if the economic
livelihood of these two groups would be adversely affected if GDPs were not used, then
both have high legitimacy. The author is not aware of any studies that have sought to
explore how the NAS might perform without the use of GDPs; however, given the
current levels of congestion and delays, it is assumed that the congestion would be
significantly worse without GDPs. Thus, airports, business, and society are assumed to
have high legitimacy.
Figure 6-11 Stakeholder legitimacy
High Legitimacy Low
Local/Regional/State
Passengers FAA Business Government
ASPs Airports Society Federal Government
Section 6.3.5 Stakeholder Urgency
As mentioned previously, urgency measures the need that is perceived by the
stakeholder to change the GDP. Although the urgency of a stakeholder may increase
with the magnitude of the impact of a GDP on that stakeholder, urgency is a measure of
perception; stakeholders that are unaware of the impact of a GDP upon them, regardless
of magnitude, will have low urgency, and those that perceive a need to act will have high
urgency. Consequently, those stakeholders that are more directly related to a GDP, such
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as those that deal with GDPs on a daily basis, will be more aware of GDPs and will also
have a higher urgency.
The stakeholders with the highest urgency are those that perceive a direct effect
from a GDP. These stakeholders are the ASPs and passengers, which are assigned delays
directly by a GDP, and the FAA, which acts to initiate a GDP. An airport is also an
urgent stakeholder to the extent that a GDP affects the flights and passengers at that
airport.
For other stakeholders, urgency may be in flux. While air transportation delays
have been perceived as a problem by the air transportation industry for many years, the
Federal Government has only recently pushed for a national solution to delays. The
recent comments made by President Bush (§6.2.1) and attention of the media to delays at
airport, suggests that the perception of the impacts of congestion and delays - and, as a
result, GDPs - may be increasing. Thus, while these other stakeholders are shown in
Figure 6-12 as having low urgency, this status may change.
Figure 6-12 Stakeholder urgency
High Urgency Low
ASPs Passengers
FAA Airports
Local/Regional/State
Business Government
Society Federal
Government
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Section 6.4 Stakeholder Salience
Given the measures of power, legitimacy, and urgency, as defined in the
preceding sections, the application of the Mitchell framework is straight-forward. The
salience of each stakeholder is determined by the degree to which it possesses the power,
legitimacy, and urgency attributes. Recall that the Mitchell classification requires that
each attribute be classified on a binary scale for each stakeholder; for this analysis, each
stakeholder-attribute is described as either "high" or "low" (Figure 6-13).
For the design of a GDP, the most salient stakeholders are the Air Transportation
Service Providers and the FAA, both of which are affected by the outcome of a GDP and
have the ability and the willingness to influence the process. This result follows what is
observed in practice; the traffic manager and various air carriers are able to and do
participate in the decisions to initiate a GDP.
Figure 6-13 Stakeholder classifications
Stakeholder Power Urgency Legitimacy Classification
Air Transportation Definitive
High High High DefinitiveService Providers
Airports Low High High* Dependent
Business Low Low High* Discretionary
FAA High High High Definitive
Federal Government High Low Low Dormant
Local/Regional/State Low Low Low Non-StakeholderGovernments
Passengers Low High High Dependent
Society Low Low High* Discretionary
Note: * assumes that the use of GDPs result in a significant reduction to NAS congestion
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Figure 6-14 Stakeholder classification presented as a Venn diagram
Po
Each of the other stakeholders exhibits high levels for some, but not all three, of
the attributes, which reduces the impetus for them to be considered during the design
process. For example, passengers and airports are affected by GDPs and might make
changes to their design, but have no power to do so. Business and Society are also
affected by GDPs but do not perceive an urgent need to act. On the other hand, the
Federal Government has the power to influence the FAA, but may also not perceive the
need to act. Lastly, Local/Regional/State Governments exhibit low values for each of the
attributes and are only tangentially related to the design of a GDP.
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The classifications provided by the analysis may be applied to determine which of
the stakeholders should be considered during the design of a GDP. For example, both
ASPs and the FAA have a high value for all three attributes, indicating a high degree of
salience. Therefore, the design of a GDP not only considers the needs of the FAA and
ASPs, but it should continue to do so. However, other stakeholders may also deserve
consideration as based on how they might become more salient. For example, the
discussion of stakeholder urgency highlights the potential for several stakeholders,
including the Federal Government, business, and society to become more urgent. This
potential is indicated by the small arrows in Figure 6-14.
The Federal Government is of particular interest because it is also a powerful
stakeholder. The Mitchell classification describes powerful and urgent stakeholders as
"dangerous;" the danger exists in the sense that the Federal Government might use its
power to direct the FAA to reduce perceived problems that might otherwise have little
impact on the effects of a GDP. For example, the Federal Government opened up
military airspace off the east cost of the U.S. in order to reduce congestion during the
busy Thanksgiving holiday. However, this measure did little to relieve congestion
around the busy New York airports or at the major passenger hubs in Atlanta, GA (ATL);
Chicago, IL (ORD); and Dallas, TX (DFW).
Further analysis also suggests that the needs of passengers might deserve greater
consideration during the design of a GDP because they could become empowered. The
analysis presented in §6.2 highlights the relationship of passengers with other
stakeholders. In particular, passengers exert some form of control over both the Federal
Government and ASPs; the first in the form of an election process (via society) and the
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second as a result of the contract formed by the purchase of a ticket. Thus, although
passengers do not have power directly over the FAA, they may have power over
stakeholders that do. In contrast, airports (which are also described as a "dependent"
stakeholder of the FAA), would be less likely to gain the support of powerful
stakeholders and are, therefore, less salient.
Section 6.5 Conclusions
The objective of the analysis presented in this chapter is to identify the
stakeholders that should receive consideration during the design of a GDP. Nine
stakeholder groups are identified and evaluated in regards to three attributes: power,
legitimacy, and urgency. The analysis shows that three stakeholders, the FAA, ASPs,
and passengers, should receive more consideration than other stakeholders during the
design of a GDP. This section presents two general conclusions from the analysis.
Section 6.5.1 Stakeholder Consideration in Practice
The first conclusion is that the design of GDPs in practice may not consider the
appropriate objectives. Of the three salient stakeholder identified by the analysis, two are
currently involved in the GDP design process (Figure 6-5, page 158) used in practice.
The third stakeholder group, passengers, does not directly participate and, therefore, may
not be adequately considered.48
Furthermore, the analysis of GDP impacts also identifies a potential conflict
between the interests of ASPs and those of other stakeholders. The initiation of a GDP
48 The analysis in Chapter Seven will demonstrate that the current process is significantly less than optimal
from the passengers' perspective.
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reduces airlines' operational flexibility, which is assumed to have a cost to each ASP.
However, GDPs reduce airborne congestion, which is beneficial for all stakeholders.
Thus, there may exist situations in which an ASP, which has the ability to influence the
GDP design process, would oppose a GDP that would be beneficial to the stakeholders as
a whole.
Section 6.5.2 Areas for Future Research
A second conclusion drawn from the analysis is that further research could be
conducted to explore the salience of the organizations that comprise each stakeholder
group. For example, ASPs is comprised of the legacy passenger carriers, "low cost" and
point-to-point carriers, air taxis, general aviation, etc. (Figure 6-2, page 153). The power,
legitimacy, and urgency of each of these groups may differ from that of the group as a
whole, so that a stakeholder analysis could identify which airlines are important. Other
groups for which a deeper analysis could help are passengers and airports.
Additionally, stakeholder theory could also be applied to understand the concept
of equity in regards to a GDP. Equity is a term that has begun to appear in the academic
literature49 in reference to the distribution of ground delay. Specifically defined,
however, an equitable allocation is "consonant with merit or importance" 50 and therefore
requires an a priori understanding of what each aircraft, or airline, etc. deserves. This is
the essence of stakeholder salience.
Finally, additional research could be conducted to explore the ways in which
passengers might be considered in the design of a GDP. The discussion of stakeholder
49 §2.2
50 Merriam-Webster online dictionary, April 23, 2007
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salience (§6.4) suggests that both airlines and the Federal Government could empower
passengers; the airlines by using their influence as part of the existing GDP Design
Process and the Federal Government by changing the nature of the process, itself. The
next chapter presents a comparison of two methods that represent these alternatives, to
test which method results in a more favorable outcome for the passenger and their
implications for other stakeholders.
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Chapter 7 Ground Delay Programs and the Passenger
The stakeholder analysis discussed in Chapter Six highlights various impacts that
flight delays may have on different stakeholder groups and the role of GDPs in
alleviating these impacts. One group that is particularly affected is the passengers, who
may be delayed for extended periods of time with little or no control over the delays that
affect them. In regards to the assignment of ground delay, passengers have little or no
power because they are neither involved in the design process nor do they have any direct
influence over the FAA. However, the needs of passengers could become more relevant
to the design of a GDP if other, more powerful stakeholders, such as the airlines or the
Federal Government, were to act on their behalf.
This chapter presents and compares two alternative approaches through which
passengers could be considered during the design of a GDP. The first is based on current
practice in which airlines are permitted to adjust the ground delays that are initially
assigned by the traffic manager. This approach assumes that each airline will use an
existing mechanism called a flight swap to minimize the total delay cost experienced by
its own passengers. The second method hypothesizes that the GDP design process could
be revised so that the traffic manager is responsible for assigning delays that minimize
the total passenger delay cost. The key difference between these two approaches is the
level at which decisions considering the passenger are made; in the former, the airline
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considers the welfare of the passenger, while in the latter, passengers of all airlines are
considered by the traffic manager.
Chapter Seven is presented in four sections. First, §7.1 defines passenger delay
cost in regards to the design of a GDP. Second, §7.2 uses an assignment model to
determine how airlines might be able to reduce the cost of delays to their passengers
through the use of flight swaps. Third, §7.3 proposes a new MIP formulation for the
design of a stochastic and dynamic GDP in which flight delay costs may vary by aircraft.
This new model is applied to the SAGHP to represent a GDP in which the traffic
manager minimizes the total passenger delay cost. Finally, §7.4 compares the results of
these two approaches for a hypothetical problem. This comparison suggests that the total
passenger delay cost of a GDP might be significantly reduced if the traffic manager were
to consider passengers during the initial design of a GDP.
Section 7.1 A Model of Passenger Delay Cost
Before proposing methods of reducing the cost of delays to passengers, it is
necessary to define passenger delay cost in regards to a GDP. A model of delay cost
introduced in §3.1 proposes that there are three types of delay, ground, airborne, and
cumulative, and that flights incur cost as a function of the duration of each type. The
flight delay cost of each flight is defined as the sum of these costs; the total flight delay
cost of a GDP is the sum of the flight delay costs across all flights. For convenience and
to be consistent with this model, the passenger delay cost incurred by a flight is defined
as the flight delay cost multiplied by the number of passengers 5 1 on the flight. Therefore,
51 For the examples discussed in this chapter, the number of seats on each aircraft is used as a proxy for the
number of passengers
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the total passenger delay cost of a GDP is the sum of the passenger delay costs that are
incurred by each flight.
Thus, if a flight f incurs costs GDCf, ADCf, and CDCf as a result of ground,
airborne, and cumulative delay, respectively, then the flight delay cost Costf is given as:
Cost1 = GDCf + ADCf + CDCf (7.01)
And, if f carries paxf passengers, then the passenger delay cost PaxCostf is given by:
PaxCostf = pax, x Cost, (7.02)
In order to differentiate the flight delay costs from the passenger delay costs of a GDP,
flight delay cost is reported in "ac-units" and passenger delay cost in "pax-units."
This definition makes two important assumptions regarding the manner in which
passengers incur delay cost. First, it assumes that all of the passengers on each flight
accrue cost in an equal manner. In reality, each passenger may have a unique function to
express the cost of a given delay. For example, a business traveler may be very sensitive
to short delays while a leisure traveler might be less sensitive. This simplification is
made to facilitate the analysis presented in this chapter and could be relaxed in future
work; all of the models proposed in this chapter could be adapted to consider cost
functions that vary by passenger.
The second assumption is that the cost experienced by passengers on a given
flight is independent of the delays assigned to other flights. In reality, some of the
passengers that are delayed as part of a GDP may be connecting to another flight, in
which case the cost due to a delay in the arrival of the first flight might be negligible if
the passengers make the connection and significant if the passengers do not. However,
including passenger connections is non-trivial from both a practical and a modeling
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perspective. During the course of a GDP, airlines may adjust their flight schedules and
reroute aircraft, so it may be difficult to determine the length of delay that would cause a
passenger to miss a connection. Consideration of connecting passengers is suggested as
an area of future research.
On the other hand, the assumption that passenger delay costs are independent of
flight connections is convenient for several reasons. First, it is not only consistent with
the design of GDPs in practice, in which the traffic manager does not explicitly consider
the connections of aircraft and crew, but it could also be estimated using data that is
currently available to the traffic manager. Second, this definition is consistent with
existing models in the stochastic/dynamic SAGHP literature, such as the ECM. These
models are based on the premise that the total delay cost of a program is the sum of the
costs incurred by individual flights. By maintaining this consistency, these models may
be more easily adapted to solve for ground delays that minimize the total passenger delay
cost.
Section 7.2 Passenger Interest as Represented by the Airlines
The objective of this analysis is to test the hypothesis that the passenger delay cost
of a GDP could be reduced if the initial assignment of delays made by the traffic manager
were to consider the number of passengers on each flight. The test, itself, will compare
the total expected passenger delay cost for two hypothetical GDPs. Both use the same
forecasts of arrival capacity and demand, but differ in the manner in which passengers are
considered during the design process.
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The first GDP, or "base case approach," assumes that the traffic manager assigns
delays in order to reduce the total expected flight delay cost for a stochastic and dynamic
forecast of the airport arrival capacity and that airlines may adjust these delays using
flight swaps in order to minimize the total passenger delay cost. The flight swap
mechanism and its limitations will be discussed in greater detail in the next section. The
second GDP, or "alternative approach," assumes that the traffic manager assigns delays
that minimize the total expected passenger delay cost. Figure 7-1 summarizes the two
approaches.
Figure 7-1 Two approaches for reducing the passenger delay cost of a GDP
Base Case Approach Alternative Approach
Traffic Assigns delay that minimizes the Assigns delay that minimizes the
Manager total expected flight delay cost total expected passenger delay cost
Airlines Revise the delays to minimize the Take no action to revise ground
passenger delay cost for each airline delays.
Section 7.2.1 The Flight Swap Mechanism
In the base case approach, ground delays are assigned in two steps. First, the
traffic manager assigns a controlled demand time to each flight. This represents the time
at which the flight will land if there is sufficient arrival capacity at the airport. Consistent
with a GDP, the difference between this controlled time and the scheduled arrival time of
the flight is assigned as ground delay52. The overall assignment of flight arrival demand
times is assumed to minimize the total flight delay cost, as is the case in the solution to
the ECM.
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52 §3.2.2
In the second step, each airline revises the ground delays assigned by the traffic
manager using a mechanism called a flight swap. A flight swap permits an airline to
exchange the arrival demand times, or slots, between two of the aircraft that it operates.
It is assumed in this section that each airline will swap flights in order to minimize the
total delay cost of its own passengers. (In practice, an airline will likely use flight swaps
to minimize its own delay costs, which might not minimize the cost to passengers.)
A key limitation of this approach is that flight swaps are limited in how they may
reassign arrival slots. First, the use of flight swaps might not increase the cumulative
airport arrival demand for any period of time. Second, flight swaps may only be used in
conjunction with flights from the same airline. And, third, flight swaps cannot assign a
flight to depart earlier than originally scheduled. Thus, while flight swaps may reduce
the passenger delay cost for both individual airlines and the GDP, as a whole, the use of
swaps will likely not minimize the total passenger delay cost across all flights.
Figure 7-2 shows an example of a flight swap. Consider five flights that are
scheduled to arrive at an airport that is subject to a GDP (column #1). Each aircraft is
operated by one of two airlines, 01A and 02A. In the first step, the traffic manager
assigns a controlled arrival time to each flight (column #2). Note that flights #003 and
#005 are assigned to times 1504 Z and 1508 Z, resulting in two and four minutes of
ground delay, respectively. In step #2, airline 01A swaps the times assigned to flight
#003 and #005 (column #3), which reduces the ground delay of #005 to zero minutes and
increases the ground delay of #003 to six minutes. Note that this is the only feasible
swap given the flights in this example.
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Figure 7-2 An example of a flight swap
(#1) Scheduled Flight (#2) Flight Arrivals (#3) Flight Arrivals
Arrivals Assigned by GDP After Swap
1500 Z 01A-001 01A-001 01A-001
1501 Z 02A-002
1502 Z i 01A-003 02A-002 02A-002
1503 Z 02A-004
1504 Z 01A-005 01A-003 01A-005
1505 Z
1506 Z 02A-004 02A-004
...........  ....................... . . . .............................................................................................................. ................................   .....................    ....................
1507 Z
1508 Z 01A-005 01A-003
In order to determine the reduction in passenger delay cost that could be achieved
using flight swaps, a new optimization model is proposed. This section presents a linear
programming (LP) formulation that solves for an allocation of flight arrival demand times
to aircraft that minimizes the total cost of passenger delays for each airline. The model,
which may be used in a manner consistent with the current use of fight swaps, is referred
to as the "Airline Assignment Model," or AAM.
Section 7.2.2 The Airline Assignment Model LP Formulation
The Airline Assignment Model (AAM) is a linear programming formulation that
identifies an assignment of aircraft to arrival slots that minimizes the total assignment
cost. Unlike the ECM, which is used to create a GDP, the AAM assumes that a GDP has
already been created and that it is optimal in terms of the total flight delay cost. The
AAM may be used to consider factors that have not been included in the design of the
original GDP. For example, if the ECM designs a GDP that minimizes the total expected
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aircraft delay cost, the AAM could be applied to the solution to the ECM in order to
minimize the total passenger delay cost.
Before defining the formulation, it is helpful to define "slot" in a manner that is
consistent with a stochastic and dynamic arrival capacity forecast. Recall that stochastic
and dynamic forecasts are assumed to be provided as a set of discrete profiles, each of
which indicates the airport arrival capacity over time and that the profiles are grouped
into a scenario tree53. Let there exist a GDP for a set of flights I and an arrival capacity
scenario tree with a set of profiles Q. The arrival demand times assigned to each flight
as part of the GDP may vary by profile. So, for each flight i E I, there exists a slot j that
consists of the set of the arrival demand times assigned to i across Q. Let the set of all
slots be J, such that III = IJI by definition.
Although each flight is assigned to a slot as part of the initial GDP, it might be
possible to assign each flight to one of many slots. It is assumed that the set of possible
assignments, which may be limited by practical considerations, and the cost of each
possible assignment are known a priori. Let the feasibility of an assignment be given by
F,, which equals 1 if the assignment of flight i to slot j is feasible and 0 if the
assignment is infeasible, and the cost of assigning flight i to slot j by Cy. As defined,
F,j and Cij allow the AAM to make a generic assignment of flights to arrival slots; both
will be discussed further in regard to flight swaps and passenger delay costs in §7.2.2.
The decision variable for the AAM is a set of binary variables X0 E {0, 1} that
indicates the assignment of flights to slots.
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53 §2.3.1
X if flight i is assigned to slot j
X. =I0 otherwise
The objective function and constraints of the AAM are defined as follows:
Minimize: C, x X (7.03)
I,J
Subject To: X,=1 ViEI (7.04)
J
XiX, 1 V jE J (7.05)
I
X F se  V iEI; jEJ (7.06)
The objective function (7.03) minimizes the total cost of the assignment of flights
to slots. Constraints (7.04) and (7.05) ensure that each flight is assigned to exactly one
slot and that exactly one flight is assigned to each slot. Constraints (7.06) specify that
only feasible assignments may be made. Provided that there exists at least one feasible
assignment (which is given by the initial GDP), the set of constraints may be represented
as a totally unimodular matrix and the AAM may be solved as an LP relaxation.
Section 7.2.3 Adaptation of the AAM to Minimize Passenger Delay Costs
As formulated, the AAM makes a generic assignment of flights to arrival slots.
However, by specifying values for FU and Cj, the AAM can be used to identify the set of
flight swaps that would minimize the total expected passenger delay cost.
187
Feasible Flight Assignments
For the assignment of a flight i to a slot j to be feasible, it must be consistent
with the use of a flight swap, which is defined as meeting four conditions:
1. The airline that operates flight i must be the same as the airline that
operates the flight assigned to slot j by the initial GDP
2. Each arrival demand time that corresponds to slot j must be equal to or
greater than the scheduled arrival time of i
3. The departure times for i that would correspond to each arrival demand
time for j must not violate the coupling, or non-anticipativity, constraints
(3.15) of the ECM
4. If i is exempt from the GDP, then the only slot to which it may be
assigned is that from the initial GDP
The third condition is especially important and unique to a swap that would occur
for a slot defined for a stochastic and dynamic arrival capacity forecast. As determined
by the optimal solution to the ECM, the departure times of a flight under various profiles
are conditional on the times at which the arrival capacity forecast is revised54. For
example, if a forecast of the arrival capacity indicates that (1) the future capacity will be
either high or low and (2) a revised forecast at 1500 Z will indicate which of the two will
occur; then it is not possible for a flight to depart at 1430 Z under the high-capacity
profile and 1445 Z under the low-capacity profile.
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54 §3.2.4
The Cost of a Flight Assignment
As defined in §7.1, passenger delay cost is the number of passengers on a flight
times the flight delay cost, which is a function of the airborne, ground, and cumulative
delay time that would be experienced by that flight. For a GDP subject to uncertain
arrival capacity, the objective is to minimize the total expected passenger delay cost.
Therefore, let
Cij = (q x PaxCostjq) V iE I; JE (7.07)
Where PaxCostoq represents the passenger delay that results from assigning flight i to
arrival slot j under arrival capacity profile q and p, is the likelihood of q (§3.2.1). The
value of PaxCostq, can be derived from the number of passengers and scheduled arrival
time of flight i, the scheduled landing times of slot j, and a set of flight delay cost
functions, such as those in §3.3.1, all of which are assumed to be known a priori.
Section 7.2.4 Passenger Delay Costs for the Base Case GDP
As a demonstration, the base case approach is applied to a simple, hypothetical
example. For brevity and convenience, the initial GDP that is required by the AAM is
taken from the solution to the ECM for a previous example from §3.3.3. The existing
solution to the ECM is convenient because it not only provides arrival demand and
landing times for each slot, but it also minimizes the total expected flight delay cost. As
an additional input for this example, aircraft carrier and type data are taken from the
ETMS database.
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A sample of ETMS data is shown in Figure 3-7 (page 60). The carrier of each
flight is given by the first three characters of the aircraft ID (ACID)sS . Aircraft type
(TYPE) is used to estimate the number of passengers on each flight. For this analysis,
aircraft are assumed to be 100% full, so the number of passengers on each flight is equal
to the number of seats in a typical configuration for the given aircraft type. For example,
a typical configuration of an Airbus 319 (A319) has 124 seats56. It is assumed that
airlines would have accurate passenger count data in practice.
Figure 7-3 shows the total number of aircraft and passengers by carrier. For these
data, there are 348 flights and 31 carriers. However, 262 of the scheduled flights, or
75%, are operated by only four carriers. This suggests that many of the carriers will have
little or no opportunity to swap flights. Furthermore, opportunities to reduce passenger
delays using swaps will be limited for two of the larger carriers (10A and 28A) because
they operate fleets with aircraft of uniform, or nearly uniform, size 57
Figure 7-3 also shows a summary of the aircraft and passenger delay costs by
airline, for the initial GDP as defined by the solution to the ECM. Specifically:
1. Total expected flight delay cost (in ac-units)
2. Total expected flight delay time (in ac-periods)
3. Total expected passenger delay cost (in pax-units)
4. Total expected passenger delay time (in pax-periods)
The total expected passenger delay cost of this GDP is 36,785.7 pax-units and the total
expected passenger delay time is 31,584.8 pax-periods58.
5s The true carrier identities are available in ETMS data but have been masked here by three-letter codes.
56 A complete table of passenger counts by aircraft type is provided in the appendix.
57 Recall that for this hypothetical example, all aircraft are assumed to be 100% full.
58 Delay time is measured as the total cumulative delay time.
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Figure 7-3 Total aircraft and passenger costs for the ECM
Total Exp. Flight Delay
Airline
01A
03A
08A
09A
10A
11A
12A
13A
14A
16A
17A
18A
20A
21A
24A
26A
27A
28A
34A
38A
39A
40A
43A
44A
46A
47A
48A
49A
50A
53A
54A
TOTAL
Results
Figure 7-4 (page 192) shows a summary of the delays that are assigned by the
solution to the AAM. Applying the assignment model reduces the total passenger delay
cost by 3.5% and the total passenger delay time by 4.3% across all airlines as compared
to the solution to the ECM. Furthermore, there is no change to the overall number of
flight arrivals over time as specified by the GDP. Thus, flight swaps reduce the
passenger delay cost while maintaining the same amount of aircraft delay time.
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Flig
1
1
7
34
Count of Avg. Pax
;hts Pax per Flight
38 11,119 163.5
3 298 99.3
5 290 58.0
1 150 150.0
50 2,500 50.0
2 493 246.5
1 305 305.0
1 253 253.0
2 87 43.5
1 452 452.0
1 100 100.0
2 824 68.7
4 583 145.8
2 100 50.0
3 463 154.3
2 648 324.0
1 130 130.0
59 3,587 52.0
1 50 50.0
1 305 305.0
1 524 524.0
7 350 50.0
1 50 50.0
3 407 135.7
2 310 155.0
3 355 118.3
2 976 488.0
1 335 335.0
8 1,000 55.6
P5 12,378 165.0
5 605 121.0
t8 40,027 115.0
Cost
67.0
0.2
1.2
1.0
42.5
0.0
0.0
0.0
1.3
1.3
0.0
6.5
6.0
0.7
3.7
0.2
2.2
42.5
2.2
1.2
0.0
4.8
1.3
0.0
1.5
9.7
6.5
0.0
15.9
71.9
5.2
296.5
Time
56.4
0.1
1.2
1.0
38.2
0.0
0.0
0.0
1.3
1.3
0.0
6.5
4.2
0.7
3.7
0.1
1.3
41.5
2.1
0.3
0.0
3.0
1.3
0.0
1.5
9.7
6.5
0.0
15.9
57.9
5.0
260.7
Total Exp.
Cost
10,481.3
24.8
70.0
150.0
2,125.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
61.1
587.6
0.0
434.2
916.8
35.0
571.5
24.8
286.0
2,252.1
110.0
366.0
0.0
240.0
65.0
0.0
232.5
1,128.5
3,305.2
0.0
873.0
11,882.3
563.0
36,785.7
Pax Delay
Delay
8,817.6
12.4
70.0
150.0
1,910.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
61.1
587.6
0.0
434.2
627.9
35.0
571.5
12.4
169.0
2,182.1
105.0
91.5
0.0
150.0
65.0
0.0
232.5
1,128.5
3,305.2
0.0
873.0
9,451.1
542.2
31,584.8
However, the results also show that most individual carriers do not benefit from the
opportunity to use flight swaps. Only three carriers (01A, 28A, and 53A) are able to use
swaps to reduce their passenger delay costs. Furthermore, of these, only 53A achieves a
reduction in cost that is greater than 5%59.
Figure 7-4 Aircraft and passenger costs for the ECM + AAM
Flight Delay
Time
56.4-
0.1
1.2
1.0
38.2
0.0
0.0
0.0
1.3
1.3
0.0
6.5
4.2
0.7
3.7
0.1
1.3
41.5
2.1
0.3
0.0
3.0
1.3
0.0
1.5
9.7
6.5
0.0
15.9
57.9
5.0
260.7
Cost
10,314
24
70
150
2,125
0
0
0
61
587
0
434
916
35
571
24
286
2,142
110
366
0
240
65
0
232
1,128.
3,305.
0.
873.
10,855
563.
35,482.
Total Exp. Pax Delay
Chg. Delay
.8 -1.6% 8,650.5
.8 0.0% 12.4
.0 0.0% 70.0
.0 0.0% 150.0
.0 0.0% 1,910.0
.0 0.0% 0.0
.0 0.0% 0.0
.0 0.0% 0.0
.1 0.0% 61.1
.6 0.0% 587.6
.0 0.0% 0.0
.2 0.0% 434.2
.8 0.0% 627.9
.0 0.0% 35.0
.5 0.0% 571.5
.8 0.0% 12.4
.0 0.0% 169.0
.2 -4.9% 2,072.2
.0 0.0% 105.0
.0 0.0% 91.5
.0 0.0% 0.0
.0 0.0% 150.0
.0 0.0% 65.0
.0 0.0% 0.0
.5 0.0% 232.5
.5 0.0% 1,128.5
.2 0.0% 3,305.2
.0 0.0% 0.0
.0 0.0% 873.0
.6 -8.6% 8,361.4
0 0.0% 542.2
.6 -3.5% 30,218.1
59 It should be noted that the results of the AAM represent the lower bound of passenger delays cost that is
achievable to an airline using flight swaps; if an airline selects a different set of swaps, then the reduction in
passenger delay cost will likely be less than that found by the AAM.
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Count of
Airline
01A
03A
08A
09A
10A
11A
12A
13A
14A
16A
17A
18A
20A
21A
24A
26A
27A
28A
34A
38A
39A
40A
43A
44A
46A
47A
48A
49A
50A
53A
54A
TOTAL
Flights
68
3
5
1
50
2
1
1
2
1
1
12
4
2
3
2
1
69
1
1
7
1
3
2
3
2
1
18
75
5
348
Pax
11,119
298
290
150
2,500
493
305
253
87
452
100
824
583
100
463
648
130
3,587
50
305
524
350
50
407
310
355
976
335
1,000
12,378
605
40,027
Total Exp.
Cost
67.0
0.2
1.2
1.0
42.5
0.0
0.0
0.0
1.3
1.3
0.0
6.5
6.0
0.7
3.7
0.2
2.2
42.5
2.2
1.2
0.0
4.8
1.3
0.0
1.5
9.7
6.5
0.0
15.9
71.9
5.2
296.5
Chg.
-1.9%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
-5.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
-11.5%
0.0%
-4.3%
III
Section 7.3 Passenger Interests as Represented by the Traffic Manager
The second, or alternative, approach is proposed as a contrast to the current
process and demonstrates the potential for reducing passenger delay costs if the traffic
manager were to design a GDP that minimizes passenger delay costs. As compared to
the airlines, which use flight swaps to minimize the delay costs to their own passengers,
the traffic manager could tailor the initial design and assignment of the arrival slots to
minimize the total passenger delay cost across all flights.
In order to consider passengers during the design of a GDP, it is necessary to
model delay costs as varying by flight. Unfortunately, the ECM is limited to considering
delay cost functions that are the same for all aircraft. Therefore, this section proposes a
new MIP formulation, which solves for the optimal assignment of ground delay given
cost functions that are non-linear and may also vary by aircraft. This new formulation is
applied to the same example used to demonstrate the AAM in the previous section. A
comparison of the results shows that the total expected passenger delay cost could be
significantly reduced if the traffic manager were to consider passengers during the design
of the initial program.
Section 7.3.1 The Flight-Defined Cost MIP Formulation
The model presented in this section solves the SAGHP subject to a stochastic and
dynamic arrival capacity forecast, a capacity of the airborne arrival queue, and non-linear
delay cost functions that may vary by aircraft. This formulation is very similar to the
ECM except that it enhanced in order to consider cost functions that may vary by flight;
for this reason, it is referred to as the Flight-Defined Cost Model, or "FDCM."
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The decision variables for the formulation of the FDCM are the same as those
previously defined for the ECM in §3.2.2.
dftq E{0,1} V fE F; tE r; q EQ
ftq E [0, 1] V fE F; tE •; qEQ
,fq E [0, 1] V fE F; tEr; qEQ
The variables dftq, 6fq, and Afq represent the fraction of flight f that departs, demands
arrival or lands, respectively, by time t under profile q.
The objective function and constraints (7.08) - (7.23) for the FDCM are also the
same as those in the ECM, with two key exceptions. First, the costs of cumulative,
ground, and airborne delay in constraints (7.09) - (7.13) are expressed as functions of
incremental cost parameters that are specific to each aircraft. It is assumed that these
parameters (Xf IY, atf) are provided as an input to the formulation.
The second difference is the addition of flight arrival coupling constraints (7.23),
which state that the flight arrival indicator variables for each flight must be the same
under all profiles in each scenario. For the FDCM, in which airborne delay cost may
vary by aircraft, it is possible for the optimal order of flight arrivals to depend upon the
future airport arrival capacity. Coupling constraints ensure that the decisions regarding
which flights land in each period may only consider the information that would be
available during the time period when the decision is made.
As a special case, if all aircraft have an identical, non-decreasing airborne delay
cost function, then the objective function is minimized by a first-come-first-serve arrival
order, regardless of which profile is ultimately realized. This occurs because, among the
flights in the arrival queue, the flight that has been in queue longest also has the greatest
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marginal cost of airborne delay. However, the use of flight-specific cost functions in the
FDCM means that a first-come-first-serve order may no longer minimize the total
expected delay cost. Deviation from this order in the solution to the FDCM will be
discussed further in §7.3.2.
FDCM Objective Function and Constraints
Minimizep x (CDCf + ADCfq + GDCq
T-1
CDCf = - Aftq) X X f-SATf +1
t=SATf
T +SDTf -SATf -1
GDCfq= ((- dfq) X Yt-SDT +1)
t=SDTr
T-1 T-SATf-1T-SATf-1
ADCfq= ((1- ftq)xaf-SATf+i)3-  Z fstq
t=SATf s=O t=s
(7.08)
V fE F; qEQ
V fEF; qEQ
V fE F; qEQ
Zfstq · - a-s) x 1- Af(t+SATf)q
Zfstq - a- f) x (i-- df(s+SDT )q)
V fE F; sE 0 ... T - SAT - 1; tEs...T-SATf -1; qEQ
(7.09)
(7.10)
(7.11)
(7.12)
(7.13)
dftq df(t-l)q
f(tSTE q f(t-l)q
df(tSTEf )q = 6ftq
V fE F; tE1...T; qEQ
V fE F; tE1...T; qEQ
V fE F; tESTEf...T; qEQ
V fE F; tE r; qEQ
(7.14)
(7.15)
(7.16)
(7.17)
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bftq = 0
Affq =1
(bftq - A'ftq W
F
(Aftq - Af(t-1)q) tq
F
dftq =...= dftqj
fti, = =ftq
f EF; tE1...SATf -1; qEQ
fEF; qEQ
V tE ; qCEQ
V tE r; q EQ
V fE F; bE B; q,,...,qj Eb; tE{b,...be}
V fE F; bE B; q,,...,q E b; tE{b,...b,}
Section 7.3.2 An Application of the FDCM
The FDCM is applied to the sample problem discussed in §7.2.3. For
consistency, the same experimental setup is maintained; except that the incremental delay
cost parameters now reflect the passenger delay cost. Let:
ft' =pax x ,t
Yf = paxf x y,
Spaxaf =paxfxa,
(7.24)
(7.25)
(7.26)
Note that this change is consistent with the definition of passenger delay cost in §7.1.
Results
The total expected cost of the solution to the FDCM is 24,002.6 pax-units and the
total expected passenger delay time is 17,840.6 pax-periods. These values represent a
34.8% reduction in the total passenger delay cost and a 43.5% reduction in the total
passenger delay time as compared to the solution to the ECM (Figure 7-5, page 198).
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(7.18)
(7.19)
(7.20)
(7.21)
(7.22)
(7.23)
These percentage reductions are also an order of magnitude greater than those achieved
by the combined ECM/AAM solution.
This significant reduction in total passenger delay cost may require an increase in
total flight delays and delay cost. The solution to the FDCM model is 1.1% higher in
total expected flight delay cost and 1.4% higher in total expected flight delay time
(measured as cumulative flight delay) as compared to the original ECM solution. Thus, a
GDP that is optimal in terms of passenger delay cost may assign more flight delays than
one that optimizes flight delay cost. However, for this example, the increase in flight
delay cost is small in comparison to the reduction in passenger delay cost. If the relative
difference shown for this example were to prove typical of what would occur in practice,
then the slight increase in flight delay cost might be viewed as acceptable to the airlines
and to the traffic managers.
A second issue is that the solution to the FDCM favors those airlines that operate
larger aircraft and may result in smaller cost reductions or cost increases for aircraft with
fewer passengers. For example, the FDCM increases the total expected passenger delay
cost of airline 28A by 77% over the solution to the ECM. Clearly, such an impact raises
the issue of equity for the carriers and passengers that would be disadvantaged by this
approach6o. The analysis presented in §6.4 identifies airlines as a definitive stakeholder
group, with the power to influence the FAA and to control the outcome of a GDP.
Therefore, future research should examine the salience of individual airlines and the
relative impact of equity.
60 Especially as many of the disadvantaged passengers may be connecting to other flights
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Figure 7-5 Results of the FDCM
Count of
Finally, although these results show that the FDCM may have the potential to
significantly reduce the passenger delay cost of a GDP, this has only been demonstrated
for a single, hypothetical example. Further experimentation with the FDCM should be an
area of future research. However, there are two reasons to believe that the substantial
reduction achieved by the FDCM for this example is indicative of reductions that may be
encountered in practice. First, the flight arrival demand for this example is representative
of the actual demand for a metropolitan airport (§3.3.1). Second, the strategy of giving
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Airline
01A
03A
08A
09A
10A
11A
12A
13A
14A
16A
17A
18A
20A
21A
24A
26A
27A
28A
34A
38A
39A
40A
43A
44A
46A
47A
48A
49A
50A
53A
54A
TOTAL
Flights
68
3
5
1
50
2
1
1
2
1
1
12
4
2
3
2
69
1
1
1
7
1
3
2
3
2
1
18
75
5
348
Pax
11,119
298
290
150
2,500
493
305
253
87
452
100
824
583
100
463
648
130
3,587
50
305
524
350
50
407
310
355
976
335
1,000
12,378
605
40,027
Total Exp.
Cost
26.6
0.2
1.0
0.0
84.6
0.0
0.0
0.0
4.0
0.0
0.0
5.0
4.4
1.2
0.2
0.2
2.2
83.4
4.4
0.6
0.0
17.3
1.5
0.0
0.0
7.5
2.4
0.0
18.0
31.7
3.4
299.8
Flight Delay
Time
13.6
0.1
1.0
0.0
84.2
0.0
0.0
0.0
4.0
0.0
0.0
4.9
2.6
1.2
0.1
0.1
1.3
83.2
4.4
0.2
0.0
17.3
1.5
0.0
0.0
7.4
1.4
0.0
17.8
14.8
3.2
264.3
Cost
4,099.6
24.E
50.C
0.C
4,230.(
0.c
0.C
O.0
192.2
0.c
0.C
272.4
706.2
60.(
31.0
24.8
286.C
3,976.9
220.(
183.(
0.c
865.C
75.C
0.C
0.C
862.5
1,243.2
O.C
944.(
5,276.4
379.
24,002.(
Total Exp. Pax Delay
Chg. Delay
-61% 2,090.9
0% 12.4
-29% 50.0
-100% 0.0
+99% 4,210.0
0% 0.0
0% 0.0
0% 0.0
+215% 192.2
-100% 0.0
0% 0.0
-37% 264.6
-23% 417.3
+71% 60.0
-95% 15.5
0% 12.4
0% 169.0
+77% 3,962.9
+100% 220.0
-50% 61.0
0% 0.0
+260% 865.0
+15% 75.0
0% 0.0
0 -100% 0.0
5 -24% 851.0
-62% 726.4
0 0% 0.0
0 +8% 930.0
4 -56% 2,296.2
3 -33% 358.8
6 -34.8% 17,840.6
Chg.
-76%
0%
-29%
-100%
+120%
0%
0%
0%
+215%
-100%
0%
-39%
-34%
+71%
-97%
0%
0%
+82%
+110%
-33%
0%
+477%
+15%
0%
-100%
-25%
-78%
0%
+7%
-76%
-34%
-43.5%
preference to larger aircraft is used in practice on a smaller scale; airlines often postpone
or cancel flights with fewer passengers in order to reduce delays to larger aircraft.
Section 7.4 Conclusions
The experiment presented in this chapter tests the hypothesis that the passenger
delay cost of a GDP could be reduced if passengers were to be considered by the traffic
manager during the initial assignment of ground delay. Two different approaches are
presented for reducing the total expected passenger delay cost. The first uses a two-step
process that initially assigns ground delays in order to minimize the total expected flight
delay cost and then uses flight swaps to minimize the total passenger delay cost of each
airline. This approach is based on current practice, in which the airlines are assumed to
consider the needs of passengers, and uses two models, the ECM and AAM, to identify
the optimal assignment of delay in each step.
The second approach is an alternative to current practice and assumes that the
traffic manager would consider passengers directly during the design of a program. This
approach minimizes the total expected passenger delay cost in a single step with a new
model, the FDCM. When applied to a simple, hypothetical example, the second, or
alternate, approach achieves a much greater reduction in passenger delay cost than is
possible given the first approach (Figure 7-6, page 200). However, the second approach
may increase the delay costs to some airlines and would require changes to the policies
underlying the current process by which GDPs are designed and implemented in practice.
This section examines the practicality of a passenger-optimal GDP and suggests areas for
future research.
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Figure 7-6 A comparison of two approaches that reduce passenger delay cost.
ECM ECM + AAM % Chg FDCM % Chg
I I I I I I
Flight Cost (ac-units) 296.5 296.5 + 0.0% 299.8 + 1.1%
Flight Delay (ac-periods) 260.7 260.7 + 0.0% 264.3 + 1.4%
..................... ..........................................................  . . . . . . . . . .... ....... ...
Pax Cost (pax-units) 36,785.7 35,482.6 -3.5% 24,002.6 -34.8%
Pax Delay (pax-periods) 31,584.8 30,218.1 -4.3% 17,840.6 -43.5%
...... . ......... . . ... ... ........... ........ .. .. . . ...... ............. ... ............ .................. .  ..... ..............................................................................................
Section 7.4.1 Implications of the FDCM for the Design of GDPs in Practice
The experimental results suggest that if passenger delay cost is considered during
the initial design of a GDP by the traffic manager, then there is the potential for a
significant reduction in the total expected passenger delay cost. However, the alternative
approach requires several key assumptions regarding the design of GDPs that might
preclude its use in practice.
First, by considering passengers, a traffic manager would give preference to
airlines that fly larger aircraft. For the example shown earlier, this preference offers
significant benefits to airlines 01A and 53A, both of which achieve a greater than 75%
reduction in passenger delay cost, at the expense of those that fly smaller aircraft, such as
10A and 28A. This preference is contrary to the current design of GDPs, which assumes
that all of the non-exempted aircraft should be treated equally.
Existing work in the SAGHP literature on equity by Vossen (2002), Vossen and
Ball (2003), and Mukherjee (2004), is consistent with this assumption and measures the
"fairness" of a GDP with reference to the amount of ground delay that is assigned to
flights. However, defining equity only in terms of assigned ground delay does not
capture many elements of the problem, some of which were brought to light by the
stakeholder analysis in Chapter Six. Therefore, it is strongly suggested that further
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research on the equity of GDPs be conducted. A possible starting point might be to
extend the stakeholder analysis in the previous chapter to determine the salience of
individual airlines and the relative cost or benefit to these airlines of considering
passenger costs during the design of a GDP. Additional work might also consider equity
in regards to other stakeholder groups, such as passenger market segments, airports, local
communities, etc.
Second, as previously noted, the solution to the FDCM may deviate from the first-
come-first-serve (FCFS) order assumed by prior SAGHP models. As part of the optimal
solution, the FDCM specifies the order in which flights should arrive: flights with more
passengers may be permitted to jump ahead of smaller aircraft in the arrival queue.
Although flight arrivals, in practice, may not always occur in FCFS order, the policies of
air traffic control may preclude the preferential treatment suggested by the solution. For
the example discussed in this chapter, the optimal solution to the FDCM assigns an FCFS
arrival order to all but four aircraft. However, as the model is only demonstrated for a
single example, it is not known whether this is the norm or an exception. Therefore,
further research should be conducted to test the effects of the non-FCFS assumption and
ascertain its practicality.
In conclusion, this chapter suggests that significant reductions in passenger delay
cost could be achieved if the traffic manager were to consider passengers during the
initial assignment of flight delays. However, in order to achieve these reductions in
practice, the benefits offered to other powerful stakeholders, such as airlines, would need
to offset the costs. Further research is necessary to identify how the changes suggested
by the FDCM would impact different stakeholders and the salience of each stakeholder in
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the design of a GDP. As a final thought, given the billions of dollars spent annually on
increasing the capacity of the NAS, if a large reduction in passenger delays is possible
with the existing capacity of the system, there is reason to believe that such change could
be achieved. At the very least, even if the barriers to change are too difficult to
overcome, the FDCM could be used to inform the FAA and other stakeholders of the
hidden cost of these barriers.
Section 7.4.2 Thoughts on Directing the Development of Future SAGHP Models
The role of Chapter Seven is two-fold. Inasmuch as the analysis presented here
demonstrates how the cost of delays to passengers could be considered during the design
of a GDP, this chapter also ties the stakeholder analysis presented in Chapter Six to the
more quantitative concepts discussed earlier in the thesis. The FDCM is built upon the
ECM, itself an extension of earlier SAGHP models. However, while the advances made
by each successive generation of models has been toward reflecting more accurately the
realities of GDPs as currently practiced - from uncertainty, to dynamics, to models of
cost - the FDCM is, intentionally, less tied to existing assumptions about GDPs.
Specifically, the purpose of the FDCM is to test a fundamental assumption that is
inherent to the current design of GDPs in practice. By allowing delay costs to vary by
aircraft, passenger delay costs can be considered directly by the traffic manager during
the design of a program. The motivation for this test is provided by an analysis of the
stakeholders of a GDP, which identifies passengers as a dependent stakeholder. Moving
forward, the results of the FDCM suggest that further research should be conducted to
examine the salience of individual airlines and classes of passengers. And, as a result of
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this work, it may be possible to further tailor how passengers are considered in order to
benefit passengers while not affecting significantly the benefits that other stakeholders
derive from the use of GDPs.
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Chapter 8 A Summary and Conclusions
This dissertation proposes a mixed-integer programming model for solving the
single-airport ground holding problem (SAGHP) subject to a stochastic and dynamic
forecast of the airport arrival capacity. This model, the ECM, offers two features not
found in previous stochastic and dynamic SAGHP models: 1) a wider range of delay cost
functions and 2) a capacity of the airborne arrival queue. As compared to previous
models from the literature, the solution to the ECM either results in an equal or lower
cost, a smaller maximum observed arrival queue length, or both.
The motivation for these two features is to improve how SAGHP models
represent the objectives of the decision to assign ground delay as it is made in practice.
First, flight delay costs are assumed to be a non-linear function of the duration of ground,
airborne, or cumulative delay, where cumulative delay refers to the sum of ground and
airborne delay. Non-linear functions may more accurately represent costs such as flight
diversions and missed connections than functions that are strictly linear. Previous models
in the SAGHP literature that assign ground delays subject to a stochastic and dynamic
forecasts of the airport arrival capacity do not consider non-linear cumulative or airborne
delay costs.
Second, the ECM assumes that a possible objective of the design of a GDP in
practice is to avoid lengthy airborne queues. SAGHP models that assign ground delays
in order to minimize the total cost of delays to flights may permit arrival queues with
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lengths that would be unacceptable in practice. The ECM allows the traffic manager to
specify a maximum limit, or capacity, of the airborne arrival queue permitted by the
optimal solution.
After presenting the formulation of the model, the performance of the ECM is
explored by two methods. One is an analysis of the sensitivity of the solution to the ECM
to changes in the model's input parameters. The analysis identifies a relationship
between these objectives and the times at which ground delays are assigned. As shown
for a simple, hypothetical example, the total expected cost of the solution to the ECM is
much less sensitive to the time at which ground delays are initially assigned subject to an
uncertain arrival capacity forecast than to the time at which they are revised subject to
perfect information. On the other hand, ability of the model to identify solutions with
smaller arrival queues is much more sensitive of the time of the initial GDP than to
subsequent revisions.
The second method is an arrival study case study analysis, which solves the
SAGHP for a variety of arrival capacity forecasts. This analysis shows that not only can
the ECM be applied to a wide variety of arrival capacity forecasts, but that it also results
in solutions that are preferable to those of previous models in the literature. For each of
the examples, the solutions to the ECM either results in an equal or lower cost, a smaller
maximum observed arrival queue length, or both.
As an extension of the SAGHP, this dissertation also examines the design of a
GDP in practice and the salience of various stakeholder groups. Various stakeholder
groups are described and classified according to their power, legitimacy, and urgency in
regards to the design of a GDP. Airlines (ASPs) and the FAA are identified as being the
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most salient stakeholders, which is in accordance with their roles in the GDP design
process. However, passengers, are an important, but under-represented stakeholder in the
design process. Although this result may not seem surprising (to passengers), previous
SAGHP models have not considered how delays might affect passengers.
This dissertation presents a final analysis to demonstrate how passengers might be
considered during the design of a GDP. A second MIP formulation is proposed assigns
ground delays to minimize the total passenger delay cost. This formulation is applied to a
simple example and the results show that the delay cost to passengers could be reduced
by 35% if the initial assignment of ground delay were to explicitly consider passengers as
opposed to a model that only considers delay costs to aircraft.
Throughout this dissertation, various problems are identified as questions for
future research. These problems can be grouped into four general areas. First, research
could explore the properties of the ECM as a SAGHP model. Further analyses could be
conducted to explore the sensitivity of the solution to the simultaneous variation of
multiple parameters. Such an analysis would provide insight not only for the design of
GDPs in practice, but also into the time required by the ECM to find a solution. As
highlighted by Chapters Four and Five, the ECM often, but not always, yields an integer
solution when solved as an LP. Such solutions are preferable because the run time of the
model is often significantly shorter if it can be solved as an LP. Therefore, additional
research could seek to identify parameter values that are more or less likely to yield
integer solutions or to identify an alternate formulation that has a shorter run time.
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A second area of research could explore how the ECM might be used for the
design of a Ground Delay Program in practice. In particular, the ECM requires a set of
delay cost functions and an arrival capacity scenario. Further research could explore the
development of these input parameters from practical data sources. A second area related
to the application of the ECM would be to compare the solutions provide by the ECM for
those of an actual GDP.
The third area for future research would be to explore the incorporation of
additional considerations into the SAGHP. Other GHP models have looked to
incorporate flight banks, the connections made by aircraft, and the capacity of en route
sectors, etc. However, these models have generally considered deterministic or static
arrival capacities. Thus, one area would be to explore these concepts under a stochastic
and dynamic forecast and to determine their effects on the design of a GDP.
A fourth area of research is to further explore the role and relevance of various
stakeholders. The analysis presented in Chapter Six identifies that certain groups have
more salience than others. However, groups such as airlines contain many members,
each of which may play a different role. Thus, a new stakeholder analysis could explore
the salience of different airlines, passenger market segments, airports, communities, etc.
One area in which an understanding of the various stakeholders may be of special
importance is the concept of equity as applied to a GDP. Initial research in this area has
defined equity in regards to the equality of aircraft. However, the notion of equity does
not necessarily imply equality among aircraft and may also need to consider additional
stakeholder groups, as well. As an area for future work, identifying a more complete
definition of equity is of particular interest to the author of this dissertation.
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Appendix 1: Acronyms and Glossary
AAM Airline Assignment Model
ACID Aircraft ID
ADC Airborne Delay Cost
AOC Airline Operations Center
ARTCC Air Route Traffic Control Center (FAA facility)
ASP Air Transportation Service Provider
ATC Air Traffic Control
ATCSCC Air Traffic Control System Command Center (FAA facility)
ATF Aviation Trust Fund
ATFM Air Traffic Flow Management
ATM Air Traffic Management
CDC Cumulative Delay Cost
CDM Collaborative Decision Making
DP Dynamic Programming
ECM Extended Cost Model
ETMS Enhanced Traffic Management System
FAA Federal Aviation Administration
FCFS First Come First Served (order)
FSFS First Scheduled First Served (order)
FDCM Flight-Defined Cost Model
GA General Aviation
GDC Ground Delay Cost
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GDP
GHG
GHP
IP
LP
M-DM
M-DMDD
MIP
MIT
NAS
OAG
ORD
PAAR
PFC
RBS
RO-PDM
SAGHP
SCS
SFO
TM
TMU
TRACON
TSA
Ground Delay Program
Greenhouse Gas
Ground Hold Problem
Integer Program
Linear Program
Mukherjee Dynamic Model
Mukherjee Dynamic Model with Distributed Delays
Mixed-Integer Program
Miles-In-Trail
National Airspace System
Official Airline Guide
Chicago O'Hare International Airport
Planned Arrival Acceptance Rate
Passenger Facility Charge
Ration-by-Schedule
Richetta-Odoni Partially Dynamic Model
Single Airport Ground Hold Problem
Slot-Credit-Substitution
San Francisco International Airport
Traffic Manager
Traffic Management Unit
Terminal Radar Approach Control (FAA facility)
Transportation Security Administration
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Cost under a profile:
Departure queue:
Irrelevant:
Marginal cost or marginal delay:
Maximum observed arrival queue:
Maximum observed flight delay:
Profile:
Realize:
Scenario:
Scenario Tree:
Time of Perfect Information:
Total expected cost:
The cost of the solution to a model as evaluated
by the set of common cost functions in
Figure 3-08 and assuming the realization of a
particular arrival capacity profile
At a given point in time, the number of aircraft
being delayed by a GDP past their scheduled
departure time
A profile with a negligible likelihood
The observed incremental change in cost or delay
per unit of change in the independent variable
with respect to the previous trial
The maximum number of flights that would
simultaneously experience airborne delay under
any profile
The greatest amount of delay assigned to any one
flight under any profile
A set of rates that represent a time-vary airport
arrival capacity forecast
The occurrence of a particular profile
A set of mutually exclusive and collectively
exhaustive probabilistic arrival capacity profiles,
each with an associated likelihood of occurring
The set of arrival capacity scenarios that may
occur over time
The time at which the actual airport arrival
capacity, or the profile that will be realized, is
known with certainty
The sum of the costs under each profile weighted
by the profile likelihoods
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Appendix 2:
Appendix 2.1:
Model Formulations
ECM and FDCM Notation
Notation
bEB
qEQ
tET
fEF
Arrival capacity scenarios
Arrival capacity profiles
Period of times
Scheduled Flight Arrivals
Pq
Mq,
be
a,
Yi
Xi
yf
STEf
SAT E T
XMT7 E {0, 1}
The likelihood of capacity profile q
The arrival capacity of the airport under profile q at time t
The maximum allowable arrival queue under profile q at time t
The start time of scenario b
The end time of scenario b
The cost of the i h period of airborne delay
The cost of the ith period of ground delay
The cost of the ith period of cumulative delay
The cost of the ith period of airborne delay of flight f
The cost of the ih period of ground delay of flight f
The cost of the i th period of cumulative delay of flight f
The scheduled time en route of flight f
The scheduled arrival time of flight f
1 for all exempt flights, 0 otherwise
Decision Variables
dftq E (0,1)
bftq E (0,1)
A•tq E (0,1)
Zf,,q
an indicator if flight f has departed by time t in profile q
an indicator if flight f has demanded arrival by time t in profile q
an indicator if flight f has landed by time t in profile q
Helper variable to compute airborne delay costs of flight f in profile q
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ECM MIP Formulation
x(CDCfq + ADCfq + GDCj )]
3[pqYPL
T-1
CDC, = ((1- ftq) x Xt-SAT , +1)
t= SATf
T +SDTf -SATf -1
GDCjq = 1 -df ) Yt-SDTf+1t=SDT
t=SDTf
V fE F; qEQ
V fE F; qEQ
T-1
ADCf= ((I-
t= SATf
ftq) x a SATf +1) -
Zfstq (a s+ - a,s) x (1
Zfstq 5 (at-s+l
T-SATf -1 T-SATf -1
s=0 t=s
- Af(t+SAT)q)
- ap,) x (1 - df(s+sDf)q
V f E F; sE ... T- SATf -1; tE s...T-SATf -1; qEQ
dftq  df(tl)q
'ýftq 2.- f(t-1)q
df(t-STE)q = ftq
Xftq • 6 ftq
6ftq =0
Xftq
(6ftq Xftq) • W,
F
I (Xftq - f(tlz) •M
F
dftq = ... = dftqj
df•q = XMTf
V fE F; qEQ
V tE ; qEQ
V tET; qEQ
V fE F; bE B; qi,...,qj Eb; tE {bs...be} (3.15)
V f EF; qEQ
Minimize (3.01)
(3.02)
(3.03)
V fE F; qEQ (3.04)
(3.06a)
(3.06b)
V f F; tEI...T; qEQ
V fE F; tE1...T; qEQ
V fE F; tE STEf...T; q EQ
V fE F; tE r; qEQ
V fE F; tE1...SATf -1; qEQ
(3.07)
(3.08)
(3.09)
(3.10)
(3.11)
(3.12)
(3.13)
(3.14)
(3.16)
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Appendix 2.2:
A Proof of Binary Decision Variables
Claim: If there exists an optimal solution to the ECM with binary values for dftq, then
there exists an optimal solution with binary values for 6ftq and Afq.
Proof: This proof is presented in two parts, one for each of the variables.
Part I: By constraints (3.09), 6fq are fully defined by dfq and a constant, STEf. As dq
are binary for any solution by definition, 6 q, will also be binary.
Part II: For the second part of the proof, it is helpful to prove the two following lemmas:
Lemma #1: There will exist an optimal solution with an integer
number offlight arrivals in each time period.
Proof: First, as the cost of flight delay is non-negative for each
incremental period of delay, an optimal solution will utilize
arrival capacity if there is a flight that demands arrival.
Second, as the arrival demand (by Part I) and arrival capacities
are integer (by definition), the cumulative number of flight
arrivals will be integer.
1. For time periods in which the arrival capacity is sufficient to meet demand, all
eligible flights will land and the corresponding values of Afq will be 1 (and Atq
will be 0 for all other flights) (Lemma #1).
Lemma #2: Flight arrivals during each time period t and under each
profile q occur in order of decreasing marginalflight delay
cost.
Proof: If there are two flights that demand arrival but the capacity to
accommodate only one arrival, then the flight that would incur
the greater cost if delayed in the air for an (additional) period
will be assigned to arrive during time period t. If the flight
with the lower marginal delay cost arrives, instead, then it
would increase the total delay cost and the solution would not
be optimal.
2. For time periods in which the arrival capacity is insufficient to meet demand
the optimal solution will allocate available arrival capacity to those flights with
the greatest marginal delay cost (Lemma #2). Therefore, a solution can always be
found in which the arrival variables are binary.
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Appendix 2.3:
Corollary: If there exists an optimal solution to the ECM and if the incremental flight
delay cost parameters adhere to the following relationship:
a, + X, a + V n; i<j (APi.01)
then there exists an optimal solution in which flight arrivals are first-come-first
serve (FCFS).
Proof: By the previous proof, there exists an optimal solution to the ECM for which an
integer number of flights arrive during each time period (and under each profile)
and the flights that arrive during each time period are those with the greatest
marginal airborne delay cost. This solution will be consistent with a FCFS arrival
process if those flights with the greatest marginal airborne delay cost are also
those flights that entered the arrival queue earliest.
The marginal cost of flight delay to an aircraft is comprised of two cost
components, airborne delay cost and cumulative delay cost. Considering only
airborne delay cost, as the airborne delay cost function is both identical for all
aircraft and non-decreasing in the duration of delay, those flights that have been in
the arrival queue the longest are those that will incur the greater marginal
airborne delay cost.
If cumulative delay costs are include, a complication might arise if one flight has
a higher cumulative delay cost than another flight. If the additional cumulative
delay is greater than the difference in airborne delay cost, then the flights might
not arrive in FCFS order. By ensuring the relationship in APl.01, costs due to
additional cumulative delay will be less than the difference in airborne delay cost
and the optimal solution will feature FCFS flight arrivals.
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The FDCM MIP Formulation
I[Pq
Q
x (CDC,, + ADC,,
T-1
CDCfq = 1((- A) XfsATf +1)
t=SATf
+ GDCf)]
V fE F; qEQ
dftq) Y-SDT ,+1) V f F; q EQ
- A3q xaf-SAT
Zfs,- (afs,+ -a,_,) x
Zfstq +l- af_) x
T-SATf-1T-SATf -1
S YZs0 t- q
S-O tIS
V f EF; qEQ (7.11)
(7.12)
(7.13)
V fE F; sE 0...T- SATf - 1; tEs ... T- SAT, - 1; q E Q
dfq > d f(t,_q
,fq 2 rAf(t-1)q
d (t-STE)q ftq
Aftq bftq
6y, =06ftq 0
)Jfq =1I
F
I ( - Ayf(t-I)) q Mtq
F
dftq, = ... dftq
Aftq, = ... = Aftq
V fE F; qEQ
V tE r; qEQ
V tE r; qEQ
V fE F; bE B; q,,...,qj E b; tE {b...b,} (7.22)
V f E F; bE B; q,,...,qj E b; tE {b...be} (7.23)
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Minimize
GDCq
T +SDTf -SATf -1
1((-
t-SDTf
(7.08)
(7.09)
T-1
ADCf=  1
t= SATf
(7.10)
( 1- Af(t+AT )q
( - df(s+sDT,)q)
V fE F; tE 1...T; qEQ
V fE F; tE1...T; qEQ
V fE F; tE STE...T; q EQ
V fE F; tE r; qEQ
V fE F; tE1...SAT, -1; qEEQ
(7.14)
(7.15)
(7.16)
(7.17)
(7.18)
(7.19)
(7.20)
(7.21)
Appendix 2.3:
The AAM LP Formulation and Notation
Notation
Equals 1 if flight i may be assigned to slot j and 0 otherwise
The cost of assigning flight i to slot j
Decision Variables
i {o 0, i} an indicator of whether flight i is assigned to slot j
Objective Function and Constraints
Minimize: C XX,
X = 1
J
X Xij = 1
Xii < F.j
Subject To: V iElI
V jEJ
(7.03)
(7.04)
(7.05)
(7.06)V iE I; jEJ
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Appendix 2.4:
Aircraft Seats as Defined by Aircraft Type
Aircraft Count
Type of Type Seats
A318 1 107
A319 13 124 "Aircraft Type" is taken from ETMS
A320 16 150
A332 1 253 "Count of Type" refers to the number of
A333 1 335 aircraft of each type that are included in the
A343 0 295 set of 348 flights used for examples in this
B721 0 149 .
B732 1 100 thesis.
B733 24 130
B734 0 168 "Seats" refers to the total number of
B735 10 132 passenger seats in all classes in a common
B737 0 149 configuration of the aircraft.
B738 1 189 Source: en.wikipedia.org, February 17,B73C 0 189
B73F 1 189
B73J 0 189 For cases in which there are multiple
B73S 0 189 configurations, an average is used.
B741 1 452
B742 1 452
B744 3 524
B747 0 467
B752 23 200
B757 0 243
B762 1 224
B763 6 269
B767 0 304
B772 8 305
BA46 9 50
CARJ 2 50
CRJ 1 50
CRJ1 15 50
CRJ2 44 50
CRJ7 21 70
DC85 0 200
DC9 0 150
DC93 2 115
DC94 1 125
E135 12 37
E145 55 50
E170 10 78
E45X 1 50
MD10 0 150
MD11 0 323
MD80 5 155
MD82 38 152
MD83 19 155
MD90 1 153
S319 0 50
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Appendix 2.5:
Appendix 3: Detailed Results for the Sensitivity Analysis
Figure AP3-01: A summary of the input parameters used for the experiments in the
sensitivity analysis
Decision Time Incremental Delay Cost
Exp. M,,t M 2  P1 P2 Initial Revision Airborne Ground Cumulative WMAX
#1 25 Varies 0.10 0.90 1300 Z 1500 Z a t  Yt Xt 30
#2 25 0 Varies Varies 1300 Z 1500 Z a t  Yt Xt 30
#3 25 0 0.95 0.05 1300 Z 1500 Z a t  Yt Xt Varies
#4 25 0 0.90 0.10 Varies 1500 Z a t  Yt Xt 348
#5 25 0 0.90 0.10 Varies 1500 Z a t  Yt Xt Varies
#6 25 0 0.90 0.10 1300 Z Varies a t  Yt X t  30
#7 25 0 0.75 0.25 1300 Z 1500 Z a,' Yt Xt 348
#8 25 0 0.75 0.25 1300 Z 1500 Z at" Xt t 348
#9 25 0 0.75 0.25 1300 Z 1500 Z a•"' Yt Xt 348
The following pages contain the detailed experimental results.
Units for Figures
Max. Queue:
Exp. Cost, Cost:
Air, Ground Delay:
aircraft
units of cost
aircraft-periods
Run Time:
P2:
a:
seconds
likelihood of Profile #2
units of cost / change in p2
* Note, due to size, detailed results for experiment #5 are not reported in this appendix
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Figure AP3-02: Results from experiment #1
Experiment #1: Arrival Capacity Under Profile #2
Exp.
Cost
1,157.2
697.7 91.9
412.0 57.1
165.3 49.3
95.8 34.8
65.1 30.7
29.8 17.7
20.8 4.5
12.7 4.1
10.0 2.7
9.1 0.9
7.3 0.9
6.4 0.9
6.4 0.0
Profile #1 (0.10)
Air Ground Max.Cost
Delay Delay Queue
349
245
97
24
13
12
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
349
245
97
24
13
12
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
Figure AP3-03: Results from experiment #2
Experiment #2: Profile Likelihood
Exp.
P2 CCost
0.00 160.0
0.05 229.8 -62
0.10 296.5 -99
0.15 358.3 -64
0.20 416.8 -42
0.25 473.3 -16
0.30 528.9 0
0.35 584.6 0
0.40 640.2 0
0.45 695.9 0
0.50 751.5 -14
0.55 806.5 -52
0.60 858.8 -24
0.65 910.0 0
0.70 961.1 -15
0.75 1,011.5 -2
0.80 1,061.8 -4
0.85 1,111.9 -96
0.90 1,157.2 -57
0.95 1,199.7 -42
1.00 1,240.0
Cost
160
160
173
173
189
191
195
195
195
195
195
213
233
245
245
257
257
301
349
433
433
Air
Delay
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
C)C)
C)
C)
C)
C)
C)
Profile #1
Ground
Delay
160
160
173
173
189
191
195
195
195
195
195
213
233
245
245
257
257
301
349
433
433
Max.
Queue
0
0
0
0
0
0C
0C
0
0
0
0)
0
0C
0
0
0C
0
0
0C
0
0
Profile #2 (0.90)
Air Ground Max.Cost Delay Delay Queue
1,247 55 995 16
748 8 732 5
447 0 447 0
181 0 181 0
105 0 105 0
71 0 71 0
32 0 32 0
22 0 22 0
13 0 13 0
10 0 10 0
9 0 9 0
7 0 7 0
6 0 6 0
6 0 6 0
Profile #2
Cost
1,581
1,556
1,408
1,408
1,328
1,320
1,308
1,308
1,308
1,308
1,308
1,292
1,276
1,268
1,268
1,263
1,263
1,255
1,247
1,240
1,240
Air
Delay
151
134
116
116
100
98
94
94
94
94
94
86
78
74
74
71
71
63
55
48
48
Ground
Delay
899
916
934
934
950
952
956
956
956
956
956
964
972
976
976
979
979
987
995
1,002
1,002
Max.
Queue
30
30
30
30
30
30
30
30
30
30
30
28
26
25
25
24
24
20
16
16
16
M2t
0
5
10
15
17
18
20
22
24
25
26
28
29
30
Run
Time
8.71
9.07
8.35
6.63
5.34
5.25
4.67
4.34
4.32
4.22
4.17
4.21
4.18
4.19
Run
Time
9.26
6.92
7.15
7.35
7.40
7.39
7.70
7.72
7.65
7.90
8.12
8.15
7.98
7.97
8.05
8.20
8.30
8.09
8.70
9.80
10.18
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Figure AP3-04: Results from experiment #3
Experiment #3: Capacity of the Arrival Queue
Profile #1 (0.95)
Air Ground
Delay Delay
0 10
0 10
0 15
0 23
0 38
0 66
0 82
0 100
0 120
0 140
0 160
0 181
0 205
0 233
0 261
0 289
0 319
0 349
Profile #2 (0.05)
Max.
Queue
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Cost
1,934
1,934
1,907
1,871
1,820
1,764
1,738
1,690
1,644
1,598
1,556
1,513
1,460
1,415
1,373
1,331
1,289
1,247
Air
Delay
246
246
239
227
210
186
176
164
154
144
134
121
106
95
85
75
65
55
Ground
Delay
804
804
811
823
840
864
874
886
896
906
916
929
944
955
965
975
985
995
Figure AP3-05: Results from experiment #4
Experiment #4: Time of the Initial Decision to Implement a Program
Exp. Cum.
Cost A%
200.4
200.6 0.1%
200.8 0.2%
201.6 0.6%
201.8 0.7%
202.4 1.0%
203.4 1.5%
203.9 1.7%
205.1 2.3%
Cost
25
24
23
19
18
10
10
10
10
Profile #1 (0.90)
Ai
Del
Profile #2 (0.10)
Ground Max.
ay Delay Queue
o 25 0 1,779
0 24 0 1,790
0 23 0 1,801
0 19 0 1,845
0 18 0 1,856
0 10 0 1,934
0 10 0 1,944
0 10 0 1,949
0 10 0 1,961
60
56
52
48
44
40
38
36
34
32
30
28
26
24
22
20
18
16
15
Exp.
Cost
106.2
106.2
109.6
115.4
127.1
150.9
164.8
179.5
196.2
212.9
229.8
247.6
267.8
292.1
316.6
341.1
367.5
393.9
Infeasible
Cost
10
10
15
23
38
66
82
100
120
140
160
181
205
233
261
289
319
349
Max.
Queue
56
56
52
48
44
40
38
36
34
32
30
28
26
24
22
20
18
16
Run
Time
5.71
5.76
5.64
5.72
6.40
6.96
7.17
6.95
6.79
6.94
6.87
7.05
7.18
7.29
7.08
7.03
7.22
7.41
Time
1300 Z
1315Z
1330 Z
1345 Z
1400 Z
1415Z
1430 Z
1445 Z
1500 Z
Air
Delay
225
226
227
231
232
246
248
249
253
Ground
Delay
825
824
823
819
818
804
802
801
797
Max.
Queue
54
54
54
54
54
56
58
59
60
Run
Time
5.72
5.35
5.02
4.71
4.52
4.08
3.88
3.65
3.57
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Profile 
#2 (0.05)
Air
Del•
Figure AP3-06: Results from experiment #6
Experiment #6: Time of the Revision
Exp. A%
Cost
133.0
138.8 4%
152.6 10%
160.0 5%
172.6 8%
203.0 18%
243.8 20%
274.1 12%
296.5 8%
409.2 38%
565.4 38%
660.2 17%
664.1 1%
Cost
10
15
19
23
38
71
116
149
173
299
473
577
577
Profile #1 (0.90)
Air Ground
Delay Delay
0 10
0 15
0 19
0 23
0 38
0 71
0 116
0 149
0 173
0 299
0 473
0 577
0 577
Max.
Queue
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Profile #2 (0.10)
Cost
1,240
1,253
1,355
1,393
1,384
1,391
1,394
1,400
1,408
1,401
1,397
1,409
1,448
Air
Delay
48
53
89
87
100
99
102
108
116
109
105
117
146
Ground
Delay
1,002
997
961
963
950
951
948
942
934
941
945
933
904
Figure AP3-07: Results from experiment #7
Experiment #7: Maximum Incremental Airborne Delay Cost
A Exp.
Cost
1.00 331.5
2.00 368.5
3.00 401.5
4.00 411.5
5.00 421.0
6.00 422.8
7.00 424.5
8.00 426.3
9.00 428.0
10.00 429.8
15.00 438.5
25.00 456.0
35.00 473.5
45.00 491.0
55.00 508.5
Cost
12
17
60
65
71
71
71
71
71
71
71
71
71
71
71
Profile #1 (0.75)
Air Ground
Delay Delay
0 12
0 17
0 60
0 65
0 71
0 71
0 71
0 71
0 71
0 71
0 71
0 71
0 71
0 71
0 71
Profile #2 (0.25)
Max.
Queue
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Cost
1,290
1,423
1,426
1,451
1,471
1,478
1,485
1,492
1,499
1,506
1,541
1,611
1,681
1,751
1,821
Air
Delay
240
230
178
172
165
165
165
165
165
165
165
165
165
165
165
Ground
Delay
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Figure AP3-08: Results from experiment #8
Experiment #8: Incremental Airborne Delay Cost (Multiplicative)
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Figure AP4-09: Results from experiment #9
Experiment #9: Incremental Airborne Delay Cost (Additive)
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Appendix 4: Arrival Capacity Profiles and Scenario Trees
Figure AP4-01: Scenario for Case #1
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Figure AP4-03: Case #2 Arrival Capacity Profiles
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Figure AP4-04: Case #2 Arrival Capacity Scenario Tree
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Figure AP4-05: Case #3 Scenario Tree
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Figure AP4-07: Scenario for Cases #5/6
30
i I t i
t I .f! I t .
! i :!r
t
!
1 !
.L .. .. 4 . .. J . ... .
1500 Z storm (20%)
- - - -1530 Z storm (20%)
- -- - - 1600 Z storm (20%)
- -- -1630 Z storm (20%)
....... 1700 Z storm (20%)
1900 Z 2000 Z
Figure AP4-08: Case #5 Scenario Tree
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Figure AP4-10: Scenario for Cases #7/8
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Figure AP4-11: Scenario Tree for Case #7
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Appendix 5: Stakeholder Analysis Supplemental Figures
Figure AP5-01: Stakeholder relationships, Air Transportation Service Providers
Relationship Air Transportation Service Air Transportation Service
Provider provides (to) Provider receives (from)
Airports Rent and usage fees Essential air transport facility
Infrastructure (and financing services/infrastructure
for construction) 1 Access to passengers
Access to passengers
Business Direct revenue Miscellaneous business
Indirect revenue via: services and products
Transportation services Fares and service fees
Promise of future service
Access to passengers
FAA Information/Feedback Industry regulation,
Info (e.g. flight plans, certification, and oversight
schedules, status) Essential flight services:
Information for use in Air Air Traffic Control
Traffic Control (e.g. ride Communication
reports) Navigation
Finance Airspace management
(via Aviation Trust Fund)
Federal Government Taxes Threat of economic
(via Treasury) regulation
Federal lobby Security (e.g. TSA)
(via lobbying organizations) General services
Local/Regional/State Tax and other incentives
Government Employment base
General services
Passengers Transportation services Fares and service fees
Promise of future service Information/Feedback
Amenities and information (direct/indirect)
Contractual obligation
Society Wages Labor
Environmental pollution
(noise, particulates, GHG)
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Figure AP5-02: Stakeholder relationships, Airports
Relationship Airport(s) provides (to) Airport(s) receives (from)
Air Transportation Essential air transport facility Rent and usage fees
Service Providers services/infrastructure Infrastructure (and financing
(ASPs) Access to passengers for construction) 1
Access to passengers
Business Revenue Miscellaneous business
Access to airlines services and products
Access to passengers Revenue (rent, other)
Access to air transportation
FAA Industry regulation,
certification, and oversight
Navigational services
Grants in Aid (for safety,
capacity, security) 2
Federal Government Taxes Threat of regulation and
(via Treasury) oversight (e.g. TSA)
Critical infrastructure General services
(i.e. national security)
Local/Regional/State Revenue 3 (taxes, other) Appointments (mandate)
Government Local infrastructure
Financing for construction
Passengers Essential facility services Revenue (PFC, taxes, fees)
Access to air transportation
Amenities, concessions, and
parking
Society Wages Labor
Environmental pollution
(noise, particulates, GHG)
Information (official reports)
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Figure AP5-03: Stakeholder relationships, Business
237
Relationship Business provides (to) Business receives (from)
Air Transportation Miscellaneous business Direct revenue
Service Providers services and products Indirect revenue via:
(ASPs) Fares and service fees Transportation services
Promise of future service
Access to passengers
Airports Miscellaneous business Revenue
services and products Access to airlines
Revenue (rent, other) Access to passengers
Access to air transportation
FAA Miscellaneous business Revenue
services and products
Federal Government Goods and services Revenue
Taxes General services
(via Treasury) Threat of regulation and
Federal lobby oversight
(via lobbying organizations)
Local/Regional/State Taxes General services
Government Goods and services Revenue
Public (local) infrastructure
Passengers Wages Labor
Goods and services Revenue
Society Wages Labor
Goods and services Revenue
Figure AP5-04: Stakeholder relationships, FAA
Relationship FAA provides (to) FAA receives (from)
Air Transportation Industry regulation, Information/Feedback
Service Providers certification, and oversight Info (e.g. flight plans,
(ASPs) Essential flight services: schedules, status)
Air Traffic Control Information for use in Air
Communication Traffic Control (e.g. ride
Navigation reports)
Airspace management Finance
(via Aviation Trust Fund)
Airports Industry regulation,
certification, and oversight
Navigational services
Grants in Aid (for safety,
capacity, security) 2
Business Revenue Miscellaneous business
services and products
Federal Government Tool for policy Operational budget and laws
implementation regarding Aviation Trust
Information (official reports) Fund 5
FAA appointments (mandate)
Local/Regional/State
Government
Passengers Revenue
(via Aviation Trust Fund) 6
Society Wages Labor
Mitigation of pollution
externalities
Information (official reports)
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Figure AP5-05: Stakeholder relationships, Federal Government
Relationship Federal Government Federal Government
provides (to) receives (from)
Air Transportation Threat of economic regulation Taxes
Service Providers Security (e.g. TSA) (via Treasury)
(ASPs) General services Federal lobby
(via lobbying organizations)
Airports Threat of regulation and Taxes
oversight (e.g. TSA) (via Treasury)
General services Critical infrastructure
(i.e. national security)
Business Revenue Goods and services
General services Taxes
Threat of regulation and (via Treasury)
oversight Federal lobby
(via lobbying organizations)
FAA Operational budget and laws Tool for policy
regarding Aviation Trust implementation
Fund ' Information (official reports)
FAA appointments (mandate)
Local/Regional/State
Government
Passengers Security (e.g. TSA) Revenue ("September 11th
Security Fee" 7)
Society General services Taxes
(via Treasury)
Votes (feedback/mandate)
Federal lobby
(via lobbying organizations)
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Figure AP5-06: Stakeholder relationships, Local/Regional/State Government
Relationship Local/Regional/State Local/Regional/State
Government provides (to) Government receives (from)
Air Transportation Tax and other incentives
Service Providers Employment base
(ASPs) General services
Airports Appointments (mandate) Revenue 3 (taxes, other)
Local infrastructure
Financing for construction
Business General services Taxes
Revenue Goods and services
Public (local) infrastructure
FAA
Federal Government
Passengers Travelers assistance and Revenue (fees, taxes)
general information
Public (local) infrastructure
Society General services Taxes
Public (local) infrastructure Votes (feedback/mandate)
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Figure AP5-07: Stakeholder relationships, Passengers
241
Relationship Passengers provides (to) Passengers receives (from)
Air Transportation Fares and service fees Transportation services
Service Providers Information/Feedback Promise of future service
(ASPs) (direct/indirect) Amenities and information
Contractual obligation
Airports Revenue (PFC, taxes, fees) Essential facility services
Access to air transportation
Amenities, concessions, and
parking
Business Labor Wages
Revenue Goods and services
FAA Revenue
(via Aviation Trust Fund) 6
Federal Government Revenue ("September 1 1th Security (e.g. TSA)
Security Fee" 7)
Local/Regional/State Revenue (fees, taxes) Travelers assistance and
Government general information
Public (local) infrastructure
Society <Passengers are a part of <Passengers are a part of
society> society>
Figure AP5-08: Stakeholder relationships, Society
Relationship Society provides (to) Society receives (from)
Air Transportation Labor Wages
Service Providers Environmental pollution
(ASPs) (noise, particulates, GHG)
Airports Labor Wages
Environmental pollution
(noise, particulates, GHG)
Information (official reports)
Business Labor Wages
Revenue Goods and services
FAA Labor Wages
Mitigation of negative
externalities
Information (official reports)
Federal Government Taxes General services
(via Treasury)
Votes (feedback/mandate)
Federal lobby
(via lobbying organizations)
Local/Regional/State Taxes General services
Government Votes (feedback/mandate) Public (local) infrastructure
Passengers <Passengers are a part of <Passengers are a part of
society> society>
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Stakeholder Relationships, Notes
1: San Francisco Chronicle, 4/1/04; "Airline granted a break UAL given OK to cut
payments on SFO bond issue"
2: FAA Budget in Brief, 2008, p. 7
3: San Francisco International Airport Operating Budget FY 2006-7
4: http://www.faa.gov
5:http://www.faa.gov/airports_airtraffic/trust_fund/; 10/20/07
6: AATF funding provided by passenger ticket and jet fuel taxes
7: Aviation and Transportation Security Act passed Nov. 19th 2001;
http://www.dot.gov/affairs/dot13001.htm 10/20/07
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